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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Daniel Brian Andersen 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Political Science 
 
September 2012 
 
Title: From Deliberation to Dialogue: The Role of the I-Thou in Democratic Experience 
 
 
This dissertation argues for a dialogic grounding for deliberative democracy. 
Building on Habermasian theories of communication and discourse, deliberative 
democrats think better (more just, fair, and rational) democratic politics is possible 
because communication itself (in whatever form it takes) provides the legitimate 
mechanism for the transformation of citizens’ opinions and political will. However, this 
is a problematic foundation for unleashing the normative potential inherent in citizen 
engagement. There are good reasons to suspect that a politics based in rational 
communication cannot actually produce the kinds of changes deliberativists insist are 
possible. Practical limitations of scale and scope make deliberative democracy difficult to 
envision. And the Habermasian claim about the inherent rationality in communication is 
challenged by postmodern notions of language and by conceptions of the embodied 
processes of reasoning. However, there is another normative foundation hinted at within 
the deliberative literature. Some theorists gesture toward a theory of transformation 
rooted more directly in the experiences associated with interpersonal relations, rather than 
in the language that is exchanged within these interactions. 
 Following this lead, I turn to the work of Martin Buber to outline a dialogic theory 
that can better explain the intuitive sense that when citizens meet and speak, they are (at 
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least potentially) opened up to new understandings. This theory, based in Buber’s “I-
Thou relation” and conception of “genuine dialogue,” offers an account of the 
phenomenon located in an interpersonal relation of a particular type in which partners in 
dialogue are opened up to one another. I argue that a politics rooted in this dialogic 
experience provides a better account of the transformative potential in citizen 
engagement. Building on this new orientation towards dialogue, I then demonstrate some 
practical institutional innovations that are well equipped to take advantage of a politics 
anchored in dialogue. Along these lines, the dissertation culminates in a discussion of the 
Restorative Listening Project in Portland, Oregon, where dialogic meeting was a central 
focus of the institution’s efforts to deal with the problem of gentrification in the city’s NE 
neighborhoods.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The argument in this dissertation unfolds, bit by bit, over the course of 4 chapters. 
As such, I think it will be helpful to offer an introduction that lays out clearly what this 
project is aiming to accomplish. In one sentence: this project is about bringing a Buberian 
theory of dialogue to bear on deliberative democratic politics. Allow me to explain 
further. 
Few outside the academy offer much hope for political discourse as a means to 
more just and fair democratic procedures. We live in an increasingly polarized age, so the 
story goes. And the possibility that we might bridge our differences and solve common 
problems by meeting and speaking to one another is often dismissed as utopian. But over 
the last 20 years, the deliberative democrats have invested a great deal of energy in a 
project with exactly these hopes. Unlikely as it may seem, I believe that they have more 
than a plausible defense of this hope. For one, some deliberative institutional designs 
have shown encouraging results for overcoming deep polarization and disrespect. Not 
always, of course, but sometimes. Successful results from Deliberative Opinion Polls, 
Citizens’ Juries, and local community dialogue projects across the country suggest that 
when people meet and speak, they can truly find their opinions and wills transformed.1 
Direct engagement between citizens seems to have real potential to overcome the divides 
that fuel our pessimism.  
That is why I want to put myself, broadly speaking, in league with the 
deliberativists. I share with many deliberative theorists the intuitive sense that meeting 
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and speaking to other citizens has real, tangible benefits to our democracy. But it 
becomes more difficult to side with deliberativists when their theoretical project is more 
closely examined. Whereas deliberation in practice often looks promising, deliberation in 
theory disappoints in a few key ways. It is hard to find a strong link between what the 
theory of deliberation suggests is at the base of the transformative possibilities of 
discourse (in particular, rational communication) and what our experiences of ‘on the 
ground’ deliberation are like. The first chapter tries to detail this normative core of 
deliberative theory and why it ultimately fails to give us a good account of the normative 
potential that exists in citizens’ engagement with one another. 
The normative possibilities inherent in deliberation are connected to the 
possibility of legitimate personal transformation. A process of deliberation (which 
produces such changes) makes democracy better – more fair and more just. And the core 
of the deliberative theory places the possibility for transformation squarely on the work 
that the process of rational communication can accomplish. This gets stated in a variety 
of ways, if it gets stated at all (often it is simply not spelled out). But the upshot is almost 
universally the same: it is through the nature of the communication itself, that is, through 
rational exchange (or something approximating it) that we can improve democracy by 
providing a legitimate mechanism for transforming opinions and wills of citizens towards 
these better ends. This is a Habermasian foundation, though as I lay out in the first 
chapter, it comes from a particular reading of Habermas that draws most heavily on his 
work on discourse ethics. I remain open to the possibility that Habermas might have been 
taken in a different direction. In fact, subsequent chapters of this project could, I think, be 
reframed as being fully in line with the spirit of Habermas’s overall project (although this 
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would be to discount the direction he himself took towards a further development of 
rational processes of communication for “discursive” democracy). However, the 
particular Habermasian foundation of a rational process of communication has not 
heretofore been challenged.  
The second chapter works through Habermas and the dominant “uptake” of his 
project in order to lay bare its normative core. I then conclude the chapter with a critical 
treatment of this normative core along two lines. First, there are practical critiques that 
put into question the workability of this normative core of rational exchange for 
contemporary democracy. These criticisms do not question the plausibility of this 
transformative possibility located in communication of the right sort, per se. Rather, 
difficulties in instituting deliberation, or the limitations of particular conceptions of what 
counts as proper deliberation make the model inherently limited. Deliberativists have 
offered a number of responses to this line of critique (the expansion of ‘allowable’ 
communicative types, institutional innovations to produce more inclusive debate, etc.). 
But the thrust of the critiques remain. Retaining a normative core of rational 
communication means constantly having to reconsider the boundaries of what properly 
rational communication looks like and how the procedures for putting it in the service of 
better democracy are to take shape. Second, there are what I term ‘ontological’ critiques 
of deliberative democracy that get at the heart of what makes the deliberative project 
work – the very possibility that through communication with one another we might 
unleash a more just, fair, and rational politics. On these accounts, language and 
communication are either antithetical to ‘better’ outcomes, or are at least limited in their 
ability to cut through complicated brain/body processes of reasoning, limiting any hope 
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for beneficial transformation for deliberating citizens. These are the more difficult 
criticisms, I argue, because they are not simply addressed by creative institutional 
designs, or more expansive notions of communication that can count as deliberative. 
Instead, the very possibility of better democracy through engagement is questioned, and 
the intuition that there is value in the meeting and speaking together of citizens is put into 
serious doubt. 
But this critical chapter is followed by a return to Habermas and the deliberative 
literature to look for an alternative account of the normative value of citizen engagement 
that is different from this usual tie to rational communication. To do this I first explore a 
critique of Habermas by Axel Honneth that suggests locating normative possibilities in 
interpersonal relations in particular (versus the nature of communication that unfolds in 
these interactions). When we begin to look at these relations themselves, we may see a 
different normative foundation for the kinds of transformations necessary for a 
deliberative democratic project to work. Indeed, I think several deliberative theorists have 
gestured toward just such a possibility. The third chapter discusses four such theorists: 
Nancy Fraser, Iris Young, Jane Mansbridge, and James Fishkin. Each of these theorists 
have pointed, although without a clear theory to guide them, to something that looks 
closer to creating opportunities for dialogue than it does relying on rational 
communication. Fraser’s efforts point to the construction of spaces within the public 
sphere where one can speak and be heard in one’s own idiom and style. Such spaces are 
meant to secure a kind of deliberation that does not only operate through exclusionary 
(white, masculinist) language and style. It is, I argue, a call for spaces that facilitate 
meaningful connection between partners in communication, not simply rational give and 
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take of information and/or arguments. Similarly, Iris Young (despite her criticisms of 
face-to-face politics) gestures towards the importance of expansive types of 
communication and the creation of spaces for meaningful interpersonal interaction in her 
own contributions to democratic theory. Jane Mansbridge discusses the importance of 
“everyday” talk as a means to facilitating better deliberation through the decidedly non-
deliberative interactions that happen (say, between two friends in a hallway) outside of 
the formal deliberative arena. These conversations can be impactful exactly because they 
unfold in a direct, unreserved way that is otherwise restricted by the requirements of 
formal deliberation. Finally, James Fishkin has shown that his Deliberative Opinion Polls 
produce the most significant change of opinions in the small-group discussion portion. In 
a response to some critics, Fishkin provided anecdotes of moments of meeting between 
participants that had immense impact on particular participants and facilitated the 
transformation of their opinions and wills. As such, even in these quite purposefully 
designed institutions, the most transformative potential resides in the particular meetings 
and interactions between participants face-to-face with one another.   
All of these point to an interpersonal interaction that is communicative, and yet is 
also about something more clearly related to a space for a meaningful relation between 
speaker and hearer to unfold. I argue that this is a dialogic theory of transformation, far 
more than a deliberative one. The transformative potential in these particular sorts of 
relations seem to be doing a great deal of work for these theorists (while deliberation, 
properly speaking, is not). But they have not sufficiently traced out what work in 
particular, and how or why it benefits democracy (through better deliberation or 
otherwise). Thus I rely on them only to show that a space has already been opened up for 
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a theory of dialogue to serve as a normative foundation for a democratic politics. The 
fourth chapter, then, provides this foundation through the work of Martin Buber. 
The fourth chapter has two major things to accomplish. First, because Martin 
Buber has been unfortunately absent from the democratic theory literature (and political 
theory literature more broadly), the chapter seeks to introduce his work and point out its 
relevance to the deliberative democratic literature. This requires some background and a 
careful treatment of some of his works on dialogue. But more than this, I seek to utilize 
Buber’s theory of dialogue (as presented in his I and Thou and in later works under the 
label of “genuine dialogue”) as a normative foundation for democratic politics based in 
citizen engagement. Allow me to run through this argument briefly, though it will 
invariably be a bit vague outside of the discussion that unfolds within that chapter. 
The most important element of Buber’s dialogic theory for my purposes is that it 
is a phenomenological account of the relation between two (or more) interlocutors. This 
is a crucial contrast with the Habermasian-influenced deliberative theory where the 
medium of language itself contains the transformative possibilities “in between” two 
interlocutors, properly oriented towards reaching understanding. With Buber we get an 
account of the phenomenon of this turning towards one another that explains our being 
opened up to transformation through our co-participation with this particular other, rather 
than remove the transformative potential to the medium of language used “correctly.” 
When we are turned towards an other as a Thou, in their fullness, rather than as some 
collection of Its (particular qualities), we put ourselves in reciprocal relation to this other. 
And, if they are similarly turned towards us, a space is opened up between us that 
becomes constitutive of each of us going forward. That is, the turning itself becomes the 
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prerequisite for potential transformation through engagement. The very presence of the 
other becomes a potential catalyst for change apart from what is said (though what is said 
will still very often matter in this dialogic turning, to be sure). It is an account that better 
fits that feeling we have of being “moved” by an interaction to new considerations about 
ourselves, others, and the world. As such, I argue a politics “anchored in dialogue” is a 
better normative foundation than a politics rooted in particular sorts of communication 
apart from this relation.  
I argue that this move away from practices of communication toward a 
phenomenal experience of dialogue has five principle advantages for deliberative 
democracy over the typical Habermasian orientation: it escapes an over-reliance on 
communication in favor of something within our experience; it gives an account of 
“fruitfulness” (potential for transformation through interpersonal interaction) with or 
without deliberation; it better understands the significance of otherness in a particular 
way – this other here before me, rather than a generalized other holding a argument to 
which I respond; it holds mutual recognition between partners as central to the very 
experience of being in a dialogue and makes that central to the very act of turning 
towards this other; and finally, it better explains the nature of reciprocity and mutuality 
from within such a relation (and how it functions to open us up to transformation), as 
opposed to assuming that these are features inherent in particular kinds of 
communication.  
These advantages get spelled out in more detail in the fourth chapter. But they are 
all a function of a reorientation towards the shared experience of dialogic relation – an I-
Thou experience between partners – rather than a product of rational language use. I 
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finish this chapter by discussing the criticisms of the typical normative core of 
deliberation (practical and ontological), judging dialogue to fare at least as well on the 
practical criticisms and better in relation to the ontological criticisms. I also acknowledge 
some concerns inherent in this turn towards dialogue. Notably, the spontaneous nature of 
I-Thou relation (or, at least the lack of guarantee of its occurrence) means that there lacks 
the normative certainty one could have if they trusted in the inherent rationality of 
communication used properly. Of course, I do not actually think deliberation can deliver 
on any guarantee in the first place, making this less worrisome than it may appear. 
Further, it is also possible that bringing people into direct contact will worsen relations. 
But so it is for deliberation, traditionally conceived. Finally, there is a concern that a turn 
towards dialogue is, in effect, a turn towards small-scale, face-to-face (read: the wrong 
scale for complex de-centered modern democracies) politics. But this objection is 
drastically overstated. The deliberativists already have an answer to this objection (in 
terms of the link-up between mini-publics and the larger public), and there is much that 
can be done in terms of institutional arrangements to facilitate the link between small-
scale, face-to-face politics and “larger” democratic politics. But this will look somewhat 
different when a politics anchored in dialogue is considered rather than a typical 
deliberative politics. Sorting out what sort of institutional arrangements make sense for a 
politics anchored in dialogue is the work of the fifth chapter. 
In many ways, the fifth chapter begins with a similar observation as the third – 
that dialogue is already an implicitly relied upon by deliberative theorists. There has been 
an intuitive sense by those interested in deliberation “on the ground” that there is great 
value in putting people into direct contact with only basic ground rules to facilitate 
 9 
 
 
successful deliberation. Thus many institutional designs already incorporate the insights 
of a dialogic theory, even if they have arrived there as a matter of practicality. People are 
more open to personal transformation when confronted directly with the presence of an 
other. As such, good deliberation seems to require building in such opportunities for 
small groups where direct engagement (and, I argue, the potential for dialogic relations) 
is increased. All the better for a dialogic theory of politics to see that it has already been 
effectively put into practice. In addition, there have been some institutional designs that 
do not fit within the designs typically associated with the deliberative literature, and yet 
are still politically valuable designs.  
By way of an example of the value of a non-deliberative institutional 
arrangement, I conclude by examining an institution designed to deal with racialized 
tensions in NE Portland stemming from a process of gentrification. The Restorative 
Listening Project was designed with the principles of restorative justice (like those 
utilized by Truth and Reconciliation Committees, such as the one in South Africa) in 
mind. It was not constructed to produce specific policy regarding gentrification. Instead, 
it was organized around an opportunity for local African-American residents to express 
the harms they had experienced as a result of the drastic changes being wrought in their 
neighborhoods and communities. The audiences were asked largely to listen, but were 
also given opportunities to ask questions or make comments. They were also given space 
in small groups after the presentations to reflect on what they had heard. The meetings 
were held regularly by the city and facilitated by three organizers. Occasionally “experts” 
on gentrification and/or the history of Portland’s most affected (Northeast) 
neighborhoods made presentations. But most often it was community members 
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themselves who shared their stories. Audiences were usually predominately white – that 
is, the gentrifiers in question. And deliberation in any formal sense was discouraged (for 
instance, no calling into question the “truth” of anyone’s particular story). But small-
scaled as it was, the meetings had a great deal of politically significant impact for the 
community in question. A number of testimonials and reflections about the process 
indicated that a meaningful exchange had occurred in the spaces provided, especially 
(though not exclusively) with some of the white audience members. Personal 
transformation of the sort deliberativists rely on occurred through these meetings (to new 
ways of understanding the problems in the community and the impact of gentrification on 
their neighbors), but without any deliberative give-and-take between participants being 
required. Instead, I argue, the design of the Restorative Listening Project itself facilitated 
spaces in which dialogic relations could be entered into by (some of) the participants. 
Deliberativists have always had a plausible story about how these small-scale 
transformations can then coalesce into larger political changes. The shift in opinions and 
wills become the foundation for larger political movements as public opinion is altered, 
barriers to change are eroded, and desires for new policies gather steam. But none of this 
is possible until some mechanism for transformation is unleashed. Dialogue, through 
institutions like the Restorative Listening Project, is capable of facilitating just this sort of 
inertia towards collectively solving complicated and difficult social problems.  
If I may be so bold, I hope this project is capable of at least opening up 
contemporary discourse on democracy to the importance of the experience of dialogue. 
Further, as the case of the Restorative Listening Project shows, this experience can have 
practical impact on contemporary democracy through institutional designs capable of 
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creating the conditions of possibility for dialogic meeting. Finally, I would also count it a 
success if Martin Buber were considered an exciting resource for thinking about 
democratic experience and the possibility of meaningful democratic participation for 
future scholars. In any case, any success associated with this project will (of course) be 
up to the readers.                       
 
Notes 
1
 I will not belabor the point here, as I treat these in more detail in chapter 5. But for an 
excellent collection of promising deliberative designs see: Gastil and Levine, eds., The 
Deliberative Democracy Handbook, (San Francisco: Wiley and Sons, 2005); see also: 
Archon Fung, Empowered Participation: Reinventing Urban Democracy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004). 
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CHAPTER II 
THE HABERMASIAN FOUNDATIONS OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
 
This chapter is concerned with deliberative democratic theory. It has two principal 
aims. First I want to argue that deliberative democratic theory is attached to a particular 
normative claim about the progressive possibilities inherent in rational communication. 
Rational communication (most often understood in terms of public argumentation) is the 
means by which legitimate transformation can be produced. Citizens can be brought to 
new (and better) understandings, opinions, and political will through the communicative 
interaction with other citizens, which in turn improves the quality of democracy. This 
normative claim is rooted in Habermas’s writings, of course, though as I will show it 
comes from a particular reading of Habermas with a heavy emphasis on his discourse 
ethics. The deliberative project might have proceeded along different lines (this will be 
explored further in chapter two).  But this core of rational communication as a means of 
producing personal transformation has remained central to deliberative theory despite its 
varied presentations and developments over the last 25 years – and despite many authors 
claiming to have distanced themselves from Habermas. However the theory gets spelled 
out in particular, deliberative democracy depends on the results that communication of 
the ‘right sort’ is able to produce in the citizens themselves.  
The second aim of this chapter is more directly critical. I argue that this normative 
foundation of rational communication does not offer a compelling account of the kind of 
personal transformation that deliberative democracy requires. I offer two types of 
criticisms. One is concerned with the practical realization of a deliberative politics in 
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various ways, though the possibility is left open that there might be real democratic 
benefits from rational communication in some form or other. More damning are what I 
call ‘ontological’ critiques, which bring into question the very possibility that rational 
communication can produce beneficial transformations in individuals in the first place. 
The overall goal of this chapter, then, is to demonstrate a central, but problematic, 
tenet of deliberative theory in order to make clear the need for a different normative 
foundation for a democratic politics rooted in the engagement of citizens with one 
another. I will argue that this alternative foundation is a dialogic one. But for now I will 
restrict my discussion to deliberative theory as it is typically presented and understood. 
 
 
The Normative Core of Deliberative Democracy 
 
 After a so-called “deliberative turn” in the democracy literature of the 1990’s, 
deliberative democratic theory has become a juggernaut in the field.1 Its adherents have 
multiplied (as have its critics). Its literature has grown voluminous. This rapid 
development has seen its terms, assumptions, and normative aspirations seep increasingly 
into the “real world” of institutions and governance. Thus according to many, deliberative 
democracy has undergone a turn of its own towards empirics and practical 
institutionalization.2 At least one commentator has suggested that three fully distinct 
generations of deliberative democratic literature exist, moving from a debate about 
normative foundations and abstract theory, to theories concerned with workability in 
modern democracy, to an effort to work the theory into actual democratic institutions and 
practice.3 And all of this has happened in the relatively short period of about 25 years.    
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 This ever expanding body of work makes it difficult to give a single definition of 
the model. But despite the size and breadth of the literature, I think a central set of 
features have emerged from the field. A general definition might run as such: 
 
Democracy is better (more just, legitimate, fair, effective) when it is connected as closely 
as possible to robust engagement by its citizenry (including elected officials) in processes 
of argumentation and debate about matters of public concern. As such, these (more or 
less ideal) processes of public debate should be connected directly and/or indirectly 
(depending on the theory) to state institutions with decision-making capacity. 
 
There are differences between particular articulations of the deliberative model 
that matter, of course. And I do not mean to pave over these important distinctions. But 
here I am more interested in something they all share: a normative core of rational 
communicative exchange. This is a Habermasian foundation that accords transcendent, 
emancipatory potential through language use in certain kinds of communicative 
interactions. It is my claim that every account of deliberative democracy builds from this 
foundational assumption. Many are explicit about this; others only tacitly accept it. And 
some seem to offer arguments against a normative orientation towards communication 
(especially in the guise of reason and argumentation), but then offer no alternative 
sources for the normative potential in their deliberative theories. This is in part because 
they do not seem to have a better argument as to why our deliberations with one another 
can be thought to improve democracy, though they seem to remain committed to the hope 
that they can. The normative core comes down to the same thing in the end: the power of 
 15 
 
 
the right kind of communication to change opinions, shape worldviews, produce mutual 
understanding, enlighten, bridge gaps of difference, etc., etc.  
The most common articulation of this normative core is in terms of “public 
reason.” Public arguments backed with reasons (in whatever form they actually take) are 
the “transformative engine” for these democratic accounts. They are the things that 
broaden understandings, change minds, and shape wills. Public arguments unleash reason 
(which makes democracy better) because participants in debates must defend positions 
with claims that others might be influenced by. Thus the ‘unforced force of the better 
argument’ is allowed to do its work. And better arguments equal better dissemination of 
information, knowledge, and understanding as the basis for legitimately directed political 
power. As James Bohman understands it, “The deliberative process forces citizens to 
justify their decisions and opinions by appealing to common interests or by arguing in 
terms of reasons that ‘all could accept’ in public debate … such a conception of 
democracy presupposes an account of how the process of public deliberation makes the 
reasons for a decision more rational and its outcomes more fair.”4 
Some deliberative theorists have tried to move beyond this original understanding 
of public reason. But, I argue, their account of the transformative potential of deliberation 
remains tied to the same foundation of rational communication. In order to ground this 
claim more thoroughly, I turn now to a treatment of Habermas’s work and the uptake of 
his arguments into the deliberative literature. This is in order to show what this normative 
reliance on rational communication is based in, and how it was converted into the central 
normative claim of the deliberative democratic model. Following this, I will discuss some 
more contemporary versions of deliberative democracy that ultimately demonstrate the 
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same reliance on rational communication, as well as some key central components to 
deliberative theory that depend entirely upon this normative core. And, again, all of this 
will lead up to the critical section that takes on this normative core. 
 
The Habermasian Foundation of Deliberative Democracy 
  
Three central features of Habermas’s overall project have provided much of the 
foundation for models of deliberative democracy – his theory of communicative action 
and communicative rationality, his moral theory (discourse ethics), and his work on the 
public sphere. These are all crucial to understanding the normative possibilities inherent 
in rational communication between citizens – and thus the normative core of deliberative 
democracy. His work on moral theory and the public sphere were especially foundational 
to envisioning an ideal procedure by which communication could be relied upon for the 
benefit of democratic politics. But communicative action was a necessary first step to this 
project, though it would (for most deliberative democrats) remain a background condition 
for the theory of moral argumentation that Habermas developed later.    
 The Theory of Communicative Action appeared in two volumes in 1984 and 1987. 
The work marked the first full exposition of Habermas’s “linguistic turn.” It was an 
attempt to place communicative reason at the core of human social relations. Broadly, the 
work had three aims: to defend a concept of reason that was not limited to the individual 
subject (as was the typical rationality of the Cartesian ego so common to liberal 
thinking); to give a theory of society that took into account both the “lifeworld” and 
“system” perspectives (not one or the other); and, finally, to develop a critical theory 
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against this background that could resist the abandonment of the Enlightenment project.5 
But it was his rehabilitation of reason away from its usual Enlightenment-inspired 
articulations that would most profoundly and directly impact deliberative theorists by 
opening up a space for (once again) trusting in reason’s progressive potential, and 
emphasizing the potential for personal transformation through cooperative 
communicative interactions – though in the eyes of many deliberativists it could not yet 
be applied to a democratic politics in any direct way.6 
 For Habermas, language represents the medium of our cooperative action as 
social creatures. In order to do anything in concert, we must first rely on communication 
through language to establish a ground of common understanding – a shared action 
situation. Simply put, this particular effort of one or more people to establish mutual 
understanding through language is communicative action. Habermas more formally 
defines communicative action as “the interaction of at least two subjects capable of 
speech and action who establish interpersonal relations (whether by verbal or extra-verbal 
means),” where the actors “seek to reach an understanding about the action situation and 
their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement.”7  For now, 
I want to set aside the element of this definition that points to something about 
interpersonal relations, even though these appear foundational for the linguistic exchange 
that follows. Despite his seeming to put some weight on this establishment of 
interpersonal relations, Habermas is primarily concerned with the linguistic exchange 
toward reaching understanding that ensues in this relation. And he thinks this exchange 
follows some particular rules – unavoidable presuppositions – whether we are aware of it 
in our actual communicative practice or not.   
 18 
 
 
 Communication with others towards mutual understanding requires the making of 
criticizable “validity claims.” When we claim a truth about the world, an appropriateness 
or rightness of a social norm, an honest self-expression, and so on, we insist that what we 
say is valid and worthy of agreement by our partner in conversation. Though, of course, 
they may or may not agree with our assertion. As Habermas puts it, validity claims 
require our interlocutor to take “yes or no positions.” “Yes” responses are usually implicit 
and unacknowledged. With them the conversation can move on based on an already 
achieved shared understanding. But “No” responses produce the requirement that our 
claims be defended with reasons if we are to achieve the mutual understanding we are 
seeking (again, in order to cooperate together going forward). Of course, this process is 
often largely unexpressed. Further, in saying “yes or no” we have often thought through 
(and have sufficient competency to do this) the possible reasons one could have for 
offering a particular validity claim and assessing them according to our own 
understandings, and all of this simultaneously along (at least) three “dimensions” (is the 
claim objectively true? normatively appropriate? personally sincere?). But, upon a “No” 
response (on whatever grounds), an actual exchange of reasons, clarifications, and/or 
revisions can ensue, with the eventual mutual acceptance of claims, their alteration, or 
their outright rejection, depending on the “force” of the reasons offered. That is, the 
rationality of the position according to good reasons acceptable to both (or all) 
interlocutors.  
 Of course, we could undertake other means to get agreement – force or deception, 
for instance. But these means, Habermas argues, are parasitic on communicative action. 
After all, without the presumption that good reasons are backing up claims, deception 
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would fail as deception. In fact, it is key to his critical theory to understand that these 
distortions of otherwise “natural” functioning of communicative reason are increasingly a 
consequence of modern social pathologies – the distorting impact of power and money in 
modern late capitalist society.      
  This process of reaching understanding through rational exchange does a great 
deal of work for Habermas beyond the simple sorting out of particular “action situations.” 
Intersubjective language use is the mechanism underlying entire processes of 
socialization – the production and re-production of the lifeworld. The lifeworld exists as 
an always already there store of socialized knowledge and understanding that structures 
(and is structured) by our communicative interactions. Since all these elements of our 
lifeworld are symbolically (that is, linguistically) structured, they are produced and 
reproduced intersubjectively through communication. As Habermas understands it the 
lifeworld appears as, “a reservoir of taken-for-granteds, or unshaken convictions that 
participants in communication draw upon in cooperative processes of interpretation.”8 
This common pool of resources provide much of the foundation for communicative 
exchange (the unarticulated “yes” answers that pass by without open contestation). But 
given a particular situation, elements of the lifeworld may emerge as themes of the 
conversation, especially when there is disagreement between some content of the 
lifeworld of particular participants. At base, then, communicative action simultaneously 
relies on and shapes our orientation in the world by way of the resources of the lifeworld. 
Or, ideally at least, it should. Contemporary times (and the rise of functional/strategic 
rationality) puts our ability to communicate freely towards mutual understanding in 
serious jeopardy. 
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 This work provided deliberativists with a form of intersubjective rationality based 
in language. This form of rationality (really, a process of producing rationally defensible 
outcomes) had progressive potentials that did not fall prey (in the same way as the 
instrumental rationality usually considered) to late modern/post modern criticisms. 
Further, they could attach this notion of intersubjective reason through communication to 
the very process of social cooperation we could already observe – however abstract 
Habermas’s treatment of it tended to be. But it was at least plausibly ‘there’ in our 
cooperative interactions. There is intuitive power to the idea that language and 
communication can do some of the things Habermas claimed. People do sometimes 
change their worldviews when presented with compelling alternatives, and socialization 
processes are transmitted through communicative interactions (at least at some level). 
 Habermas’s later essay on discourse ethics was an expansion of these basic 
arguments about communicative rationality. In this project, he enters into an existing 
debate over moral foundations, armed with the belief that communicative rationality held 
for moral utterances as well as any other validity claim. That is, when we ask ‘What 
ought I do?’ the answers are not arbitrary, but are claims that can be defended with 
reasons. Moral claims require a particular sort of defense, however. Just as statements 
about the objective world, about social norms, or about self presentation all require 
different kinds of arguments particular to the claims they make (claims to truth, rightness, 
or truthfulness), moral arguments require a defense that speaks to their universal nature as 
rules that apply generally and equally to all.  
 Habermas thinks that the most fruitful place to look for a rule governing 
appropriate defenses of moral claims is the Kantian categorical imperative – not its 
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content per se, but its notion of an impartial, general character of a moral rule: “The 
moral principle is so conceived as to exclude as invalid any norm that could not meet 
with the qualified assent of all who are or might be affected by it.”9 But Kant’s 
articulation of the universal nature tended to cause him to mistake individual reasoning 
ability for that of any and every other person. This is the rationality embodied in the 
individual subject that Habermas has worked so hard to defeat with his intersubjective 
(communicative) rationality. Thus two principles are necessary for moral argumentation, 
one that appeals to this principle of universality, and another to appeal to the need for 
actual processes of discourse to defend some moral claim or other. The universalization 
principle (U) says:  
 
All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects [that] its general 
observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests 
(and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities 
for regulation).10  
 
The second principle, the discourse principle (D), then puts those moral arguments 
thought to satisfy this form into actual discourse for validation. It reads: 
 
Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the 
approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.11 
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The first principle exists as an “argumentation rule” that satisfies Kant’s intuition about 
moral rules, but does so with an awareness that any claim fitting this form must still be 
circulated and defended in a practical discourse, as required by the second principle. As 
such, the first principle is built upon a bedrock of intersubjective reason before any actual 
discourse must commence. That is, a set of “unavoidable presuppositions” ground its 
satisfaction unless one wants to slip into preformative contractions.12 For a principle to 
satisfy U, something like the following conditions must be (hypothetically) met: no one 
may be excluded or limited in fully participating (unconstrained opportunity to argue, 
express interests/needs/desires, etc) in the discourse that would justify such a moral 
norm.13 Meeting this criteria means having a legitimate moral norm to offer.  Thinking 
through these intersubjective requirements can be fulfilled by Habermas’s ideal speech 
situation abstraction (where one is supposed to envision themselves in an ideal discourse 
that meets all the normative requirements), though he was less inclined to rely on this 
idealization for the confusion it created in seeming like a Rawlsian-like abstraction not 
requiring any further work. After all, ‘further work’ towards validity was exactly what a 
practical discourse was meant, in principle, to achieve.   
 These abstract principles are clearly central to the normative claim that 
communication, properly unleashed, can produce better democracy. After all, many 
argued that making better policy requires arguments pitched at the same general, 
universal level as moral claims. That is, they need to hold for “all possibly affected.” This 
is a level ‘big enough’ for contemporary democracies. Thus (and as we shall see 
momentarily) early statements of deliberative theory often cited the ideal speech situation 
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and the universalizing potential inherent in public reason (modeled on the U and D 
principles) as justifying a faith in the procedure of public argumentation.  
Interestingly, Habermas’s own understanding of the uncertain processes of the 
practical discourses themselves often received less attention by these same early 
deliberative theorists. Practical discourses are an imperfect, messy procedure by which 
normative claims (in this case moral claims, though also others) are “tested for validity.” 
That is, it is the process of discussion and debate carried out by individuals within 
concrete time, space, and within specific social-cultural settings. In these discourses an 
orientation towards mutual understanding seems to be presumed by Habermas and the 
deliberativists that follow him. This is because, ideally, communicative action is the 
means by which these discourses are moved towards consensus. But, in actual practice a 
great deal of ‘other things’ can disrupt the process towards a hypothetical consensus of 
each and every member of the communication community. For instance, such discourses 
about moral matters cannot be separated from “two other forms of argumentation: 
aesthetic and therapeutic criticism,” which by their nature are not resolvable via the same 
rationally motivated agreements other sorts of arguments (like moral arguments) can.14 
Further, arguments about moral norms run up against “the balance of relations of 
intersubjective recognition” that structure a given society – what Honneth will later call 
the “recognition order.” In general, then, Habermas understands that in practice moral 
discourses are always directed against a host of “settled” social dynamics and power 
relations. Still, Habermas, and the deliberativists that draw from him, remain committed 
to the real possibility that moral discourses can transcend situated claims about culture or 
dominant ways of life to thematize appropriate matters from the “moral point of view.” 
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 One thing worth noting here for understanding deliberative uptake of Habermas is 
the shift from the broader story about communicative action in more immediate relations 
to a story about the settling of certain sorts of principles in much larger, impersonal 
contexts.15 All potentially affected, in fact. This reduced, in a sense, the scope of topics 
for which consensus-driven communication could tackle – only those admitting of 
something defensible on universal grounds. Of course, the ability to give a good defense 
of communicatively justifiable moral norms with universal application is close in spirit to 
how public policy (which must apply equally to all) might ideally be defended. However, 
this turn towards universal reasoning and consensus made many democratic theorists 
uncomfortable. To address this, many imagined various theoretical amendments to 
weaken these requirements of consensus and universal reason (I will discuss this further 
below). But even these projects depended, ultimately, on this procedure of rational 
communication (‘discourse’) among citizens. Thus, the possibility of transformation 
through citizen engagement became firmly entrenched in deliberative theory in all its 
varieties, with the debate being about how universal, or how strong claims to consensus 
should be – or, in other words what reasons/arguments should ‘count’ in the process 
through which citizens could be brought to new and better understandings.  
   Finally, these rather abstract insights were given an empirical root in Habermas’s 
work on the public sphere.16 In this work, Habermas sought a source for the political and 
social transformations of early modernity in the West. And before he had a theory of 
language to explain in detail “how” this change could have been brought about, he 
uncovered a “where” and something of a “why.” He located it in the use of public reason 
unleashed in the emerging bourgeois public sphere. It began as a literary public sphere, 
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but its resources were put to work on political matters regarding the common good. In 
salons and coffee houses, newspapers, letters and pamphlets, rational-critical debate on 
public matters emerged into a new means by which to motivate political action. As 
Habermas understands this historical phenomenon: 
The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private 
people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated 
from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate 
over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly 
relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor. The medium of the 
political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people’s 
public use of their reason.17 
 
Habermas was interested in showing the development of this new space for 
argumentation, its institutional forms, and its emergence as a space between private life 
and the state that could “steer” the state according to the interests of private citizens. For 
him, 18th century England was the model case, though France and Germany also 
developed comparable sites for rational-critical debate.  
  But for Habermas, this public sphere was in decline by the late 19th century. Its 
rational-critical functions displaced in late modern times by advertising and consumption 
of mass culture, as well as the changing relations between the state and private 
individuals in the age of the modern welfare state. There is hope for the public sphere, 
however, as the potential remained for the rational-critical public sphere to be 
reestablished (albeit in a different version and however unlikely) in Habermas’s account.   
Now, this “public use of reason” in the public sphere was just the sort of grounded 
example that made the abstract process of moral argumentation seem plausible to 
democratic theorists interested in Habermas’s work. On scale alone, I think, this 
understanding of public reason led more easily to a discourse ethic interpretation than a 
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more basic communicative action one. During 18th and 19th centuries, the public sphere 
grew into a space where the aggregation of a process of public reason coalesced into 
something with political impact. This led to good arguments (and not, say, ascribed 
aristocratic status) being the basis for political action that would affect everyone in that 
society. Again, it was as ‘big’ as discourse ethics (affecting a whole society), rather than 
located in particular contexts of shared action situations among particular interlocutors 
(as with much of the discussion of communicative action). In effect, then, Habermas had 
provided a historical, empirical example grounding his theories of communication and 
(especially) discourse that demonstrated real political potential. And for hopeful 
democratic theorists this came along with a critical theoretic take offered in Theory of 
Communicative Action and echoed in Structural Transformation about the possibility of 
recovering communicative rationality within a properly functioning public sphere. All 
that was needed was to imagine the institutional and social reforms necessary and 
deliberation (with all its normative benefits) could be properly unleashed.   
 Allow me to briefly summarize the central Habermasian contributions to 
deliberative theory. First, Habermas offered a conception of rationality rooted in 
communication. His theory of communicative action pointed towards the normative 
possibilities inherent in communication oriented towards reaching understanding. 
Deliberativists had a sense that one could legitimately expect citizens engaging with one 
another to find their opinions and wills transformed through a communicative interaction 
with each other. This base of communicative rationality then informed Habermas’s 
project of discourse ethics, where moral argumentation could undergo a process of 
justification such that particular moral principles could be sufficiently justified as to be 
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deemed valid by all affected by their adoption. This discursive procedure was at a scale 
worthy of politics and policy making, as it imagined an entire community participating in 
a collective process of validation. Finally, Habermas’s work on the rational-critical 
functioning of the public sphere in early modernity gave an empirical grounding to these 
abstract notions of communication and discourse. Deliberative democrats could now 
argue that communication could produce real, large-scale political changes, given 
sufficiently free and fair communication between citizens about political matters. All of 
this was built around the normative idea that such communication between citizens had 
the ability to shape opinions and wills towards better democratic ends.       
Let me turn, now, to the uptake of these central elements of Habermas as they 
proceeded in the literature. The point of showing this uptake is, again, to show how the 
normative core of deliberative democratic theory is rooted in these Habermasian 
arguments. The normative core identified above has remained central to deliberative 
democratic theory even as some have tried to take a critical stance towards these seminal 
works. That is, this initial uptake of a certain reading of Habermas has gone more or less 
unchallenged even in more recent contributions to the deliberative literature that appear 
to have advance beyond these initial formulations.  
 
Deliberative Democracy and the Uptake of Habermas 
  
 There were two primary strains of deliberative theory in its initial stages, each of 
which relied on Habmeras’s work to produce the normative possibilities of the models 
they offered. One strain was based in liberal theory that was concerned, in Rawlsian 
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terms, with the fact of legitimate pluralism and reasonable disagreement about essential 
political matters. For these theorists, Habermas offered a practical, procedural approach 
for dealing with these difficulties that improved upon Rawlsian veil-of-ignorance 
abstractions. The second group were critical theorists who were more directly attached to 
a Habermasian program and the progressive possibilities therein for democracy (which 
Habermas himself had not spelled out as yet). From different directions, both secured the 
status of Habermasian claims about the normative potential inherent in rational 
communication in developing the deliberative democratic model. 
The most notable of the liberal theorists was Joshua Cohen, who remains one of 
the most well-cited of the early deliberative theorists. Although Cohen understands his 
approach as growing from a Rawlsian orientation, I would argue that the normative hopes 
he places in this type of democracy are clearly Habermasian.18 Cohen outlines an ideal 
procedure of deliberation where 4 assumptions are made:19  
1) participants regard themselves as both bound by and capable of action in 
relation to the results of free deliberation amongst one another;  
2) the parties to deliberation must rely on reasons and the unforced force of better 
arguments for making collective choices; 
3) the participants are equal in standing and potential influence in deliberation; 
4) the participants are aimed at a “rationally motivated consensus.”  
 
Here, of course, the Habermasian influence is clear. These statements share a great 
affinity with Habermas’s ideal speech situation as it applies to moral discourse, and 
Cohen cites Habermas in defending this idealized process. In fact, commenting on his 
overlap with two other early deliberative democrats of liberal origin (Bernard Manin and 
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Jon Elster), Cohen writes in a footnote that the overlap exists because they all three “draw 
on Habermas.”20 In general, those liberal theorists utilized Habmeras because they are 
committed (in liberal spirit) to the problem of securing the legitimacy of collective, 
democratic state action. As such, the desirable normative element inherent in deliberation 
lies in its movement towards rationally defensible outcomes of a deliberative process 
open to all. For these liberals, a democracy centered around public debate can attain 
legitimacy due to the inclusion of all in the deliberative process. But more than this, these 
authors (Cohen, Manin and Elster in particular) pointed to the process of deliberation 
itself as a means to produce something approaching (though perhaps never achieving) a 
universally agreed upon public will by transforming individual opinions and wills on the 
basis of good communicative reasons. 
At the same time this move towards a discursive conception of liberal politics 
began to emerge, other writers from a perspective of critical theory were utilizing 
Habermas’s work to articulate a deliberative politics. Among these authors, Seyla 
Benhabib and John Dryzek (both still being among the most widely cited of the 
deliberativists) are especially noteworthy. 
To associate these authors with Habermas is hardly controversial. They both turn 
explicitly to Habermas in developing their democratic theories. But I want to highlight a 
few key elements of their respective theories because they have continued to influence 
more contemporary conceptions of deliberative democracy.  
In a highly influential volume on democratic theory which she edited, Benhabib 
contributed an essay titled, “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy.” 
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Here, the normative core found in the discourse ethics project had clearly and explicitly 
found its way into a theory of “deliberative democracy.” She writes: 
According to the deliberative model of democracy, it is a necessary condition for 
attaining legitimacy and rationality with regard to collective decision making 
processes in a polity, that the institutions of this polity are so arranged that what is 
considered in the common interests of all results from processes of collective 
deliberation conducted rationally and fairly among free and equal individuals … 
The discourse model of ethics formulates the most general principles and moral 
intuitions behind the validity claims of a deliberative model of democracy. The 
basic idea behind this model is that only those norms (i.e., general rules of action 
and institutional arrangements) can be said to be valid (i.e., morally binding), 
which would be agreed to by all those affected by their consequences, if such 
agreement were reached as a consequence of a procedure of deliberation[.]21  
 
And beyond simply securing legitimacy based on the ideal of a free and fair 
discourse about the basic features of society, Benhabib also suggests that these processes 
of deliberation can secure a more rational politics. “According to the deliberative model, 
procedures of deliberation generate legitimacy as well as assure some degree of practical 
rationality” because “Deliberation is a procedure for being informed.” And, “More 
significantly, the very procedure of articulating a view in public imposes a certain 
reflexivity on individual preferences and opinions … This process of articulating good 
reasons in public forces the individual to think … from the standpoint of all involved for 
whose agreement one is ‘wooing.’”22 
John Dryzek demonstrated similar influences in his effort to bring Habermas’s 
work to bear on democratic theory by way of an overall appreciation of the Frankfurt 
School. Where Benhabib had unparalleled influence on the uptake of the abstract 
elements of Habermas’s project into the democratic literature, Dryzek was central in 
giving these abstract theories some applications to institutional contexts. His 1990 work 
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Discursive Democracy was among the early contributions to the “deliberative turn” and 
to the theory’s eventual turn toward institutions and institutional design.23   
After a sustained critique of instrumental rationality, Dryzek offers discursive – or 
communicative – rationality in its place as a means by which to propose a politics better 
suited to contemporary ills. And while Habermas is one several theorists who appear in 
this discussion, his place is central. Dryzek seeks to apply a vision of communicative 
rationality to “concrete political concerns,” largely as extension fo Habermas’s project, 
which at that time had failed to “develop anything that [met] the specifications of his 
theory.”24 As such, Dryzek seeks to apply discursive rationality to real institutions of 
democracy and the problems they confront in both the system and the lifeworld. He 
argues for the application of discursive democracy to “social problems (especially 
complex ones), political and policy-making institutions, policy analysis, and empirical 
political science” not in order to “defend the lifeworld against further colonization by the 
system but to conduct a counteroffensive by taking discursive rationality to the heart of 
the enemy’s domain.”25 
From this point forward, Dryzek’s book applies “discursive designs” to 
institutions and policy making (as well as the study of institutions and policy making) 
that rely on the “counterfactual of ideal speech,” and the “authentic public sphere.” 
Within institutions Dryzek saw great benefits in Habermasian concepts such as relying on 
authority based only in “the forceless force of the better argument,” communicative 
competence among actors, non-exclusion of voices, etc.26 But all of this with a practical 
orientation towards solving real, complex political challenges. This made Dryzek’s work 
of particular importance to those seeking to apply the more idealized and abstract models 
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of deliberative democracy to “real politics.” And in drawing on Dryzek, they were, in 
effect, drawing on Habermasian notions of the normative possibilities built into rational 
discursive exchange. 
    
The Continuing Influence of Habermas 
  
As the deliberative democracy literature developed, many theorists purported to 
have moved away from the model’s Habermasian foundations – to the extent they 
acknowledged these foundations at all. Some such as James Bohman attempted to move 
the abstract theory in to a more practical account of deliberation as it might actually 
unfold ‘on the ground’ between citizens. Others sought to move away from strict 
orientation towards consensus and universal reasoning, or take deep disagreements and 
legitimate pluralism as serious limitations to the possibility of moral or political 
consensus. Despite a variety of surface changes, the vast majority of these “revisions” 
retain the original normative core taken from Habermas.  
James Bohman often claims to have separated himself from Habermas at various 
points in Public Deliberation, but his basic formulation remains clearly attached to the 
normative presuppositions made possible by Habermas.27 He argues that many accounts 
of deliberative democracy (and by 1996 there were many) leave unexamined the basic 
reasons why deliberation can work to solve collective problems. His account locates the 
normative possibilities in deliberation in a dialogic account of the give-and-take of public 
reasons.28 He describes deliberation thusly: 
Deliberation in democracies is interpersonal in a specific, political sense: it is 
public … “Public” here refers not just the way citizens deliberate but also to the 
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type of reasons they give in deliberating … that is, they must be convincing to 
everyone. This fact about democratic deliberation provides a minimal standard for 
what constitutes an agreement among free and equal citizens.29 
 
Properly engaged in, then, public reasoning leads, as Habermas argued, to an “uncoerced 
consensus.” This is possible, at least potentially, because Bohman thinks public reasoning 
as a cooperative endeavor will lead to better outcomes (more rational, certainly), and 
non-tyrannical decisions (because of their having been justified publically). Bohman 
stresses a practical orientation towards cooperative problem-solving with inclusive 
participation. Unlike Habermas or Rawls, he argues that he does away with “pure 
proceduralist” notions of ideal speech or original positions. The reasoning process is 
purely practical, and unfolds in the communicative practice of citizens themselves. And 
yet, his account is clearly wed to Habermasian notions of transformation (agreement, 
ideally) through the give-and-take of good reasons in public. In fact, it is hard to see how 
this is substantively different from Habermas’s model, ideal speech abstraction or no. 
Bohman explicitly relies on the normative potential inherent in the nature of rational 
communication (in this case as public reasoning). 
 Another typical development in the deliberative literature was to give up on a 
strong requirement for consensus-oriented reasoning (as many read Habermas as 
requiring) and instead suggest that inclusive and fair deliberation based on norms of 
mutual respect and/or reciprocity was sufficient, even if participants in debate never 
arrived at common understandings as a result of the deliberative process. This move was 
rooted in concepts like Benhabib’s “egalitarian reciprocity,” which is based on the equal 
respect for participants in discourse that allows equal opportunity to influence others (and 
the due respect that gives proper, equal consideration to everyone’s arguments).  
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  Of note in this regard are Gutmann and Thompson’s Democracy and 
Disagreement, which  remains one of the most influential works in deliberative 
democracy. It has spawned its own secondary literature, as well as follow up work by the 
authors themselves, undertaken due to the immense popularity of this initial effort.  
 Gutmann and Thompson draw some from Habermas. But they draw most heavily 
from the early liberal deliberativists who were more explicitly indebted to Habermas 
(Cohen, notably). And what they produce, I argue, is unmistakably Habermasian 
whatever their source. First, Gutmann and Thompson argue, in general, that deliberative 
democracy responds to the fact of deep moral disagreement “directly on its own terms.”30 
They offer four reasons why this is the case. First, deliberative democracy contributes to 
the sense of legitimacy of actual political decisions in which some will not get what they 
want (or get the same as others), something they equate to a morally-justified consensus 
that citizens continually strive for, though perhaps never fully reach. Second, deliberation 
allows participants to take a broader perspective and hear the claims of others. Third, 
deliberation can clarify the nature of deep moral conflicts and “sort out self-interested 
claims from public-spirited ones.” Finally, deliberation can produce better public reasons. 
“Through the give-and-take of argument, citizens and their accountable representatives 
can learn from one another, come to recognize their individual and collective mistakes, 
and develop new views and policies that are more widely justifiable.”31  
In order to unleash these deliberative potentials, Gutmann and Thompson suggest 
three principles that need to be encouraged: reciprocity, publicity, and accountability. 
Reciprocity, they describe as the most important of these as it sets the conditions under 
which the others operate. Their notion of reciprocity has an extremely strong 
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Habermasian flavor. Reciprocity is needed in order to assure that “a citizen offers reasons 
that can be accepted by others who are similarly motivated to find reasons that can be 
accepted by others.”32 In other words, it is the desire to enter into exchanges 
cooperatively with the goal of giving answers that others can accept. Thus the normative 
foundation for their project is straightforwardly Habermasian. 
A similar Habermasian foundation is also evident in deliberative literature that 
takes seriously the deep divisions created by cultural pluralism. And yet, again, the 
Habermsian normative core remains. Take, for example, a recent effort by Jorge Valadez 
to question the idea of reason-giving in terms “all could accept.”33 Valadez claims that 
deep incommensurability of cultural frameworks (including metaphysical beliefs, 
evaluative standards, and more) renders suspect the possibility that particular reasons will 
be able to similarly convince everyone involved in deliberation. His argument seems 
contrary to the received standard about public reasoning common amongst deliberativists. 
However, his solution retains a similar normative ideal. Instead of deliberative 
democracy working by means of reasons all could accept, deliberation can (and should) 
proceed by the mutual articulation of interests in the hopes of clarifying and identifying 
shared reasons for adopting agreed-upon solutions. That is, deliberation would not be 
about reasons with universal ability to influence, but instead be an opportunity for 
clarification and communication of interests, views, and understandings in order to seek 
common ground (if some exists) and common interests (again, if some exist). The 
mechanisms for being able to do this are greater multicultural education and a process of 
“reciprocal validation.” This process is an exchange with others in which we depend on 
their testing for validity our understandings of their worldviews, as opposed to presuming 
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on our own that we can access and understand their views and appeal to them with 
reasons we find compelling. If this sort of engagement is practiced, Valadez thinks that 
deliberation can produce “acceptable compromises by deepening mutual understanding 
and respect between members of different cultural groups.”34 In other words, Valadez 
desires an exchange in which participants articulate to one another their own 
understandings in the name of reaching mutually-acceptable positions that they can each 
support. It is hard to understand this revision as anti-Habermasian, even if it is against 
arguments being made in universal terms. But, nothing of the normative core of a rational 
exchange of language is deeply challenged on this account. It is still a story about the 
transformative potential of communication, only it is limited to the more modest goals of 
mutual understanding and respect between radically different others. 
 Finally, even a recent turn in deliberative literature towards the inclusion of 
rhetoric fails to move away from this Habermasian core. On the surface, allowing 
persuasion based on rhetoric seems removed from the reliance on rational-critical 
exchanges that most of the deliberative literature has used as a model. But this retains the 
reliance of rational communication that can transform. Rhetorical persuasion represents a 
sort of limit case for those deliberativists who rely on rationally defensible claims as the 
impetus for progressing arguments (and thus opinions and wills) to new and better 
results.35 Rhetoric can be permissible if it is not the “bad” kind that willfully deceives, 
and it serves to bring arguments to audiences in ways they can more clearly understand. I 
will return to this concept when I discuss Iris Young in the next chapter. For now, what I 
think is notable about this most recent development in the deliberative literature is that it 
represents a continued effort not to look beyond rational communication between 
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citizens, but to simply negotiate the boundaries as to what counts as communication that 
can properly be relied upon to change opinions and wills for the benefit of democracy. 
This is the same reliance on communication that has always been at the heart of the 
normative claims of deliberation, but now with an attempt to include more passionate 
expressions of rationally defensible claims.   
  
Critiques of the Normative Core of Deliberative Democracy 
  
  Deliberative democracy has been criticized from a variety of perspectives, some 
liberal, some feminist, some post-modern, as well as some empirically grounded doubts. I 
want to look at a few of these concerns that I find convincing, not as a means to “defeat” 
the deliberative democratic project, but as a way of seeing what shortcomings need to be 
addressed if a workable theory of democratic politics rooted in the engagement of 
citizens with one another is to succeed. I group these criticisms into 2 basic types: 
critiques related to actual deliberative practice (call these practical critiques) and critiques 
about the very nature (and possibility) of deliberation towards better democratic ends 
(call these ontological critiques).36 These two do not always appear separately, of course, 
as they often express overlapping and related concerns. But I think conceptually they 
address two different problems. I will describe the criticisms in turn and what they tell us 
about the normative core on which deliberative democracy is based. 
 Practical critiques rarely call into question the desirability of deliberation about 
political matters, but instead object to its being a central component in a democratic 
theory. This might be either because the practice of deliberation itself, as they understand 
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it, is too limited to encompass the size, scope, and nature of modern democratic politics; 
or, it might be because the nature of ideal deliberation is somehow too narrow or 
incomplete to properly address political problems that face contemporary societies.  
 Michael Walzer offers a practical critique of the first sort. In a piece dedicated to 
commentary on Gutmann and Thompson’s Democracy and Disagreement,  Walzer offers 
a list of necessary components of democracy (included are things such as lobbying, 
voting, mobilizing, demonstrating) among which he would not place deliberation. Why? 
Because real political inequality (a real ruling class who desires to keep its power) 
prevents anything like deliberation from taking center stage in the political processes in 
which conflict is real and necessary. Also, the sheer size and scope of modern 
democracies make deliberation impracticable in place of these other activities. He writes, 
“Deliberation is not an activity for the demos. I don’t mean that ordinary men and women 
don’t have the capacity to reason, only that 100 million of them, or even 1 million or 
100,000 can’t plausibly ‘reason together.’ And it would be a great mistake to turn them 
away from things they can do together.  For then there would be no effective, organized 
opposition to the powers-that-be.”37 
 Lynn Sanders’ well-cited piece “Against Deliberation,” represents a practical 
critique of the second sort. She cites some disheartening jury studies in arguing that 
deliberation often serves as a vehicle for dominant, privileged modes of communication. 
As such, deliberation (as it is usually understood) is too restrictive of communicative 
practice to produce the kinds of transformations deliberativists hope. She writes, 
“Arguing that democratic deliberation should be rational, moderate, and not selfish 
implicitly excludes public talk that is impassioned, extreme, and the product of particular 
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interests.”38 Instead, she proposes testimony, “citizens telling their own stories in their 
own ways,” which addresses a “more fundamental goal: to try and ensure that those who 
are usually left out of public discussions learn to speak whether their perspectives are 
common or not, and those who usually dominate learn to hear the perspective of 
others.”39   
 The upshot of such practical critiques, I think, is the observation that there is a 
difficulty translating an idealized and abstract notion of rational speech into something 
with practical democratic benefits. It is not that Habermas and the deliberativists are 
completely or necessarily wrong about language and reason in the abstract, but that their 
conceptions fall short, or even fail, in application. The ideas need to be stretched to fit 
real practice, and augmented by other institutions and procedures, or by forms of 
communication other than rational argumentation. In short, deliberation too narrowly 
conceived cannot be the core of a democratic politics, no matter how normatively 
valuable deliberation may itself be. 
 There has been a widespread effort to appreciate the weight of these criticisms by 
the deliberativists themselves, though they attempt to do so without betraying their basic 
models. In terms of opening up democracy to other forms of political decision-making, 
many deliberativists have already accepted bargaining and negotiation as necessary in a 
society in which “communicative action is overburdened,” as Habermas puts it. And in 
terms of opening up what should count as deliberation, this, too, has been largely 
accepted by deliberative democrats. Following theorists like Iris Young (who will be 
central to the following chapter), the addition of communication styles and forms has 
been accepted up to a point. There are limits, of course, to the kind of rhetoric that can be 
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tolerated for the deliberativist if they are to retain their critical-normative insight into 
distorted forms of communication and power. But to a great degree, many deliberative 
theorists feel these practical objections are resolvable from within a theory of deliberative 
democracy that retains its normative core of communication having transformative (and 
critical) potential.  
Still, the weight of these sorts of critiques is not easily dismissed, even with 
modifications offered by deliberative theories themselves. They amount to a call for a 
constant reevaluation of the lines of inclusion and exclusion in deliberation and a careful 
attention to the forms of power that may disrupt the functioning of deliberative processes. 
And they certainly preclude any deliberative theory from a misplaced confidence in the 
“natural” functioning of communicative rationality apart from the fact of these 
disruptions. That is, if the normative core upon which better democracy rests is to remain 
tied to the functioning of language apart from these distortions. Thus conclusions like 
Walzer’s are hard to avoid, even if one has faith in the potential (and even someday the 
realization) of a politics more in line with the ideal of deliberative democracy.   
 The ontological critiques are in a sense more difficult to deal with for deliberative 
democrats. These critiques attack the very heart of deliberative democracy’s normative 
core – the inherent rationality present in the right kinds of communicative exchanges. 
Often these are from post-modern sources, such as Foucaultian notions of power and 
Lyotard’s or Derridia’s challenges to the inherent rationality of communication. But they 
also have increasingly stemmed from a direction prefigured by Merleau-Ponty, now 
being confirmed in cognitive studies and dubbed the “brain-body” problem for traditional 
Western philosophy. Thinkers such as William Connolly and George Lakoff and Mark 
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Johnson have begun developing the philosophic conclusions that stem from our being 
embodied. And these ideas cast further doubt on the very possibility of something like 
rational communication.  
 A nice summary of the impact of the first post-modern line of critique on 
deliberative democracy is offered by Dana Villa’s “Postmodernism and the Public 
Sphere.”40 According to Villa, from Foucault we are given doubt that any claims to better 
arguments, as well as the reliance on public autonomy and equal influence, are mitigated 
(if not rendered completely ineffectual) by the self-surveillance and internalized 
hegemony of civic actors. From Lyotard, we get the overriding doubt about any meta-
narrative (of which Habermas’s Enlightenment-rooted deference to the emancipatory 
nature of better arguments is one) and an insistence on the agonistic and “discordant” 
nature of language games as a more accurate theory of communication. Villa cannot see 
any viable response to these concerns that could be given by a Habermasian, though he 
does find some possibility in Arendt’s idea of the public sphere.  
Another line of post-modern critique has been canvassed by Margaret Kohn: 
Wittgensteinian, Bahktinian and Derridian criticisms. Kohn suggests that: 
the structure of language itself undermines the possibility of fully determined 
meaning … Language cannot be completely determined because it is constantly 
being reconstituted by social conditions and erased by custom and practice. This 
means that instances of miscommunication and manipulation are not accidental, 
secondary effects, but rather part of the nature of language itself.41  
 
According to Kohn, Wittgenstein and Bakhtin argue convincingly that language 
reproduces power relations, perhaps in terms of unequal distribution of linguistic 
competency (per Wittgenstein via Bourdeiu), or through its suppression of difference in 
order to form ‘genres of unity’ (Bakhtin). In either case, some users of language are 
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inevitably at the mercy of others by the nature of language itself, not because of its 
(ameliorable) distortions at the hands of outside powers, as critical theorists like 
Habermas would have it. Finally, Kohn refers to Derrida’s argument that even though 
language is in fact largely performative (as Habermas also agrees, following J.L. Austin), 
it is based on a “gap” between what is said and what is meant. This is because language is 
both used by an individual, but exists already as a system made up of “all previous 
instances” in which some sign within language has been used. Language is thus based on 
iterability, not “a telos of serious, literal speech [that] is the perfect correspondence 
between speaker’s intention and the linguistic formation.”42 Further, Derrida shows us, 
following Nietzsche, that original meanings of language are erased over time. What 
remains is not a language corresponding perfectly to a world of things or ideas shared by 
everyone, but a system of myths and metaphors whose origins have been erased from our 
awareness. Thus, Kohn concludes, “By appealing to the standards of rationality and 
reason, discursive democracy masks an irrational core at the heart of its project.”43 
 These ontological arguments regarding the nature of language and language use 
suggests that the Habermasian story of language oriented toward rational ends is, at least, 
suspect. The question, of course, is to what extent distortions from the Habermasian ideal 
are the product of power from “outside,” or whether it is the fact of power and language 
themselves that create doubt about a faith in rational communication. If the latter is true, 
the troubles facing deliberative democrats are immense. Such criticisms go to the very 
heart of what the deliberative project requires – the possibility of transformation based on 
an exchange of good, defensible reasons. Without this possibility, one cannot have 
deliberative democracy.      
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 On to the “brain-body” issue. These materialist accounts call into question the 
basis for our faith in reason unleashed through communication at the very level of our 
ability to act as competent users of language. Instead, we are constrained (in a sense) by 
our bodies and the metal processes of our brain in ways that complicate the linking of 
language, reason and action. One version of this argument grew out of a question about 
the psychological plausibility of Habermas’s linking between communication and action 
in individuals. For example, Mark Warren expresses doubts about Habermas’s idea of a 
discursively-competent citizen, someone who needs to be capable of “ascending” to the 
level of argumentative discourse in a way that they can “live out” the analytic separation 
of arguments about political issues and language use aimed at securing their self-identity. 
He writes, “Discursive democracy requires individuals who are autonomous in the sense 
that they can question elements of their lives and life-styles without drawing into 
question their own identity and value.”44 Further, Warren suggests that while Habermas 
has a psychoanalytic theory to justify this separation (a communicative reading of 
psychotherapy as critical theory), there is a danger in his theory of overstating our self-
access and control of drives and experiences (and God forbid neuroses) through 
language. He writes, anticipating the “brain-body” problem I will detail below:  
The danger is that because the body’s nonlinguistic ‘talk’ cannot be conveyed in 
linguistic form, it will come to seem illegitimate, something that falls outside the 
interests and needs of the self … These implications have not been lost on 
Habermas’s critics, who sometimes suggest that his focus on the rationality of 
language threatens a tyranny of discourse over the necessary and desirable 
ambiguity of inner experience. The point is not a romantic one, but rather a 
recognition of the manifest inadequacy of language to inner experience. Inner 
experience, though it may not be formulated in discourse, anchors parts of the self 
that not only ‘disturb’ language, but also account for happiness, uniqueness, and 
difference.45   
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Thus there is something beneath what is communicable through language that shapes our 
selves and constrains our abilities to act as autonomous participants in discourse. It is 
something psychological, but seems to have a link with our embodied selves as well. And 
this is the insight developed even more powerfully by those who locate this psychological 
state in the actual brain-body processes at the level of biology.    
Take for example the following explanation of reason by Lakoff and Johnson: 
Reason arises from our brains, bodies, and bodily experience and cannot transcend these 
structures; it is not “universal” except in the sense of our shared bodily structures that 
produce certain commonality of process; it is mostly unconscious; it is largely 
metaphorical and imaginative (not literal); and it is not dispassionate, but emotionally 
charged.46 They draw a number of conclusions from this fact that put a Habermasian 
project into question. An embodied reasoning process is dependent largely on metaphors 
that are neurally linked to “sensorimotor experiences.” As such, concepts and moral 
reasons often contain mutually inconsistent structuring of abstract concepts that are 
difficult to revise “Because our conceptual systems are mostly unconscious and neurally 
fixed … we cannot freely change our conceptual systems by fiat.”47 
In Neuropolitics, William Connolly offers a similar take on the nature of 
embodied reasoning. Connolly adds the dimension of culture into this brain-body 
dynamic to indicate the thick, well-sedimented layers of culture that form neural 
connections that become difficult to break. This is an insight complimentary to Lakoff 
and Johnson, as our cultural experience becomes the source for many of the metaphors 
and experiences that form the hard-wired structure of our concepts and reasoning 
processes. And, again, these happen largely beneath our perception at a speed our 
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conscious brain could never participate in. For Connolly, the dispositions produced in 
these processes is our “affect”. One particularly interesting type of brain-body-culture 
phenomena is called a “somatic marker.” This is “a culturally mobilized, corporeal 
disposition through which affect-imbued, preliminary orientations to perception and 
judgment scale down the material factored into cost-benefit analyses, principled 
judgments, and reflective experiments.”48 Or, in other words, the stuff prior to our 
conscious thought that drastically whittles down alternatives, streamlines options, and 
sifts through possibilities before we ever begin consideration. It is part language and 
cultural experience, part biology, and all largely beyond our direct control. And the 
nature of this process leads Connolly to suggest: 
Once somatic markers are added to your ledger, both rational-choice theory and 
the reduction of culture to an unlayered set of intersubjective concepts and beliefs 
are thrown into jeopardy. The model of “deliberative democracy,” loved by many 
political theorists, requires modification too. Culturally preorganized charges 
shape perception and judgment in ways that exceed the picture of the world 
supported by the models of calculative reason, intersubjective culture, and 
deliberative democracy. They show us how linguistically complex brain regions 
respond not only to events in the world but also, proprioceptively, to cultural 
habits, skills, memory traces, and affects mixed into our muscles, skin, gut, and 
cruder brain regions.49 
 
This awareness of our embodied self leads Connolly to articulate an individualist 
“micropolitics” of techniques of the self and a appreciation of deep pluralism in the 
world. This is because the best we can do is respect the difference in others and engage in 
an uncertain project with ourselves towards some end we desire – always at the mercy of 
our brain-body-cultural matrix to some extent. 
On the whole, then, brain-body arguments cast a materialist doubt on the 
possibilities that language can produce in us (given that it is utilized “by us”) any 
dependably rational conclusions that will then “bind and bond” us to action 
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recommended by these rational arguments. The “higher level intersubjectivity” of 
communicative processes (as Habermas has come to refer to them) are always tied to the 
actual use of language by embodied – and thus monstrously complicated and notoriously 
undependable – creatures. The lifeworld concept can get at some of this, to be sure. The 
layers of culture, prior experience, deeply ingrained metaphors, even the firmly wired 
neural pathways themselves might fall within the domain of the “pre-given” of our 
lifeworld. But these theories put into serious question the idea that in communication we 
can open up a slice of this lifeworld and reconsider it, alter it on the basis of better 
arguments, and proceed anew. The layers are deeper then we can access in our 
conscience, and thus beyond the reach, perhaps, of even the most universal 
presuppositions of language use in communicative contexts – at least in any neat and 
reliable way.   
   
Looking Forward: A Project Worth Redeeming?  
 
 Deiberative democrats need a story of transformation. Most thought they had 
found it in a Habermasian account of the normative possibilities of language use. But I 
think the criticisms offered in this chapter provide us with real doubts about this 
foundation. But if the normative core is subject to question by these critiques, it is not, I 
think, altogether lost. There remains something both intuitively compelling and 
normatively valuable in putting some faith in the possibility that when citizens meet and 
speak, sometimes, somehow, something beneficial happens in this encounter. The 
critiques of the deliberative project, however, leave some doubt as to whether we can 
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place all our eggs in the basket of normative expectations related to the proper unleashing 
of rational communication. Even if we remain open to the possibility that language use is 
rooted in a kind of rationality, we have to also have reason to hesitate in thinking it can 
be unproblematically unleashed for our common good. The practical critiques show us 
this. And we may even have reason to remain skeptical in regards to our reasoning ability 
itself, even in its intersubjective form, as a trustworthy as a means to rational politics and 
common understanding. The ontological critiques raise this doubt.  So what now? 
 The following chapter will pick up a different line of thinking from within 
Habermas and the deliberative literature that I think is much more promising. It is a 
dialogic account (in a much “thicker” sense of the word than we have encountered it thus 
far) of what makes citizen engagement promising as a means of transformative 
experience with the potential for greater mutual understanding and “better” democratic 
politics along the lines deliberativists hope. It is an account that does not jettison 
language and deliberation entirely, but situates these activities within an interpersonal 
experience that is not reducible to communication. And although they have not 
necessarily understood it in terms of dialogue, I will show that it is already operative in 
some theorists’ conceptions of deliberation. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE HIDDEN NORMATIVE FOUNDATION IN DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: 
PUSHING TOWARD DIALOGUE 
 
The previous chapter suggested that a normative core rooted in Habermas is 
central to the deliberative democratic literature – that the give and take of the right kind 
of reasons by citizens, properly inclusive, can produce more legitimate and rational 
democratic politics by transforming opinions and wills. I argued that this normative 
orientation is at best incomplete, and at worst entirely suspect when it comes to an 
account of what actually transforms citizens – what moves people to hear new arguments, 
adopt new positions, and find common ground where it previously did not exist. And yet, 
I suggested there was good reason not to abandon the deliberative project on the whole. 
This chapter begins to outline an alternative account of the normative foundations for 
deliberative democracy in a theory of dialogue. 
 The particular understanding of dialogue I have in mind has not been an explicit 
focus within the Habermasian/deliberative literature. Still, I think it has been present, if 
only implicitly, from the very beginning. I will further develop this dialogic orientation 
by reference to Martin Buber’s work in the next chapter. But at this stage, I want to 
demonstrate that there has been a sense by deliberativists (only rarely acknowledged, and 
occasionally denied outright) that something happens within certain sorts of interpersonal 
experiences – experiences that go beyond how and about what we exchange arguments. 
And through these experiences citizens’ engagement with one another can produce some 
of the uncoerced transformations that deliberative democracy depends on.  
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 To begin mining the deliberative literature for this alternative I will return first to 
its wellspring in Habermas, this time by way of a critique offered by Axel Honneth. I do 
this in order to show that Habermas offered another normative possibility in his 
communicative program within interpersonal relations themselves. From there, I offer a 
few committed deliberativists who stress alternative types of meeting and/or 
communication in immediate interpersonal relations that I think gestures at something 
like dialogue. With these theorists we begin to get an outline of what a dialogic theory is 
and what it can accomplish within the deliberative model. But it will be the task of the 
following chapter to fill in this theory via the work of Martin Buber. Nancy Fraser, Iris 
Young, Jane Mansbridge, and James Fishkin, are all central to my claim that the 
resources for a theory of dialogue are in many ways already implicit in deliberative 
politics. They each articulate, in their own ways, the importance of encounters between 
citizens that are direct (face-to-face), welcoming, spontaneous, and unreserved. All of 
this will be central to an account of a dialogic grounding for deliberative politics. By the 
end of this chapter, then, I hope to have provided a direction for developing a dialogic 
account of interpersonal exchange that has a “home” in a deliberative politics. 
 
An Ambivalence in Habermas; Or, Exploring the Normative Possibilities in Interpersonal 
Relations 
 
 As I argued in the last chapter, deliberative democratic theory relies on a 
Habermasian foundation for its normative claim about the transformative potential 
inherent in rational communication. But in this section I explore the possibility that 
Habermas also left the door open to normative potential being located in interpersonal 
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relations themselves, though he did not himself follow through on this as completely as 
he might of. Deliberative theory, in its uptake of Habermas, also ignored the normative 
potential located in these interpersonal relations. Instead, deliberative theorists invested 
all of the transformative potential in processes of communication that unfold within such 
relations. But allow me to work through the ambivalence between interpersonal relations 
and communication in the Habermasian project beginning with a critique by Axel 
Honneth. 
Axel Honneth, thought by many to be the heir apparent of Habermas and the 
Frankfurt School, has offered a different approach to the critical theory program that, in 
part, expands on a tension he finds in Habermas’s work.  According to Honneth, 
Habermas utilized a “real” or “immanent” anchor in a theory of language use and social 
relations in order to offer a transcendent critical theory with emancipatory possibilities 
(with the proper unleashing of communicative reason and communicatively generated 
power). That is, Habermas attempted to locate normative potential (the possibility of 
greater human emancipation) in an actual feature of human life – in his case, 
intersubjective language use. Honneth has suggested that his own project seeks the same 
immanence/transcendence move (like all good critical theory), but he finds it necessary to 
move beyond Habermas’s particular framework because:  
a certain ambivalence is still inherent in his [Habermas’s] efforts, since it is not 
entirely clear whether the transcending potential is to reside in the normative 
presuppositions of human language or in social interaction. Even if this distinction 
appears artificial – since all complex actions among people are linguistically 
mediated – in the end it makes a considerable difference whether social 
interactions themselves bear normative expectations or whether it is only through 
language that a normative element comes into communication.1  
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Further, if the normative potential is linked primarily to the use of language oriented 
towards reaching understanding, then it happens in that “pre-theoretical space” that is 
prior to the awareness and experience of those that engage in it. Or, put differently, any 
success (or distortion) of this fundamental type of communicative practice happens, 
“behind the backs of the subjects involved” and this “in no way appears as an 
emancipatory process in the moral experiences of the subjects involved.”2 To sum up the 
point: speech acts do not make themselves apparent in our experiences of interpersonal 
relations. Their successful (or unsuccessful) functioning remain hidden from us in the 
give-and-take of lived communicative experience. As such, any normative potential that 
resides only in the proper functioning of language (through appropriate speech acts) 
escapes our awareness, and thus our ability to participate in emancipatory action as 
subjects. The whole normative project that is tied to communication in language, then, is 
removed from the very actions and experiences we have as social actors within which 
proper (or distorted) communication unfolds.   
But Honneth thinks that an alternative exists “if we follow Habermas’s 
communication paradigm more in the direction of its intersubjective, indeed sociological, 
presuppositions.”3 For Honneth, this means a turn towards a recognition-theoretic 
perspective, which relies on the experiences of disrespect as a violation of the normative 
expectations of proper intersubjective recognition. Or, more simply, an anchoring of his 
normative theory directly in social experiences themselves and not (strictly) in formal 
rules of language use. 
My aim here is neither to endorse nor criticize Honneth’s program of recognition 
directly. While I certainly think that experiences of mutual recognition are in fact central 
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to both dialogue and good deliberation, I will describe the experience of recognition in 
different terms than Honneth does.4 But this critique of Habermas demonstrates 
something important about locating normative possibilities in the functioning of language 
that is (in a sense) outside of our interpersonal interactions themselves. This move has 
been reproduced by much of the deliberative literature, which has sided far too much 
with the abstract communicative exchange typified by Habermas’s later move to moral 
theory, rather than locating normative possibilities in social relations themselves. Any 
“transcending” potential for deliberation is thus located in the functioning of rational 
communication, rather than in the event of our meeting and speaking. Or, again, as 
Honneth helps us understand it, democratic theorists locate the normative potential of 
deliberation too firmly in a communicative framework that is not part of the immediate 
“moral experiences” of citizens in their actual engagements with one another. However, 
one can find material in Habermas that opens the door up to seeing normative potential 
located in experiences had in direct interpersonal engagement, just as Honneth suggests, 
though there are also some limitations in his project that need to be addressed as well.  
Recall that Habermas defines communicative action as “the interaction of at least 
two subjects capable of speech and action who establish interpersonal relations (whether 
by verbal or extra-verbal means),” where the actors “seek to reach an understanding 
about the action situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by 
way of agreement.”5 Given that communicative action is the base for the Habermasian 
move to discourse and democracy, this event where the subjects establish interpersonal 
relations would seem worthy of explanation. In a sense, it remains “step one” of each and 
every particular cooperative endeavor that makes rational communication between 
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subjects possible. By comparison, however, it sees much less attention from Habermas 
than does the structure of the linguistic exchange and the presuppositions that are 
required for a successful cooperative venture. And, consequently, receives almost no 
attention by deliberativists indebted to this Habermasian project.   
One way to conceptualize what this establishing of interpersonal relations requires 
could be by (again, drawing from Honneth) understanding it as an experience of mutual 
recognition: an “event” in which participants acknowledge one another and invite them 
(as equals) into the communicative exchange. Habermas seems to have something like 
this in mind at times, but continually reduces the event to the process of communication 
that follows from it, to the actual offering of validity claims and responses in a reciprocal 
way (thereby acknowledging one’s interlocutor as an equal participant in the exchange). 
But he uses the concept of recognition both to mean recognition of validity claims and 
the recognition of an other without carefully distinguishing between the two.6 Even when 
Habermas addresses matters having to do with intersubjective recognition in response to 
Charles Taylor’s famous essay on the politics of recognition, he does so by reference to 
the recognition of subjects capable of political action in a modern democracy.7 In this 
case, he argues all that is needed is the actualization of the political rights guaranteed as 
individuals in order to participate and be recognized as a specific other (in terms of 
individual or groups status). This is, in a sense, correct when pitched at the level of 
recognition of one’s universal status as a political actor who is entitled to press one’s 
particular claims. But it misses the fullest impact of the harms of misrecognition in one’s 
everyday social interactions, a harm that is richly described by Taylor (and Honneth, as 
well). It is not simply about being allowed to speak or participate, but being affirmed, 
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acknowledged, and/or confirmed as a specific other (perhaps as part of a specific group). 
This is something required alongside (or, perhaps even prior to) one’s being recognized 
as an individual capable of speech, action and political participation. It  involves one’s 
being recognized as the individual that one is in any given moment. Always temporarily 
so, of course, but nonetheless “me” in an irreplaceable sense, which needs your 
acceptance and affirmation.  
Thus for Habermas it seems that recognition is simply a part of the 
communicative exchange, either produced within it, or as an always already present and 
part of any linguistic exchange. But this does not shed light on the nature of the 
interpersonal relation that is required, nor the function of those “extra-verbal” means that 
might secure our cooperative interaction. Further, he also often reminds his readers that 
communicative action does not coincide with the speech acts that coordinate it, which 
seems to lean again to a thicker conception of communicative action then suggested by a 
consideration of language use only.8 Habermas hints at such a direction, but never really 
delivers a theory of such relations apart from his theory of communicative exchange. 
Recognition seems central to this establishment of interpersonal relations, but its status is 
unclear in Habermas’s project, and thus by itself cannot shed much light on what is 
required in these relations for communicative action to properly function. 
Kenneth Baynes seems to tap into this ambivalent element in Habermas in his 
comparison of Hegel and Habermas’s notions of freedom, specifically referring to 
communicative freedom in Habermas’s case. He writes: “On the one hand, freedom is a 
normative social status that, together with the capacity to reason in general, depends on 
forms of recognition and the social practices in which they reside … Subjectivity, in the 
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sense of being a ‘reason-giver’, depends centrally upon the existence of distinct forms of 
social recognition.”9 Thus Baynes, referring to a Habermasian trope, calls subjectivity 
and intersubjectivity “co-constitutive.” This means that what allows two subjects to 
reason cooperatively is a certain freedom to respond as independent subjects to one 
anothers’ claims – freely give ‘yes or no’ responses. And this freedom is available to a 
given subject in virtue, it would seem, of a host of social processes (proper socialization 
towards competent language use, for instance) as well as the ‘granting’ of a proper 
place/status in which to speak located in the nature of co-participation in linguistic 
interaction. 
Again, however, Honneth’s comments on the ambivalence of this account remain. 
If some elements that establish interpersonal relations in which communicative action can 
occur are (at least sometimes) ‘extra-linguistic,’ then they happen apart from what occurs 
within the cooperative exchange of validity claims. In fact, such relations seem to be 
necessarily prior to, and at a minimum something at least partially independent from, any 
cooperative exchange of reasons/validity claims – even on Habermas’s own definition of 
communicative action. 
So why does any of this matter to deliberative democracy? I think many 
deliberative theorists may have too narrowly conceived the transformative potential in 
their own model following a reading of Habermas that depends on the abstract, “higher 
level” intersubjectivity of rational communication; at least, in terms of their explicit 
defense of the potential inherent in deliberation. And in doing so, they are “stuck” with a 
model that has limited congruence to our actual experiences of democratic engagement 
that produces opportunities for movement and transformation. But they could have, also 
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following Habermas, explored a different direction regarding interpersonal relations and 
what their role is in establishing the very possibility of communication oriented towards 
understanding. But just as Habermas displayed some ambivalence in this regard, so too 
have many deliberative theorists. That is, most deliberativists seem, like Habermas, to 
locate the normative potential in the deliberative model in the power of public reason and 
argumentative exchange. But, also like Habermas, they seem to place a great deal of 
importance in the interpersonal relations established more or less directly between actual 
people in small-scale (face-to-face) settings. In short, as the theorists detailed below and 
in chapter 4 demonstrate, deliberativists have often relied on transformative moments 
produced in interpersonal exchange to “show” that the power of public reasoning and 
argument is doing what they hope – no matter how much our experience and practice 
points to something in these relations themselves. In other words, they have implicitly 
pursued Honneth’s reading of Habermas and focused on social interaction and 
interpersonal relation, but retained Habermas’s language about the normative hopes 
located in language and communication itself, obscuring the role that these social 
interactions and interpersonal relations actually play in their own theories.    
Of course, deliberative democratic theorists have spent relatively little ink on 
either the theoretical problem of their reliance on public reasoning, nor on working 
through an actual phenomenology of democratic participation in interpersonal relations 
themselves that transforms opinion and will. However, some have moved us in a 
direction to consider what might be involved in social relations themselves (and not tied 
narrowly to the nature of reason-governed exchanges) that makes deliberation work. I 
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turn now to some of these accounts in order to set the stage for a dialogic theory in the 
following chapter. 
 
 Beyond Rational Communication, Towards Dialogue: Deliberative Democracy Revisited  
 
Nancy Fraser, The Ethics of Solidarity and the Subaltern Counterpublic 
 
In general, Nancy Fraser has been a supporter of a Habermasian approach to 
democratic institutions and practice, though she has often been a “friendly critic” within 
this same debate.10 From very early on in the secondary literature on Habermas and 
democracy, Fraser began to mark out a slightly different approach to what makes good 
public deliberation possible. This approach, I argue, seems to rely on something that is 
beyond the nature of communicative practice between individuals. Instead, it seems to get 
at a “thicker” conception of what allows deliberation to be successful for a diverse range 
of people. This “thicker” conception places a great deal of the normative possibilities in 
deliberation in secure spaces for communication, diverse styles of communication, and 
on the strong bonds that connect up communities of people and make their 
communicative practice more meaningful and successful. And all of this moves us closer 
to dialogue than deliberation.  
In a commentary on Seyla Benhabib’s work, Fraser suggests that a politics of 
discourse has an advantage of being able to contest dominant cultural patterns of 
communication and exclusion, so long as discourse ethics could “maintain a kind of 
suspicion or distance from any given vocabulary for interpreting needs, defining 
situations and pressing claims.” If not, then dominant modes and styles of communication 
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could limit participatory (deliberative included) possibilities of subordinated groups by 
excluding their input. In order to secure sites for equal discursive participation, Fraser 
wants  collective identities to  be stressed as the path to a better political ethic 
(specifically, an ethic of solidarity) for combating privileged discourses. This is in part 
because Fraser believes there is a real collective dimension to identity that is made up of 
relationships that exist in an “intermediate zone” where solidarity and collective ties 
matter. This ethic offers political resources in order to ensure group members have equal 
participatory opportunities “in moral and political deliberation” and to: “speak and be 
heard, to tell one’s own life-story, to press one’s claims and point of view in one’s own 
voice.”11    
Fraser expands on these ideas in another essay that, in particular, has had an 
enormous impact on the Habermasian picture: “Rethinking the Public Sphere” in 
Habermas and the Public Sphere. Habermas himself has explicitly supported thinking 
about the public sphere in the terms Fraser introduces in this essay.12 In general, Fraser 
meant this essay to support the overarching idea of a public sphere as necessary for a 
critical theory and a radical conception of democracy. Her concern is, however, that the 
image of the public sphere painted by Habermas in Structural Transformation is 
(problematically) both bourgeois and masculinist. As such, this original formulation 
offered by Habermas does more to exclude than to include a wide variety of voices and 
viewpoints by relying on a bracketing of social difference (even if this seemed to have 
the effect of privileging only the best arguments). That is, in terms of her earlier article, 
the public sphere envisioned by Habermas was too likely to contain an exclusionary 
communicative style (a style common, for instance, amongst educated white males), 
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which by definition privileged some groups’ participation in social life over others. A 
public sphere that is made up of a number of smaller counterpublics is preferable 
(descriptively and normatively) for Fraser both in “actual” democratic society (marked by 
inequality and political exclusion), and even in an ideal democracy (which is more or less 
completely egalitarian and is multicultural). The reasons for multiple counterpublics are 
slightly different relative to which of these two societies are being considered.    
For actual democratic society, the counterpublic represents a site of critical 
contestation to ‘dominant’ discourses. Rather than bracket inequalities, counterpublics 
can successfully “thematize” such inequalities and put them into public consideration. 
Further, in public discourse dominant paradigms and ways of understanding very often 
control the terms of discourse and eliminate points of view critical to these dominant 
ways of thinking. In such cases, discourses counter to this dominating one can be 
articulated and advanced within counterpublics. This is why Fraser titles such 
counterpublics “subaltern.” She imagines them as “parallel discursive arenas where 
members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to 
formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs.”13 These 
counterdiscourses can have an effect on “official public spheres.” Fraser finds such 
evidence in the successes of the feminist counterpublic, which successfully articulated 
“new terms for describing social reality, including, ‘sexism,’ ‘the double shift,’ ‘sexual 
harassment,’ and ‘marital, date, and acquaintance rape.’”14 Thus participatory parity 
(Fraser’s own critical-theoretical yardstick) is served by the existence of subaltern 
publics, even in a society where perfect equality does not exist. 
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Focusing on a normative model of public debate, Fraser argues that for societies 
that have already achieved egalitarian social relations, and are multicultural (a likely 
outgrowth of free expression and association, she thinks) multiple publics remain 
necessary. The reasons why recall her rationale for the political advantages of 
considering an ethic of solidarity in a discursive ethics framework. Fraser argues that 
participation in a particularistic counterpublic (one devoted to some particular social 
group) is necessary because what happens in public space goes “beyond” simple 
exchange of arguments. Matters of identity and (though she did not yet utilize the term) 
recognition are in play in these spaces. She writes: 
To answer this question [why multiple publics would still be necessary], we need 
to take a closer look at the relationship between public discourse and social 
identities. Pace the bourgeois conception, public spheres are not only arenas for 
the formation of discursive opinion; in addition, they are arenas for the formation 
of and enactment of social identities. This means that participation is not simply a 
matter of being able to state propositional contents that are neutral with respect to 
form of expression. Rather, as I argued in the previous section, participation 
means being able to speak in one’s own voice, and thereby simultaneously to 
construct and express one’s cultural identity through idiom and style.15 
 
To be able to participate in processes of not only opinion and will formation, but also 
processes of culture and identity construction does not move one beyond the scope of 
communicative action. After all, communicative action was the means by which 
lifeworlds are created, sustained, and remade. But Fraser’s point seems to be that these 
processes are intimately tied to our public participation of a more classically 
“deliberative” sort (the discursive exchange of public arguments). Hence the likelihood 
that “counterdiscourses” will emerge from subaltern publics as particular (and in some 
way disvalued, excluded, or unequal) social groups articulate particular experiences 
against dominant assumptions. But even in the absence of a need to create 
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counterdiscourses from a particular social experience, multiple publics provide a place in 
which one can speak and be heard in those particular ways that one is accustomed to. 
This indicates that for Fraser there is something thicker required for public discourse to 
properly unfold. Public discourse best takes place within interpersonal relations of a 
certain sort – just as within identity groups that Fraser saw as politically important in her 
ethic of solidarity. The problem being addressed here is that those in dominant groups 
have a space where they have been received as participants – as competent contributors to 
opinion and will (and culture and identity) formation. Multiple publics provide similar 
“pre” acceptance for those not properly welcomed or encouraged in these other spaces. 
They give us spaces to speak as someone (in particular) to someone (in particular). In 
short, multiple publics for Fraser seem to offer opportunities to connect and share with 
others in a thicker way than the neutral exchange of reason could possibly provide, and at 
its worst may dissuade such exchange (at a minimum for those who aren’t already 
socialized to participate in this way). Expectations of recognition, lifeworlds that more 
fully overlap, and especially opportunities for unreserved communication with others that 
care to listen – all of this is likely in play within one’s collective group and its related 
“sub-public.” Thus, it is not the potential for public reasoning of a certain sort that moves 
participants in Fraser’s story, or at least not only this. Put in terms I hope to defend later, 
smaller publics and collective identity groups open up opportunities for real meeting and 
communication – “dialogic encounters” – in a way that an “all encompassing” rational-
critical debate or a discourse ethics as usually understood cannot. And Fraser begins to 
point to this fact very early in the literature, though it is not yet a theory of dialogue 
properly speaking. 
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Iris Young, City Life, Communication Styles, and the Ambiguous Place of the Face-to-
Face 
 
Iris Young offered two impactful works on democratic theory. In her first work, 
Justice and the Politics of Difference, Young gives a critical appraisal of various forms of 
oppression and a defense of the value of diversity and difference for an ideal democratic 
life. This work is not directly concerned with deliberative democracy or Habermas, 
though some similar terrain is covered by both this book and the emerging literature on 
deliberative democracy. But her following book is fully engaged with the deliberative 
model. Taken at face value, neither of these works seem to offer anything approaching a 
theory of dialogue. In fact, Young is critical of those democratic theories that rely too 
heavily on face-to-face elements, which she associates (unfortunately, I think) with the 
neo-republican theories of communitarian writers. And she is critical of political 
possibilities inherent in face-to-face interaction both in ontological terms, as well as 
practical. But despite her strong criticism of neo-republicans, I think Young is actually 
ambivalent about interpersonal interactions and the desirability of actual meeting between 
citizens in both of her accounts of democracy. Despite herself, I think Young opens us up 
to something only beginning to emerge in Fraser’s work. Namely, the idea that  actually 
encountering others presented before us means something valuable to democracy and 
democratic communication. And arguments, rational or no, do not seem to really get at 
the heart of these relational possibilities. In the sense Honneth hints at, they are 
interpersonal and very much in the experience of those that participate in them. And 
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whereas Fraser was inclined to focus on such meeting within a given community/identity 
group/public, Young reminds us that diversity and meeting across difference are equally, 
if not more important in thinking about the possibilities of better democracy. In what 
follows I want to work through both her critique of the neo-republicans as well as explore 
some of the many ways in which she points toward a theory of dialogue, despite her 
misgivings about face-to-face politics. 
In Justice and the Politics of Difference, Young offers a strong criticism of ideals 
of community that underlie republican politics. She thinks that such politics rely on 
assumptions that are both metaphysically suspect and politically undesirable. This notion 
of community suffers from what she calls (following Foucault) a “Rousseauist Dream.” 
She writes: 
This ideal [of community] expresses a desire for the fusion of subjects with one 
another which in practice operates to exclude those with whom the group does not 
identify. The ideal of community denies and represses social difference, the fact 
that the polity cannot be thought of as a unity in which all participants share a 
common experience and common values.16 
 
This problematic ideal of community, which she thinks is shared not only by neo-
republicans such as Benjamin Barber and Michael Sandel, but also by deliberative 
theorists such as Seyla Benhabib, relies on notions of reciprocity and mutuality in their 
democratic theories. All of these theorists mistakenly rely on what Derrida calls the 
“copresence of subjects.” This means that they assume that “each understands the others 
and recognizes the others in the same way that they understand themselves, and all 
recognize that the others understand them as they understand themselves.” This, she 
argues, “denies the ontological difference within and between subjects.”17 Young argues 
that subjects are asymmetrical, opaque (to themselves and to others) and necessarily 
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heterogeneous. When democratic theorists pave over diversity and heterogeneity in this 
way, it results in “serious political consequences” of privileging face-to-face politics. 
Instead Young suggests (in order to avoid such fallacious metaphysics) that, “Politics 
must be conceived as a relationship of strangers who do not understand one another in a 
subjective and immediate sense, relating across time and space.”18 
As Young moves on to defend her conception of communicative democracy, her 
fear about face-to-face politics remains, though not for (only) the metaphysical reasons 
she defended earlier. Her concerns are more practical and along Habermasian lines. Her 
concerns about unity and homogeneity remain, but now she adds a criticism about the 
impractical nature of small-scale face-to-face for modern complex democracies. Both 
neo-republicans and some deliberative democrats fall in this camp, she thinks. Instead, 
she thinks democracy needs to be thought of as de-centered, existing in mediated, diffuse 
interactions between citizens across time and space. 
It would seem Young, then, is a rather odd figure to turn to for uncovering a latent 
concept of dialogue. However, I argue that despite her explicit criticisms of face-to-face 
politics, she repeatedly returns to a vision of democracy that seems to rely on the benefits 
related to actual interpersonal connections that citizens might make. And this is, I argue, 
a kind of pushing towards the necessity of dialogue for democracy, even if Young would 
have rejected this claim.  
Young nods occasionally toward the value of face-to-face meetings and small-
scale politics, even as she insists on understanding a politics that relies on treating them 
critically. In Justice and the Politics of Differences, she writes: 
I am not arguing that there is no difference between small groups in which 
persons relate to one another face-to-face and other social relations, nor am I 
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denying a unique value to such face-to-face groups … existing with others in 
communities of mutual regard has specific characteristics of warmth and sharing 
that are humanly valuable … A vision of the good society surely should include 
institutional arrangements that nurture the specific experience of mutual 
friendship which only relatively small groups interacting in a plurality of contexts 
can produce. But recognizing the value and specificity of such face-to-face 
relations is different from privileging them and positing them as a model for the 
institutional relations of a whole society.19 
 
And in Inclusion and Democracy, she again offers a hesitant nod towards small scale 
politics: 
Without question, democracy cannot function well unless there is freedom of 
association and civic culture that encourages people to meet in small groups to 
discuss the issues that press on their collective life. A discussion-based 
democratic theory will be irrelevant to contemporary society, however, unless it 
can apply its values, norms, and insights to large-scale politics.20 
 
Still, it is not in these nods to the value of face-to-face interactions we find Young’s 
dependence on dialogic experiences, but right in the heart of her democratic theory itself. 
I will consider each “part” of her democratic theory in turn, her ideal of “city life” 
presented in Justice and the Politics of Difference, and her “communicative” democratic 
theory in Inclusion and Democracy. Both, I argue, have at their core a largely implicit 
dependence on something very close to a theory of dialogic experiences. 
In Young’s understanding of “city life,” the city is normatively preferable to the 
(homogenous) community for four reasons: social differentiation without exclusion, 
variety, eroticism, and publicity.21 By social differentiation without exclusion Young 
means that urban life offers a certain freedom to form “affinity groups” in a way that is 
never fully “settled.” Groups (and individual members of groups) intersperse, overlap, 
and intermingle. Though borders between groups exist (there are neighborhoods that have 
clear “ethnic identity”), these borders are always uncertain and at bottom undecidable. 
Variety exists in cities because of the diversity of social space and the intermixing of 
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purposes in social spaces. Bars, clubs, restaurants comingle with residences and offices. 
People form attachments to their particular mix of social spaces, engendering 
commitments to the diverse range of people and places that make up “their” 
neighborhood. Eroticism is meant in the broad sense of an attraction or pleasure in the 
strange and other. The diversity in cities brings us into the constant possibility of new, 
unfamiliar experiences and encounters. And its aesthetic qualities can always entice and 
entertain us. Finally, publicity refers to the inherently public dimension always present in 
cities. Cities provide spaces and forums open to anyone and everyone to speak and listen. 
They are full of spaces where the truly heterogeneous public can operate. 
 Throughout this description of city life, Young makes frequent gestures towards 
the importance of face-to-face meeting for the benefits of city life to be realized. In 
understanding social differentiation without exclusion, affinity groups appear as those 
close relations between like minded people that motivates the communitarian vision of 
community. Of course, these groups are more uncertain at their margins. But what makes 
them non-exclusive is “a side-by-side particularity” where they can “intermingle” without 
becoming homogenous. Groups exist both as opportunities for encounter of “sameness,” 
while encounters with difference limit their exclusionary abilities. Encounters, one 
presumes, in the actual sense of meeting and interacting with others. Variety is based on 
what Young calls the “interfusion” of groups in multiuse social spaces. That is, the 
variety comes from the actual interaction of people from different groups in actual social 
life as they “go about their business.” Eroticism is similarly based in the experiences of 
“walking through Chinatown, or checking out this week’s eccentric players in the park.” 
She writes: “There is another kind of pleasure … in coming to encounter a subjectivity, 
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as set of meanings, that is different, unfamiliar … A place of many places, the city folds 
over on itself in so many layers and relationships that it is incomprehensible. One cannot 
‘take it in,’ one never feels as though there is nothing new and interesting to explore, no 
new and interesting people to meet.” 22 In short, the city’s eroticism is bound up in the 
possibility that we meet, face-to-face, with something different than ourselves. The 
public-ness of the city is similarly oriented towards the actual meeting, speaking and 
listening of citizens to one another in the spaces and forums it provides. It is, by 
definition, a site of engagement of people actually presented to one another in public, 
“where people stand and sit together, interact and mingle, or simply witness one another 
… where anyone can speak and anyone can listen.”23 
 Nowhere in Young’s description of an ideal social setting, vibrant and 
democratic, are face-to-face engagements precluded. Far from it. Interactions between 
people actually present to one another seem to form the heart of what the normative ideal 
of the city offers us. And, of course, these interactions are supposed to affirm diversity 
and difference (not reduce it to homogeneity), which makes them different from the sort 
of neo-republican politics of face-to-face interactions she criticizes, though she does not 
offer us a theory about the difference between these valuable encounters and exchanges 
and those she derides, only the assertion that they are in fact different.  
 And so it is with Young’s communicative democracy. Young is critical of those 
deliberative projects that assume a politics of face-to-face interaction, citing their 
insufficiency in complex modern democracies. Yet, her own attempts to understand a 
more inclusive democratic politics often return to this very space. Consider her attempts 
to open up communication styles of public debate to include greeting, rhetoric, and 
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storytelling. These modes of address are meant to draw on communicative practices that 
occur in “everyday life” to “enable understanding and interaction in ways argument alone 
cannot.”24 Greeting is meant to invite others, to recognize or acknowledge interlocutors, 
to name them as partners in a common project. It is a crucial “first step” because, 
“Without the moment of greeting … no discussion can take place at all, because the 
parties refuse to face one another as dialogue partners.”25 Indeed, rhetoric, in its 
affirmative sense (not in its potentially deceitful mode), brings passion and color to 
exchanges. It is how we engage an audience passionately and be sure we are engaged by 
them in return. It is not always utilized in speech (though it often is), but may come in a 
variety of forms, “visual media, signs and banners, street demonstrations, guerrilla 
theatre, and the use of symbols.”26 But importantly it serves to (among other things) make 
communication attentive to particularity of an audience, a difficult but important task in 
complex society. “[A]ny actual situation of political discussion is particular with respect 
to forum, participants, audience, issue, and the history that has called forth the discussion 
… Rhetoric constructs the speaker, the audience, and occasion by invoking or creating 
specific connotations, symbols, and commitments.”27 Storytelling, or narrative, is meant 
to put interlocutors into a relation of understanding or sharing by revealing personal 
experiences, collective meanings or understandings that the audience might not be 
familiar with, and enlarging thought. It is a mode of communication that can open up the 
possibility of meaningful exchange when difference is “too great.” She describes 
storytelling as a way for ‘local publics’ to form within mass society: “Storytelling is often 
an important means by which members of such collectives identify one another, and 
identify the basis of their affinity. The narrative exchanges give reflective voice to 
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situated experiences and help affinity.”28  And while these local publics are not 
synonymous with a spatial locality (they need not form only among people in the same 
place and time), these publics are meant to indicate those smaller, more intimate spaces 
that are “carved out” of mass society. Thus storytelling is meant to move ever closer to an 
ideal of community and face-to-face politics than may otherwise be available in society.  
The relations in these accounts are very often between speakers and audience, 
between participants in a discussion, between performers and observers, and between 
localized groups of affinity. Thus they seem largely oriented towards describing actual 
engagements between people. Arguments, of course, can be more or less mediated. They 
might take place in the op-ed sections of newspapers, on television, or other “de-
centered” forums. But Young herself seems to understand communication as rooted in 
exchanges that are at least in some meaningful sense “personal” or “inter-personal.” And 
at a minimum they serve to bridge the distance (physical or affective) created in mass 
society by bringing us closer to the ideal of actual engagement with others.  
 Consider further her understanding of the way in which common problems and 
concerns are solved in publics. She writes: 
 
Political co-operation requires a less substantial unity than shared understandings 
or a common good … It requires first that people whose lives and actions affect 
one another in a web of institutions, interactions, and unintended consequences 
acknowledge that they are together in such a space of mutual effect. Their 
conflicts and problems are produced by such togetherness.29 
 
The mechanism for dealing with these problems produced by togetherness is the 
democratic participation of citizens in a public (and, of course, some defined procedural 
mechanisms for democratic decision making). And it is notable that Young relies on 
 75 
 
 
Arendt for her description of what a public is: “a place of appearance where actors stand 
before others and are subject to the mutual scrutiny and judgment from a plurality of 
perspectives.”30 Again, the language here is about standing before others, communicating 
with them, speaking and listening, being together. This is not the stuff of face-to-face 
interaction only, but it seems certainly to have its roots therein. 
 
Jane Mansbridge and “Everyday Talk” 
  
Mansbridge, in some ways, can make a claim to being a pioneer of the 
deliberative turn, at least as it gained a following by way of its critical relation towards 
interest group liberalism. Her Beyond Adversary Democracy, while most immediately 
impactful to neo-republican “strong” democrats in the 1980’s, is still a widely cited work 
for deliberative theorists today. In it she relies on two case studies, a town-hall meeting 
and a workplace (a crisis response center), to begin to articulate an alternative “unitary 
model” of democracy located in face-to-face settings. And while Mansbridge is careful to 
distinguish unitary democracy as a model where common interests reign (and thus not a 
replacement for the more traditional adversarial model), this opened up a great deal of 
interest in alternatives to adversarial politics and the everyday politics that happens 
between “regular folks” in small, face-to-face settings.31 
In a much later essay commenting on Gutmann and Thompson’s, Democracy and 
Disagreement, Mansbridge brings to bear this orientation towards the everyday and 
interpersonal elements of politics on a deliberative ideal. Here she understands the role of 
“everyday talk” as a critical component of the “deliberative system.” Though by itself 
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this kind of talk does not always (or even often) meet a suitable definition of deliberation, 
Mansbridge thinks it helps contribute to a process where people can “change themselves 
and others in ways that are better for them and for the whole society.”32 It does this in 
two ways. First, it facilitates the political action of the “everyday activist” who grabs 
ideas or criticisms from larger movements and applies them in the practical dealings in 
personal life. It is thus the medium of personal politics. Second, everyday talk also 
“sometimes provides spaces that shelter one from the demands of more formal 
deliberation.” She describes this everyday talk thusly:  
Everyday talk sometimes provides spaces, such as the arms of a best friend, in 
which the most corrosive and externally harmful words can be uttered, 
understood, assimilated, and reworked for more public consumption … good 
deliberation has to include what goes on before and after, as individuals talk over 
their positions with likeminded and opposing others … These processes work best 
in groups of only two or three, where the flow of communication, both verbal and 
non-verbal, is relatively unfettered. [Formal public spaces] all require their spaces 
of unmediated authenticity, which sometimes require nonreciprocity toward the 
outside world.33 
 
This idea, I think, captures a version of daily, on the ground, political activity that has to 
transpire between “real” people in “real” relations to others. Thus they are even smaller 
“publics” than one is inclined to picture in Fraser’s account above. But the concepts 
overlap, to be sure. Each theorist is envisioning a smaller space, carved out of our bigger 
discursive participation. A space in which one is free to be oneself with some other(s).   
Mansbridge’s concern is to differentiate what may happen within these enclaves 
of personal conversation from what should be expected from good deliberators – 
deference only to better arguments, reciprocity and mutual respect, etc. Hence her focus 
on the potentially “corrosive and harmful words” and “nonreciprocity with the outside 
world.”34 And this may well be a powerful function of non-deliberative personal 
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conversation, and perhaps of the subaltern counterpublic as well – a space to “vent.” But 
this venting is productive. And these everyday conversations need not be (and are not 
always) so inflamed. They are sometimes (as Mansbridge said) about resolving a 
disagreement, or addressing someone with whom we disagree in this smaller context. 
Their topics and stakes vary. But Mansbridge’s overall point seems to be that these side 
conversations of an everyday nature are helpful in producing better deliberation because, 
as part of a deliberative system, they have the potential to produce something 
transformative for those involved. 
 Note the words Mansbridge relies on in describing what makes these smaller 
conversations meaningful. They provide “unfettered communication” and “unmediated 
authenticity” between conversation partners. There is a Habermasian reading of these 
features of a conversation relative to communicative action. Habermas understands 
everyday conversation as (at least potentially) communicative action, so long as 
particular types of expressions are offered towards reaching some kind of 
understanding.35 A Habermasian no doubt thinks something like this is a part of what 
makes everyday talk a potential contributor to greater understanding between speakers 
and hearers. 36  And certainly “unfettered” communication could be construed as 
communication not distorted by strategically oriented forms of power. But I think 
Mansbridge has something else in mind here. Instead, this unfolding of everyday talk is 
deeply related to a personal presence of particular speakers and hearers – a meeting in 
which what is said is not limited by a desire to “win anyone over” (hence its unfettered-
ness) and involves an actual sharing of space in a personal relation (which is why it is 
“immediate” and “authentic”). Within such interpersonal relations, something happens 
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that cannot be understood in terms of the give and take of reasons – even if something 
like the give and take of reasons happens. The relation itself in which everyday talk 
unfolds seems of the utmost impotence for its own sake and for better deliberation.       
 
James Fishkin and an Unseen Mover in Deliberative Opinion Polls 
 
 Thus far, we have only taken the institutionalization of deliberative democratic 
principles as a side issue. This discussion will occupy much of the final chapter, but I 
think at this stage there is good reason to turn to one of the leading figures in the effort to 
institutionalize deliberative democracy, James Fishkin. In Fishkin’s most recent work, 
When the People Speak, he attempts to show how his design of the Deliberative Opinion 
Poll can achieve something approximating the advantages of the deliberative model en 
masse from within smaller, more manageable settings. And he thinks the results of 
experiments with these Deliberative Opinion Polls have produced some very promising 
data in defense of the deliberative model. I think his description of the most 
transformative space within these events are actually better evidence of a dialogic, rather 
than a deliberative foundation for the results these Polls have demonstrated.  
 The Polls work as follows: first, a poll is conducted generating public opinion on 
some set of issues to be addressed in a smaller deliberative group. This smaller group is a 
random sample of citizens (approximating something like “the people”), and are given 
background information on some set of issues which is aimed at a balanced presentation. 
Then, this random sample meets for a weekend receiving presentations from experts “on 
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both sides of the issue” during which they can ask questions. And then, and this will be 
crucial, they also meet in smaller groups to deliberate together in face-to-face settings.37  
 Fishkin and some collaborators have statistically measured the change in opinions 
at various stages in the this process. The results for the overall event lend support to the 
transformative possibilities of deliberation as conducted in these Polls. But more, the 
results indicate that for many issues, the most change-inducing element of the whole 
deliberative process is the small group “in-house” deliberations.38 The question is what 
makes this small group stage so powerful. One explanation Fishkin offers that I find 
especially interesting is given in response to criticism from Lynn Sanders. One of 
Sanders’ criticisms is that opinions arrived at through deliberation may or may not result 
from the process of better reasoning. She cites psychological studies that indicate that 
prejudice and bias may color our political opinions “under the surface” of our 
consciousness. In response, Fishkin claims that some evidence from Deliberative Polls 
show that people can overcome prejudice, whatever their predispositions were (and, 
presumably however deep in one’s consciousness they were rooted). He offers the 
following anecdote: 
In the very first US [Deliberative Poll], the National Issues Convention in 1996, 
we observed what may be part of the dynamic. An eighty-four year old white 
conservative was in the same small group as an African American woman who 
was on welfare. Welfare reform was part of one of the topics (the future of the 
American family). At the beginning of the small group, the conservative said to 
the woman, “you don’t have a family” because a family required having a mother 
and father in the same household. At the end of the weekend, he came up to her 
and said “what are the three most important words in the English language? They 
are ‘I was wrong.’” I have always interpreted that incident as indicating that he 
came to see her viewpoint in the discussions. There was a kind of ideal role taking 
in which he could view the issue from her point of view as well as from his own.39   
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And a second, equally moving account from a discussion in Bulgaria from which Fishkin 
draws a similar conclusion: 
I noticed a similar dynamic with the Roma. I observed a small group in which one 
of the participants claimed that the Roma were lazy and undependable workers. 
Then a woman said that she had never missed a day of work at her factory job and 
that, in fact, she was Roma. This revelation appeared to have a startling effect on 
the discussion as she had already established herself as an active member of the 
group. When people of different backgrounds discuss public problems together in 
moderated discussions in which some minimal norms of civility are established, 
the dynamic of ideal role taking can be engaged so that people can look at the 
issue from the point of view of those affected by a policy as well as from their 
own perspective.40 
 
Clearly, Fishkin understands these situations in good deliberative, even Habermasian 
terms (ideal role taking recalls Habermas’ usage in regards to arriving at moral claims 
that could satisfy his U principle).41 And certainly deliberation about matters of common 
concern is central to both of these stories. This was, after all, the design of the meeting 
space in which these events occurred.  
But what makes these transformative moments emerge from the small group 
settings in particular? Theoretically, these same arguments might have been advanced at 
other points during the Deliberative Polling process – that the conservative’s definition of 
a family was too narrow, or that many Roma were, in fact, dependable workers. But 
would we expect these arguments to have the same effect if delivered, say, in preparatory 
literature regarding the weekend’s topics, or by spokespeople or experts in large group 
settings? Or, even if they had been offered by proxy from people not personally related to 
the claims being made (‘Have you ever considered that some Roma may in fact be hard 
workers?’)? My hunch is to say ‘no.’ And I think Fishkin would likely agree, given his 
defense (statistical and anecdotal) of the transformative potentials unleashed in the small 
group setting. So even if we grant that something like “ideal role taking” occurred here 
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(though I’m not entirely sure this is the right way to characterize it), there remains 
something worth explaining here for deliberative theorists. The most plausible answers, I 
think, fit the models hinted at in this chapter much better than the one presented in the 
previous chapter, where (theoretically) arguments advanced in op-ed sections of 
newspapers, or offered by cool-headed representatives in Congress should contain similar 
force. But I think Fishkin adds weight (perhaps unwittingly) to the intuitive sense that 
they don’t. Instead, something in these small groups facilitated personal transformations 
in participants who were personally connected (in some sense) to the people from whom 
a moving argument was issued. This is not to say that the rest of the event surrounding 
the deliberative opinion poll was unnecessary or unhelpful. But something happens in 
those face-to-face encounters that couldn’t have happened without them.  
 
*** 
 
What remains is to fully work out this alternative normative explanation for the 
kinds of events Fishkin relates. An alternative needs to be described that links up with 
Fraser’s insights about speaking freely in one’s own ‘idiom and style’ to an attentive and 
accepting audience; that connects to Young’s opening up of communication styles in 
(whether she would accept it or not) face-to-face settings; one that is directly connected 
to ‘everyday talk’ with transformative potential as explained by Mansbridge. This is the 
task of the next chapter. I will work out through Martin Buber’s dialogic theory a 
different normative grounding for citizen engagement that, I think, can elucidate the un-
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theorized elements of the above accounts as well as solve a number of difficulties for 
deliberative democratic theory more generally.    
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CHAPTER IV 
MARTIN BUBER AND A POLITICS ANCHORED IN DIALOGUE 
 
In the previous two chapters I argued that deliberative democrats rely on a 
Habermasian core of rational communication, which is a suspect normative foundation 
for a democratic politics.  But, I also argued that an alternative foundation was available 
in the deliberative literature, though it has not been worked out in any explicit or 
sustained way. I will argue that the alternative is best understood as a theory of dialogue. 
A dialogic theory directs us to look at what can happen in the deep connections we 
sometimes make in our interpersonal relations – where we are physically present before a 
particular other that is fundamentally different from myself, where we can speak without 
reserve, feel welcomed and/or recognized as a partner in conversation, and interact 
specifically and irreplaceably as oneself. These are the sorts of experiences that the 
authors in the previous chapter  seem to think make personal transformations through 
deliberation likely (or, at least more likely). So, following the lead of these insights, I will 
develop the concept of dialogue specifically related to the work of Martin Buber. Buber, 
though he wrote long before Habmeras and the deliberativists, offers an account of the 
phenomenon of dialogue that captures these insights about the transformative potential 
that sometimes occurs within our interpersonal relations. His work on the I-Thou relation 
and genuine dialogue gives us an account that can explain what such relations look like, 
and how and why experiences of dialogue can be beneficial for democratic politics. But, 
regrettably, Buber has not been a central figure for contemporary democratic theory. 
Thus the chapter begins by detailing Martin Buber’s legacy and introducing him as a 
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resource for democratic theory despite this absence. I then describe his conception of the 
I-Thou relation and its development into a theory of “genuine dialogue,”  as an 
alternative normative foundation for a deliberative politics. Finally, the last section of this 
chapter outlines some of the prominent features of a “politics anchored in dialogue” and 
compares this model with the deliberative one that was considered in the first chapter, 
demonstrating the advantages (and also some concerns) of this dialogic foundation.  
  
Martin Buber’s Legacy and Influence 
 
 Buber was born in Vienna in 1878. He lived out much of his youth on his 
grandparents’ farm in Galicia, an area near western Ukraine and Southern Poland. He 
received an excellent education from private tutors and eventually at the local Polish 
schools. He attended his first University classes in Vienna, and by the early 20th century 
had become influential in several circles in Viennese culture. He was well received 
among local socialists, became a committed and influential Zionist, and was a budding 
academic, translator, editor, and essayist.1 Buber’s early life was also defined by his 
conversion to Hasidism. Among his early works were Hasidic translations and stories. 
Many credit him and his work in this period as having a profound impact on Jewish 
cultural renewal. But he was also interested in sociology and was inspired by Simmel and 
Dilthey. As an editor and essayist he contributed to a growing literature on social thought 
during the first 15 years of the 20th century. Included in this early work was his 
sociological concept of the “Interhuman” (the realm created in between two people 
engaged in social interaction), which would later inform his dialogic philosophy.2  All of 
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this culminated in Buber’s turn toward a philosophy of dialogue, which came (relatively 
speaking) late in his career. Buber was in his mid 40’s when his most influential and 
lasting work was published. His I and Thou, published first in German in 1923 and in 
English in 1937, marked a turn towards a philosophy of dialogue that would occupy him 
throughout the remainder of his prolific academic career, ending only shortly before his 
death at the age of 88.  
 I and Thou was both Buber’s first and preeminent statement of his dialogic 
philosophy. Though surely his magnum opus, it was in many ways a work of transition 
both in terms of focus and style. He had begun developing a relational theory that was a 
mixture of German social thought and a heavily mystical Hasidic influence.3 Although he 
had turned away from this mysticism (though not Hasidism in general) by the time of its 
writing, this influence is still apparent in I and Thou.4 This religious orientation may, in 
part, explain the currently limited interest in Buber outside of religious scholarship. But 
such a dismissal would be hasty. Buber was a religious thinker with secular interests 
rooted in the problems of this world. One may not be able to entirely separate Buber’s 
religion from his work, but his work has significance beyond religion. A politics relying 
on Buber’s dialogic philosophy may have ties to his Hasidic worldview, but it does not 
have to ‘stay there.’ It can inform the secular world of democratic politics without any 
mass conversion required. 
 Though it is a difficult text, I and Thou and the subsequent formulations of 
Buber’s dialogic philosophy did indeed have an impact – both in terms of its applications 
to a wide range of fields and among some important 20th century philosophers. This 
makes its current absence from democratic theory literature surprising. In fact, in the mid 
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20th century, Buber’s practical, popular impact was by academic standards quite 
impressive. After WWII, Buber went on a number of successful lecture tours in Europe 
and North America. His work was picked up (more or less directly) by theorists and 
practitioners of psychology, notably Carl Rogers,5 and educational theory, notably Paulo 
Friere.6 His understanding of the distinction between I-Thou and I-It was referenced by 
no less than Martin Luther King, Jr., in Letter From a Birmingham Jail.7 Buber remained 
a popular public intellectual both within Israel and abroad, attaining something of a 
celebrity status, so far as academics can achieve such things.8 Despite this widespread 
influence in the mid-20th century, commentary on Buber’s work – even his more clearly 
secular, dialogic work – has in recent years been largely relegated to religious studies 
literatures. 9 
 Despite this contemporary pigeonholing, there is little doubt that Buber had 
noteworthy influence among some philosophers who have been at least tangentially 
important to debates in democratic theory. His intellectual lineage is probably clearest in 
the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Hans-Georg Gadamer.10 Levinas’s ethics is based on 
a necessary response of an I to a Thou – in particular to the “face of the other.” An ethics 
of responsibility issues from our experience of the other in face-to-face relations. This 
experience demands we answer the call of the other. Levinas’ philosophy makes use of 
the immediate relational experience shared by an I and Thou, and understands the 
primacy of this relation. There is much Buber in this program, though Levinas sees the 
relation in different terms than Buber, with the primacy of the Other over and above the 
I.11 To establish the difference, Levinas offered a series of criticisms of Buber’s program 
which proved, in some sense, damning to Buber’s continued influence in the discipline 
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(while interest in Levinas, helped by Derrida, grew).12 Despite the criticisms and 
differences, though, Buber’s work was undeniably central to Levinas’ ethical project.   
Gadamer’s explicit reliance on a concept of the I-Thou relation is also clearly 
inspired by Buber. The I-Thou relation occupies an important place for Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics and his notion of a “fusion of horizons.” In Truth and Method, Gadamer 
explicitly evokes Buber in describing the “highest type of hermeneutical experience”  
which is akin to the I-Thou experience.13  
Buber was also a political theorist in his own right.  Favoring a sort of 
communitarian vision, he articulated a suspicion of politics and the extent to which the 
“political principle” could be relied on.14 But this was in part due to a concern about the 
corrupted nature of social and political relations in the modern world. Not to mention the 
fact that the expansion of what constitutes politics in personal and social life (at the hands 
of feminist and post-modern thought) had simply not yet happened. Buber thought of 
politics as that which concerned collective life as tied up with the state and economy. 
Thus his writings about political matters tended to focus on the restriction of politics to 
the role of administration. But against this cynicism towards mass politics and large 
institutions, Buber defended a version of communal socialism. This commitment was 
evident in his early activism with German Socialists prior to WWII, a deep friendship 
with and respect for German anarchist/communist Gustav Landauer, and presented most 
thoroughly later in his life as a utopian socialism, exemplified by a defense of the Israeli 
system of communes in Paths in Utopia.15 Buber’s politics had a deep connection with 
his dialogic philosophy, which (as I will detail below) is evident from his second section 
of I and Thou where he calls for reanimation institutions, public life, and community with 
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the spirit of real, direct relations (a “Thou saying” spirit). It was, accordingly, a 
communal socialism deeply tied to an intimately connected people.  
Certainly, a thorough examination of Buber’s political theory along these lines 
would be an interesting project, finding much affinity with Habermas, Arendt, and 
contemporary communitarian theorists (and much critical perspective on modern mass 
democracy). But that is not my aim here. Partly, this is because I question the 
applicability of Buber’s politics to complex, modern democracies that we live in today, as 
the small-scale nature of Buber’s vision remains unrealistically utopian. Instead, I want to 
detail Buber’s dialogic philosophy in order to put it into the service of deliberative 
democracy, which I think makes a much stronger claim to application to contemporary 
institutional life. And, his own politics aside, I think Buber opens us up to something that 
can provide a normative foundation for the deliberative project that I have argued is 
otherwise suspect, but worth retaining as a valuable approach to contemporary 
democratic politics. This alternative might be called a “politics anchored in dialogue.” It 
is, I think, what is really “there” underneath that intuitive inclination deliberativists have 
in thinking that engagement between people can do something beneficial for our relations 
to others and to our politics – even if they  found it in different and problematic form in 
Habermas. But bringing this dialogic theory into an account of democratic politics 
requires a sustained effort to uncover the relevant terms and concepts in Buber’s thinking, 
which I work through in the following section. 
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Buber’s Dialogic Theory 
 
I and Thou 
  
I and Thou begins by outlining Buber’s relational ontology. The world is twofold, 
he tells us, according to two relations humans can take in the world. These relations 
correspond to two basic “word-pairs” we can speak. When we turn to the world and 
speak “It” we enter into a relation to objects that we experience. When we turn to the 
world and speak “Thou” we enter into a relation with an other in their entirety.16 And 
although we “speak” these word-pairs, it is not as if we must actually say these words 
(make the tones with our vocal cords and so forth). They are not reducible to the sounds 
we make, or even the linguistic signs that we attach to these particular pronouns. It is 
instead meant in the sense of an address or a turning towards that is accomplished in 
“speaking” one of these basic word-pairs. Allow me to detail each relation in turn. 
 The I-It is our most common relation to the world. When we relate in this way to 
the world we relate to things, objects, or sense-data. It is where we perceive, count, 
quantify, study. It is the relation of the isolated ego to the world. An I-It relation is not, by 
definition, a relation in which one (co)participates with their object(s). Says Buber, 
“Those who experience do not participate in the world. For the experience is ‘in them’ 
and not between them and the world. The world does not participate in experience. It 
allows itself to be experience, but it is not concerned, for it contributes nothing, and 
nothing happens to it.”17 Although this is the relation we have with things, we also often 
relate this way to other humans. We see them according to some quality or qualities they 
 93 
 
 
possess: they are tall, short, a man, woman, a Republican, Democrat, etc. And when we 
do this, we have experienced them as an object for our contemplation. We have received 
them as some information in time and space that we can classify, interpret, and know. 
They have this and that quality, this and that way of being, this and that type of 
personality. 
 The I-It relation is not by its nature wrong or bad. It is necessary and even, at 
times, produces enormous benefits for human kind. After all, the progress of math, 
science and other forms of knowledge require this mode of relation to the world. 
Whatever the  status of the I-It relative to the I-Thou (and Buber certainly writes as if 
celebrating the I-Thou over the more commonplace I-It), we cannot do away with our It-
relations even as we strive for more I-Thou relations. Buber writes, “Every You in the 
world is doomed by its nature to become a thing or at least to enter into thinghood again 
and again … But the language of objects catches only one corner of actual life. The It is 
the chrysalis, the You the butterfly. Only it is not always as if these states took turns so 
neatly; often it is an intricately entangled series of events that is tortuously dual.”18 At 
best, then, the I-Thou and the I-It are in a sort of constant tradeoff as our relation to the 
world shifts from a relation of objects to a relation with a Thou.   
 The I-Thou relation  is one in which we turn to an other and enter into a relation:  
 
When I confront a human being as my You and speak the basic word I-You to 
him, then he is no thing among things nor does he consist of things. He is no 
longer He or She, limited by other Hes and Shes, a dot in the world grid of space 
and time, nor a condition that can be experienced and described, a loose bundling 
of named qualities. Neighborless and seamless, he is You and fills the firmament. 
Not as if there were nothing but he; but everything else lives in his light.19 
 
Here one encounters an other in relation, not in experience. At least, not in the sense of 
experience in which they are this or that type of person, having this or that quality, which 
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occurs to us in a way we can make note of. Instead, these qualities become indissoluble, 
inseparable from the person before us. As Buber describes it, “Even as a melody is not 
composed of tones, nor a verse of words, nor a statue of lines – one must pull and tear to 
turn a unity into a multiplicity – so it is with the human being to whom I say You. I can 
abstract from him the color of his hair or the color of his speech or the color of his 
graciousness; I have to do this again and again; but immediately he is no longer You.”20 
The I-Thou is by definition that which occurs in the present. Our Thou is just that 
which confronts us as presence, always here and now. As such, Buber understands the I-
Thou encounter as “actual life.” It is a constitutive act of the “whole person.” Not in the 
sense of some fully presentable, fully knowable transparent subjectivity, but just as this 
particular other that I encounter in their uniqueness and entirety. As Buber says, one only 
“knows everything” of the Thou in the sense that “one no longer knows particulars.”21 
This is not the same as saying one knows everything of the other as if they are a fully 
transparent list of particulars available for our evaluation. This would be the nature an 
entirely “successful” It-relation; the dream of, say, a certain kind of psychologist or, 
perhaps, professional marketer. Instead, it is an act of becoming and a creative deed, “I 
require a You to become; becoming I, I say You.”22 When we encounter an other in this 
way, we are presented to them, and them to us. In relation something might be 
accomplished between us  – actualized – that has a chance to profoundly affect us both. 
But this relation cannot be forced or willed by one party. It happens when two people 
turn towards one another and each speaks “I-Thou.” As such, Buber thinks the relation 
“encounters me by grace.”23   
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   The I-Thou relation, then, is an event – experience is not an acceptable word, 
though it does capture something of the phenomenon that the relation is.24 It is that 
encounter that we have to “wake up out of.” We are lost in a conversation, a good book, 
or into our surroundings (perhaps in nature). It only lasts briefly. And we are only able to 
take stock of the impact of what occurred after having had our encounter broken off. This 
is the oscillation between the I-Thou and I-It, from presence to experience.          
Reminiscent of a Habermasian/deliberative paradigm, Buber understands 
reciprocity as central to the I-Thou relation. He writes, “Relation is reciprocity. My You 
acts on me as I act on it. Our students teach us, our works form us … How are we 
educated by children, by animals! Inscrutably involved, we live in currents of universal 
reciprocity.”25 Deliberative theorists like Benhabib and Gutmann and Thompson require 
reciprocity in order to guarantee something like equal respect, or a predisposition to be 
open to cooperation on equal terms with one’s interlocutors. An aspect of this is 
preserved in Buber where reciprocity, in virtue of its tie to the I-Thou relation, is an 
openness to an other. But it is both something more and less for Buber than for the 
deliberativists. It is less in that it isn’t a predisposition or ethical commitment needing to 
be secured (how?) prior to (potentially successful) deliberation. It is, instead, an element 
of the relation itself, as rare and fleeting as the I-Thou relation is, but necessary to it.26 
Thus in this sense it is also more than the deliberativists are able to rely upon. If they give 
an account of where reciprocity is supposed to come from (few do), it tends to be derived 
as necessary via rational argument itself. Take for example how Benhabib describes the 
securing of her notion of egalitarian reciprocity. For her, egalitarian reciprocity is a 
principle secured by the “metanorm” of the discourse principle (only those norms are 
 96 
 
 
valid that can meet with the agreement of all affected by their adoption). As a principle it 
should guarantee equal access to partake in and influence discourses. Once agreed upon 
(one supposes), this principle can be “realized through a range of legal and political 
arrangements as well as through noninstitutionalized practices and associations in civil 
society.”27 It is both a presupposition of discourse and a state of affairs requiring 
normative acceptance and institutional security. And all this only if it can generate 
adherence through the practice of deliberation. Quite an interesting circle. Benhabib has 
called it not a vicious, but the “hermeneutic circle that characterizes  all reasoning about 
morals and politics.” As such, she argues: “Discourse ethics in this sense presupposes the 
reciprocal moral recognition of one another’s claims to be participants in the moral-
political dialogue … such reciprocal recognition of one another’s rights to moral 
personality is a result of a world-historical process that involves struggle, battle, and 
resistance, as well as defeat, carried out by social classes, genders, groups, and nations.”28 
This, however, seems more of a (defeated?) nod to the critics of deliberation’s 
impracticality than a defense of the expectation of reciprocity for contemporary 
deliberations. Buber’s account, however, locates this standing in reciprocity to the 
interpersonal relation of partners in dialogue, in virtue of their having entered into the 
encounter itself. To be in relation is to be thrust into a reciprocal engagement with an 
other, perhaps all too briefly, but undeniably open to their influence and they to ours.             
Buber describes the I-Thou relation as a relation of love. But this is not to confuse 
the profession of romantic love between partners as the same thing. That may or may not 
represent a moment of I-Thou relation. It would depend on whether or not an authentic 
relation was entered into, or there remained some distance at which the partners sought 
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some personal feeling of enjoyment from (and not with) the other. Buber instead has in 
mind a kind of love particular to the I-Thou relation, which he distinguishes from 
feelings. Feelings are inner experiences that one has to themselves. One experiences 
feelings.  As such, they are (however deeply felt) of the It world. A relation, however, 
occurs in the present and between (not simply “in” either). And this relation is a “cosmic 
force” for those that find themselves enmeshed in it. He writes:  
For those who stand in it and behold it, men emerge from their busyness; and the 
good and the evil, the clever and the foolish, the beautiful and the ugly, one after 
another become actual and a You for them; that is, liberated, emerging into a 
unique confrontation. Exclusiveness comes into being miraculously again and 
again – and now one can act, help, heal, educate. Love is responsibility of an I for 
a You.29   
 
Thus, rather than some romantic feeling, Buber seems to have in mind a feeling of 
responsibility for one’s dialogic partner, a sense of obligation to an other who is 
presented to us. And this sense of obligation is prior to our linguistically “working out” 
such an obligation.30 While Buber conceives of love as part of an I-Thou relation, he also 
argues that hate can come very close to authentic relation, though inevitably can never be 
a full I-Thou. He writes, “Hatred remains blind by its very nature; one can only hate part 
of a being. Whoever sees a whole being and must reject it, is no longer in the domain of 
hatred but in the human limitation of the capacity to say You … the basic word [I-Thou] 
always involves an affirmation of the being one addresses.” He goes on to say that 
anyone who hates directly is “closer to relation than those who are without love and 
hate.”31 Buber suggests that the I-Thou affirms the other in their entirety by its very 
nature. That is, one cannot retain a particular aspect of someone – some demographic 
fact, say, their race or political persuasion – and truly hate the actual person in question. 
Only that given quality or qualities are hated. Nonetheless, when one feels hatred for 
 98 
 
 
some particular person, they are nearer to the I-Thou than those who dwell only on the 
qualities (again, say, their race or political persuasion) they find detestable. This, I think, 
is a useful understanding for an agonistic dimension for democratic politics where 
conflict, even hostility can characterize our political interactions. In this understanding, 
relations of both love and hate can (potentially) spark real I-Thou relations.  
 
  The Modern World and the Rise of the I-It (or, Buber’s Critical Theory) 
  
Buber’s second section of I and Thou offers a developmental story about the 
steady increase of I-It relations in the modern world. What is especially noteworthy in 
this section is that Buber begins to understand the interaction between the I-Thou and 
more public, collective institutional life, and the need to recover more of the I-Thou 
relation in our public life.32 This will be important for realizing the applicability of 
Buber’s dialogic theory for democratic politics, as his own desire to reanimate public life, 
I think, mirrors a great deal of the central motivations of the deliberative project. 
Though the I-Thou is a rare and fleeting relation compared with the I-It, Buber 
thinks that the I-Thou is the primary relation. He has both a developmental psychological 
story and a historical/anthropological story to explain this. The developmental story has 
roots in the innate bond of mother and child. Once a child is born into the world there is a 
period in which the child must “make it a reality for himself; he gains the world by 
seeing, listening, feeling, forming.” But, this first experiencing cannot be done in the 
same way as adults experience the world, as a detached observer, assimilating knowledge 
into already known categories and narratives. Lacking both the detached I of the ego and 
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a prefigured knowledge base, the child constantly reaches out to the world through direct 
encounter, revealing its innate longing for relation. Only through these encounters does 
the world eventually emerge for the I (now able to take the form of the detached 
observer). That is, only after a series of confrontations with Thous does an “I” and a 
world of potential “Its” emerge. As Buber puts it, at the level of each and every 
individual, “Man becomes an I through a You.”33  
 The historical/anthropological argument is related to this argument about the 
development of the individual. In a story reminiscent of Rousseau, Buber explains that 
primitive man had to develop both concepts and a independent sense of self, which 
“gradually crystallized out of notions of relational processes and states … the living sense 
of confrontation [and from] living with one who confronts him.” Prior to this, no 
detached concepts or prefigured categories of knowledge existed. As man began to grow 
apart from the world (in a process like that of a developing child) the detached relation to 
data became possible. But it was likely a slow process, over countless generations. 
Something of a glimpse of this development, Buber thinks, can be seen in the 
mystically/spiritually-tinged worldviews of primitive people and the traces of this wonder 
and mystery that works its way into primitive languages. Here the immediate relation to 
the world is still the primary mode of being, which is then codified into language. But 
over time, the development of It-relation to the world overtook these primitive 
worldviews and the emergence of the detached I and the awareness of the world as 
experienced by this I increased. This primal past, Buber argues, is where “our melancholy 
lot took shape” – with the emergence and eventual ascendency of I-consciousness and the 
I-It relation.34      
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 In a sense, one might call this Buber’s critical-theoretical take on modernity. 
Whereas the I-Thou relation is primary and the only truly human relation, the modern 
world has seen the ever increasing domination of the I-It at the expense of this primary 
relation. Buber tells a story about man’s rapid improvement of the ability to “experience 
and use.” Because of this increase in the I-It, communal and institutional life become 
void of real meaning (more on this in a bit). Given that only from within the I-Thou can 
one be present and truly act and create, further retreat into the It-world brings forth a 
sense of increasingly being at the mercy of causality. All of this produces a weakened 
sense that a person can recover real encounter with being. It is an experience (and now 
this is the correct word) of alienation both from man and from the world. It is a 
despairing retreat into the impersonal. 
 But Buber does hold out some hope for the recovery of the I-Thou, though at this 
stage the recourse to individual thought and reflection (an I-It activity) is well established 
as a means for dealing with any existential discomfort (though the same retreat that is 
many ways is its source). Those things that have been reduced to Its in our experience are 
nonetheless always (potentially) able to reemerge in full relation to us.  The “Thou” 
remains a possibility despite its habituated removal from the lives of humans in the 
modern world. But one can be moved to speak the basic word pair because of its primacy. 
After quoting approvingly of the kind of “I-saying” practiced by Socrates, Goethe and 
Jesus, Buber insists “The You abides.”35    
 According to this same critical-theoretic line of thinking, Buber understands 
modern institutions, (both those of the economy and state, as well as “personal 
institutions” such as marriage) as having fallen under nearly complete sway of the It 
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world. That is, they are removed from any attachment from real presence and relation of 
humans to each other. As such, they take on a life of their own to which the humans 
living within these structures feel powerless to stop them. He writes, “the state is no 
longer led: the stokers still pile up coal, but the leaders merely seem to rule the racing 
engines … the machinery of the economy is beginning to hum in an unwonted manner” 
and the despotism of the It “under which the I, more and more impotent, is still dreaming 
that it is in command.”36 The It-world cannot be dispensed with in man’s communal life 
(just as it cannot be dispensed with by the individual). Buber even thinks that man’s “will 
to profit and will to power” as exercised in the spheres of the economy and politics are 
possibly legitimate. But only if they are “tied to the will of human relations and carried 
by it. There is no evil drive until the drive detaches itself from our being.”37 The 
institutions of the state and the economy, to recover from this “impotence” at the hands of 
the It-world, need to be reattached to a “You-saying spirit” of “true community” built 
around “living reciprocal relationship.” He writes: 
The statesman or businessman that serves the spirit is no dilettante. He knows 
well  that he cannot simply confront the people with whom he has to deal as so 
many carriers of the You, without undoing his own work. Nevertheless he 
ventures to do this, not simply but up to the limit suggested to him by the spirit; 
and the spirit does suggest a limit to him … He does not become a babbling 
enthusiast; he serves the truth which, though supra-rational, does not disown 
reason but holds it in her lap … It is only from the presence of the spirit that 
significance and joy can flow into all work … and all that is worked and 
possessed, though it remains attached to the It-world, can nevertheless be 
transfigured to the point where it confronts us and represents the You.38  
 
All this is to say that the nature of institutions such as the state and the economy require 
something of the It world to function, but can (and should) also maintain a connection 
(always limited) to communal life that is centered on actual (inter)personal relation. Even 
though those involved in large-scale institutions in modern democratic societies simply 
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cannot enter into full relation with every individual under their purview (they would 
instantly be overburdened and rendered incapable of performing their duties), they can 
(and should) retain something of the spirit of an I-Thou relation in their dealings – a sense 
of responsibility to the actual human beings that exist within the scope and dealings of 
the institution in question.     
  
Genuine Dialogue in Later Works 
 
 Buber’s prolific writings after I and Thou were often in the service of elaborating 
his arguments in that work. In this section I work through two essays most clearly suited 
to elaborating a dialogic theory for deliberative politics: his 1929 essay, “Dialogue,” and 
his much later “Elements of the Interhuman,” from 1957. In these two essays, Buber 
offers a number of extensions and clarifications of the I-Thou relation (now called 
dialogue, or genuine dialogue) that will be crucial for envisioning what a democratic 
politics that relies on a dialogic foundation will look like, and helping to distinguish it 
further from a deliberative politics based in rational communication.  
 
 “Dialogue” 
 
 “Dialogue” was produced in order to clarify the ‘dialogical’ principle he had 
introduced in I and Thou six years earlier. He described his goal in the essay being: “ to 
illustrate it and to make precise its [dialogue’s] relation to essential spheres of life.”39 
Buber’s first section in this essay is committed to a description of dialogue and argues 
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first (and perhaps surprisingly) that silence can be communication – that “Speech can 
renounce all the media of sense, and it is still speech.”40 He offers an example of two men 
sitting beside one another not speaking, not even looking at one another. One of the men 
is open and inviting in his attitude, the other, however, is a normally reserved man, often 
simply incapable of communicating himself. But, in this moment, the reserved man 
(though he says nothing) feels this “spell lifted” though he did not do anything himself to 
have done this. He may never actually say anything to the other man, but he will have 
been opened up nonetheless in communication, though it is in silence. Thus Buber says, 
“Human dialogue, therefore, although it has a distinctive life in the sign, that is sound and 
gesture … can exist without the sign, but admittedly not in an objectively comprehensible 
form.”41 This echoes a point made earlier – that the basic words need not be spoken in a 
literal sense, but represent a “turning toward” an other that is “in language” (generally 
speaking) but not reducible to words or grammatical structure. 
 Perception was relegated to the I-It relation in I and Thou. But in his “Dialogue” 
essay, Buber refines this view to some degree. He now offers 3 types of perceivers: The 
observer, the onlooker, and one who instead “becomes aware.” The observer notes details 
of an other as a collector of data. The onlooker is a more artistic sort. He or she lets 
impressions be made on them, not desiring to count or quantify, but to let experience 
unfold before them. However different these two seem, Buber argues that they both have 
situated themselves apart from an other in an impersonal way. The third type, however, is 
one who has been “spoken to” by an other and thus brought into a relation which is 
immediate. Here one cannot perceive the other as an object. Rather: 
I have got to do with him. Perhaps I have to accomplish something about him; but 
perhaps I have only to learn something, and it is a matter of my ‘accepting.’ It 
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may be that I have to answer at once, to this very man before me; it may be that 
the saying has a long and manifold transmission before it, and that I am to answer 
some other person at some other time and place, in who knows what kind of 
speech, and it is now only a matter of taking the answering on myself. But in each 
instance a word demanding an answer has happened to me.42  
 
This is a perception of some kind, an awareness of something having happened. There is 
real content exchanged. Buber suggests calling it “becoming aware,” which indicates 
presence – being aware “with” the other, as opposed to an observation “about” an other.  
 Buber also offers a comment on responsibility in the first section of this essay. He 
says, “Genuine responsibility exists only where there is real responding.”43 It is thus a 
matter of being “attentive” and “facing creation as it happens” ready to respond and 
participate. No system of moral rules or dictates (all of which remove the face of the 
other and our actual responsibility to them in some given moment) could capture this, 
unless it is connected to this sense of personal being there for an other. This is not, then, a 
Kantian system built on the power of reasoning apart from a given context. Rather, it is a 
morality that owes its sense to the specific presence and care for an other that has called 
out to us.  
 The second section of the essay discusses the limitations of the dialogic principle. 
That is, what does and does not count as dialogue in the sense Buber means it. He begins 
by comparing “genuine dialogue” with two other forms of conversation: technical 
dialogue and monologue disguised as dialogue. Genuine dialogue (spoken or silent) 
“where each of the participants really has in mind the other or others in their present and 
particular being and turns to them with the intention of establishing a living mutual 
relation between himself and them.”44 There is also what Buber calls a “technical 
dialogue” where two people converse “prompted solely by the need of objective 
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understanding.” This seems to be an everyday sort of conversation aimed at the 
transmission of information, which is so necessary to “modern existence.” And though 
this is not a genuine dialogue, it can occasionally “break the surface” of these exchanges 
(which may interrupt the flow of information, but, of course, may do a great deal more 
for the interruption). A third sort is the most troubling for Buber – monologue disguised 
as dialogue. Buber offers four examples of this: a debate in which each opponent speaks 
in order to win as if in a competition against someone (the particular someone being 
unimportant); a conversation that is motivated solely “to have one’s own self-reliance 
confirmed by marking the impression that is made, or if it has become unsteady to have it 
strengthened”; a friendly chat where neither is willing to open themselves up; or, a 
lover’s talk “in which both partners alike enjoy their own glorious soul and their precious 
experience.”45 None of these sorts of exchanges are genuine dialogue (they lack a true I-
Thou relation) because they do not involve the phenomenon of being fully present to an 
other. There is no risk, no reciprocity. The partner is not important, only the activity of 
the self for its own ends – a victory in debate, a confirmation of one’s sense of self, 
passing time by way of a reserved chat, or a self-gratifying attempt to enjoy an other in 
our own experience (all of which need an other, but not this particular other whom they 
address).  
 These non-dialogue forms of communication compare interestingly with 
Habermas’s communicative action. Whereas Habermas understood an interpersonal 
relation between interlocutors as necessary for communicative action to ensue, he defined 
their interaction in terms of reaching understanding, not in terms of the relation itself. As 
such, it seems very much like the technical dialogue Buber describes – concerned with 
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information and coordination. To the extent Buber understands the occasional glimpses 
of real relation as emerging from such an attempt to reach understanding, it is as if the 
relation emerges despite (and certainly not solely in the service of) the transmission of 
information required for shared action. As I discussed in chapter 2, Habermas seems to 
either assume a relation of the right sort prior to the creation of a shared understanding, or 
is only concerned for its instrumental ability to open up communication in a way capable 
of being meaningful to each participant. But in doing so, all of the power gets relegated to 
the nature of the language used and its inherent ability to change minds and bind the 
interlocutors to action. The deliberativists, of course, incorporated this directly into their 
own theories. But to look at this through Buber’s lens, this is an overemphasis on what is 
said rather than the spirit in which it is said. After all, nothing guarantees sincere 
communication, no matter how necessary it is to human life. Habermas knew this, too, of 
course, which is why he spent so much time understanding the pathologies of speech that 
interrupted the natural functioning of communicative action. But for Buber, strategic 
action (to frame it as Habermas does) is a symptom not of a certain way of (parasitically) 
using language, but of a failure to relate. We remain bound to our own ends, unopened to 
the voice and call of the other. Dialogue does not follow from a desire to reach 
understanding about something (though it might), but by the relation itself, whatever the 
content of our conversation. 
 Consider further the move toward discourse and the argumentative stance 
required. This removes one further away from the realm of personal relation, towards 
monologic reasoning. In order to avoid a recourse to (Kantian) monologue the 
deliberativist has to place even more trust in the intersubjective power of language to 
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produce better results. But, to argue one’s position does not imply any reciprocal concern 
for the arguments of others. Hence the need for deliberative democrats to build in 
(following Habermas) norms of reciprocity grounding one’s participation in moral and 
political discourse (grounds to move one beyond monological, self-regarding reasoning). 
But rather than see this as Buber might (as considering one’s moral obligations with a 
sense of the ever-present Thou), they had to depend on the logical power of such 
grounds. And a debate cannot produce any transformative powers if those engaged in 
practical discourse are not opened up to being moved. But the Habermasian theory of 
discourse ethics and the deliberativists who borrowed it lost sight of what made that 
transformation possible. Only reasons remained to fill in what was lost by ignoring the 
primary importance of the dialogic relation.  
 A similar line of view is offered in Buber’s take on thinking. As a personal 
activity, thinking would seem to be an activity relegated to monologue. But Buber 
defends a type of reflection that has a dialogic grounding. Like morality based in a sense 
of the ever-present Thou, thinking is (at least potentially) built around dialogue. The 
emergence of thought happens against an “inner court” that is not the subject’s only, but 
contains elements of those to whom the thinker must answer in arriving at and testing this 
thought. Buber calls on Socrates, von Humboldt, and Feuerbach to understand thinking as 
potentially located in the relation of an I to a Thou that has been taken up into one’s own 
process of thought. But in opposition to a more Kantian and (to a qualified extent) 
Habermasian insight, Buber writes: “If we are serious about thinking between the I and 
Thou then it is not enough to cast our thoughts towards the other subject of thought 
framed by thought. We should also, with the thinking, precisely with the thinking, live 
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towards the other man who is not framed by thought but is bodily present before us … 
towards his person, to which, to be sure, the activity of thinking also belongs.”46 That is, 
not to the arguments we can expect or imagine from another considered in our own mind, 
but to the other’s actual voice and presence as taken up into our own thinking. Habermas, 
of course, tries to accomplish something of this sort in requiring an anchoring of Kantian 
abstractions in a practical discourse where real speakers participate with one another. But 
something is lost in the quest for the impartial viewpoint that must construct arguments in 
the moral sphere (and, as translated by deliberativists, the political world). Instead, 
personas in particular should form the Thou in our thinking, as opposed to an abstracted 
and generalized Thou that has lost its specific voice, face, and presence in our 
considerations. 
 The final point I wish to draw out of “Dialogue,” is Buber’s consideration of the 
nature of community in light of this dialogic principle, which echoes his insights in I and 
Thou. Even in the dealings between humans at the level of “the masses” a core of 
personal relation can be realized, though contemporary community is devoid of this 
living center. In contemporary politics, groups (we might think of political parties in this 
regard) are dedicated to ends and collect up people as a means to build power and 
accomplish these ends through influence and/or institutional channels. But this is not the 
nature of true community. Buber distinguishes between a collectivity and a community:  
A collectivity is not a binding but a bundling together: individuals packed 
together, armed and equipped in common, with only as much life from man to 
man as will inflame the marching step. But community, growing community 
(which is all we have known so far) is the being no longer side by side but with 
one another of a multitude of persons. And this multitude, though it moves 
towards one goal, yet experiences everywhere a turning to, a dynamic facing of, 
the other, a flowing from I to Thou. Community is where community happens. 
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Collectivity is based on an organized atrophy of personal existence, community 
on its increase and confirmation in life lived towards one another.47    
 
The creation of community is not inconsistent with authority, but cannot persist with 
authority that seeks only the gathering of adherents, which is how politics generally 
operates. While the deliberativists no doubt can share Buber’s concerns about collectivity 
versus community (a similar dissatisfaction with interest-group liberalism, after all, 
animated much of the energy of this literature), the option here is a turning toward others 
directly, not as required for more perfect democratic procedure, but as required for real 
participation with actual others.   
 
 “Elements of the Interhuman” 
 
 The term “interhuman” was invented by Buber long before I and Thou, but not 
fully elaborated or clarified until an essay very late in his career, “Elements of the 
Interhuman,” which was published originally in Psychiatry in 1957. In this essay, Buber 
gives us a more thorough understanding of the dynamic that permits transformation in 
one or both partners in a dialogic relation. The “interhuman” represents a space of action 
that is between partners (in the sense of being within neither partner), which can have a 
profound impact on each of them. Further, Buber offers more limits to dialogic relation 
that indicate what interrupts the creation of this profound, impactful ‘in between’ space.   
He begins the essay by distinguishing between “the social” and the “interhuman.” 
The social realm, similar to Buber’s explanation of collectivities, indicates only a 
common belonging together. Our interactions in the social world may or may not contain 
meaningful interpersonal relations. The Interhuman realm, however, is a term meant to 
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exclusively describe a realm of interpersonal relation. This relation can exist even among 
the most mundane of exchanges, even between opponents, and even in brief, passing 
encounters. Of course, this is the relation of the I-Thou, and the phenomenon of our being 
absorbed into a relation with another. But here Buber offers it as distinct from everyday 
social relations of humans, normally experienced and understood. Further, the dialogue is 
necessarily not something in the objective experience of the other – experienced in their 
psyche and bound by their own pre-given psychological state.  It is instead the realm that 
is created (and re-created in each and every instance) in between two partners who have 
entered into the I-Thou (or into dialogue). Buber writes about this realm:  
When two men converse together, the psychological is certainly an important part 
of the situation … Yet this is only the hidden accompaniment to the conversation 
itself, the phonetic event fraught with meaning, whose meaning is only to be 
found neither in one of the two partners nor in both together, but only in their 
dialogue itself, in this ‘between’ which they live together.48  
 
Thus the interhuman is reminiscent of Habermas’s understanding of the intersubjective 
nature of language, where meaning is produced not in either subject, but between them 
through the medium of communication. But this interhuman realm is not reducible to 
language in Buber, of course. It is instead a relation of one to another that opens up this 
‘between-ness.’ 
 Buber then goes on to describe a series of problems that can impact the possibility 
for the emergence of the interhuman realm between interlocutors. As with is description 
of the limits of dialogue, Buber is concerned here to point out those modes of relation, 
attitudes towards and designs on one’s dialogic partner, that prevent a true I-Thou 
encounter from happening; or, in this case, the creation of the in between of the 
interhuman realm. When one attempts to interact with an other so as to produce a certain 
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response in their partner (impression management, as some would understand it), this 
prevents a real meeting of the interlocutors from happening. This is giving over to 
semblance, an attempt to focus my partner on some element (real, imagined, or 
otherwise) of my I in our conversation, which Buber opposes to meeting one with 
spontaneity and without reserve. Further, there is a barrier to the interhuman when people 
speak not to the other present before them, but past this person “to a fictitious court of 
appeal whose life consists of nothing but listening to him.”49 Buber argues that Sartre 
elevates this deficiency of human interaction into the ontological/existential problem of 
human life: the inevitable walls between partners in conversation that are impassible. But 
Buber understands this only as evidence of contemporary conditions and man’s continued 
fall, not as evidence of an uncorrectable existential condition. This, of course, was central 
to the story of modernity in I and Thou, where modern conditions made I-Thou relations 
increasingly difficult. And it remains central here as Buber understands the increasing 
distance between interlocutors that  too-often typifies our interactions. 
Buber then offers a comparison between the propagandist and the educator. Both 
seek to bring something about in another, and thus have (in a sense) designs on the being 
of the other. But the propagandist does this with a message delivered in such as way as to 
be indifferent to the particular other in question, except perhaps for some qualities or 
other that they possess, which the propagandist can bend his message to more effectively 
secure their capture. The educator, on the other hand, seeks to form a partnership of sorts 
with a specific other and help in bringing about some potential in that other; to actualize 
something in them (their specific pupil), with the help of the educator’s expertise. The 
propagandist is very close to Habermas’s strategic actor, bent on producing a desired 
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effect in their partner by means of deceit and manipulation. But where Habermas could 
only point to a parasitic use of language, Buber gives us a glimpse into the deeper failure 
of the strategic actor – they have failed to enter in the first place into a dialogic relation, 
but have remained at a distance in order to achieve their personal goals, whatever the 
structure of language they employed in this effort.     
 Perhaps more interesting than the failures of the “interhuman” realm are Buber’s 
descriptions of genuine dialogue over and against these failures. They indicate that 
dialogue is comprised not only of a reciprocal, mutual relation, Buber also brings in 
elements of mutual recognition and even an agonistic dimension of struggle over and 
against one’s interlocutor. Consider the following description of what must constitute a 
relation in genuine dialogue: 
The chief presupposition for the rise of genuine dialogue is that each should 
regard his partner as the very one he is. I become aware of him, aware that he is 
different, essentially different from myself, in the definite, unique way which is 
peculiar to him, and I accept whom I thus see, so that in the full earnestness I can 
direct what I say to him as the person he is. Perhaps from time to time I must offer 
strict opposition to his view about the subject of our conversation. But  I accept 
this person, the personal bearer of a conviction, in his definite being out of which 
his conviction has grown – even though I must try to show, bit by bit, the 
wrongness of this very conviction. I affirm the person I struggle with: I struggle 
with him as his partner, I confirm him as creature and as creation, I confirm him 
who is opposed to me as him who is over against me. 50 
  
Mutual recognition of a sort is thus presupposed in dialogue. But not simply in virtue of 
the two participants speaking to one another. It is presupposed in their relation, and their 
turning towards one another as individuals. And this grounding permits even a struggle 
directly against this other, so long as it is considered to be against the views of this other, 
and not some generalized argument or point of view for which we see them as a stand in.  
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 This is in part accomplished by what Buber terms the “personal making present” 
of an other “through imagining the real.” By this, Buber means to enter into an I-Thou 
relation, though he describes it here as receiving a whole being without reduction or 
abstraction, in “his wholeness, unity, and uniqueness, and with his dynamic center which 
realizes all these things ever anew.”51 Imagining is a difficult term here, I think. It recalls 
something like the enlarged mentality of Arendt or other constructions fraught with the 
implications of transparent subjectivity. Or, worse, it may seem to indicate one forming 
presumptions about content of the other that we “imagine” being really them, which in 
fact is not. But this would be, again, to miss the mark and associate this kind of imagining 
of the other with the exhaustive ‘It-knowledge’ of all the particular qualities of the 
individual to whom we relate. Instead, Buber seems to have in mind the immersion into 
the other’s presence of which we become fully “aware” in the sense of awareness he 
discussed in the “Dialogue” essay – an awareness of the other “with” them, as opposed to 
knowledge of or about them at a distance. Thus he defines the “imagining the real” not as 
simply seeing the other, but as a “bold swinging” into their life as I attempt to make them 
present to myself. And if we each accomplish this bold swing, the in between is opened 
up and genuine dialogue can ensue. Buber summarizes the nature of genuine dialogue as 
such: 
In genuine dialogue the turning to the partner takes place in all truth, that is, it is a 
turning of the being. Every speaker ‘means’ the partner or partners to whom he 
turns as this personal existence. To ‘mean’ someone in this connection is at the 
same time to exercise the degree of making present which is possible to the 
speaker at that moment. The experiencing senses and the imagining of the real 
which completes the findings of the sense work together to make the other present 
as a whole and as a unique being, as the person he is. But the speaker does not 
merely perceive the one who is present to him in this way; he receives him as his 
partner, and that means that he confirms this other being, so far as it is for him to 
confirm. The true turning of his person to the other includes this confirmation, 
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this acceptance. Of course, such a confirmation does not mean approval; but no 
matter in what I am against the other, by accepting him as my partner in genuine 
dialogue I have affirmed him as a person.52 
 
And the benefits of such genuine dialogue, though uncertain, and certainly rare, are at 
least potentially significant. He writes:    
But where dialogue is fulfilled in its being, between partners who have turned to 
each other in truth, who express themselves without reserve, who express 
themselves without reserve and are free of the desire for semblance, there is 
brought into being a memorable common fruitfulness which is to be found 
nowhere else. At such times, at each such time, the word arises in a substantial 
way between men who have been seized in their depths and have opened out by 
the dynamic of an element of togetherness. The interhuman opens out what 
otherwise remains unopened.53 
 
This is exactly the kind of openness required for the deliberative project to work. A 
“fruitfulness” made possible by being opened up to the influence of an other, which is 
produced between the self and other through dialogue. In the section that follows, I start 
to synthesize Buber’s conceptions of the I-Thou relation and genuine dialogue into a 
conception of deliberative politics. But first, I want to briefly take stock of the most 
salient features of the I-Thou relation and genuine dialogue in order to make it clear what 
I am applying to the deliberative picture. 
  
A Summary of the Dialogic Relation 
 
An I-Thou relation to an other is an event, or a phenomenon of encounter. It is 
that feeling we have of being “lost” into a relation present to us – the existing in the 
present over and against our partner (be it another human or otherwise). For instance, in 
any given conversation (or, in a ‘meaningful silence’), we may slip in and out of an I-
Thou relation, escaping from time to time to consider what we have just been through and 
 115 
 
 
reorient ourselves in the world. We check the time (how long have we been sitting here?); 
we reflect on our own about something that was said and locate it among other things we 
know (though in truth our brain and body has already done much of this without our 
awareness); we plan a response; we recall other matters that need our attention. That is, 
we remove ourselves into the It world and do the work of contemplation and reflection 
that necessarily happens in this realm. But, so long as we remained turned to this partner, 
immersed in our dealings with them, we may return to this relation, again lost in their 
presence and they in ours. This is the phenomenon of genuine dialogue. 
 While in this I-Thou relation, each time we find ourselves in it, we have 
necessarily lost sight of those particular qualities of our partner that we may otherwise 
reduce them to. Instead, for a moment (however long this moment lasts) they are simply 
this person present before me, my “Thou.” Nothing about seeing a singular and unique 
being means that I forget or stop knowing any of the qualities they possess, only that I 
cannot pick them out just now, in this moment with them. They have fused into this 
whole person that “fills the firmament” for me. This confirmation of them as only 
themselves is a form of recognition. Mutual recognition, in fact, since we also require it 
from them for our “in between” to emerge. We have the power to grant someone 
affirmation as an equal partner in dialogue, but no guarantee that they will offer us the 
same. It is a reciprocal granting of recognition necessary for the entering into the relation 
itself.  
Similarly, I have lost sight of my personal ego in this event – my pre-determined 
goals for the conversation, my desire to produce a certain response in my partner, my 
anxieties and self-consciousness, all these get a momentary reprieve. They have not gone 
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away entirely, I can go back and get them, and I will often have to do this if anything 
particular is to be accomplished according to plan. But to do so means to break out of the 
relation itself and close ourselves off to the more fully open and reciprocal relational 
event. 
 Again an example is perhaps the easiest way to communicate this phenomenon. I 
often rely on an example of reading a good book (probably fiction). This is a limited I-
Thou encounter, and a particular kind of dialogic encounter given the unresponsive 
nature of the inanimate object in question. And, perhaps it is less compelling, politically 
speaking, when compared to an argumentative exchange of views between citizens. Still, 
I think it is useful for describing the phenomenon in question. At various times while 
reading we may think to ourselves how interesting we find the author’s writing style, or 
reflect on an image presented in the book and let that trail us off into memories and 
feelings we associate with that image. Each and every time we do this the text disappears 
and our direct relation to it is broken. Often, if we continued reading (that is, letting our 
eyes scan over the words on the page) we might realize that we had not actually been 
aware of what occurred in the text while we were preoccupied with other thoughts. But, 
there are those times when the words blend together into a narrative and we are lost in a 
relation to it as the book “speaks” and we “listen.” Sentences roll past, pages turn, though 
we don’t know how many. And we are locked in to each and every word, its meaning (for 
us) being revealed without our stopping to define any of the particular words or phrases. 
Again, we will break off this connection and contemplate some element in this story, or 
perhaps turn our attention to something unrelated. Now we quantify, categorize, “make 
sense” of the book and its story as an object. Things that we were simply aware of as the 
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narrative unfolded before us now become information for our contemplation. And this is 
an important thing to do over and over again. We need to contemplate and consider what 
occurs otherwise in a dialogic relation. But, enjoying being with this story, we might 
reenter our dialogue with it and let it continue to speak to us. And long after we’ve 
finished reading it, if it was a particularly good book (and good, in part, means having 
been able to maintain our sustained immersion in it) it still speaks to us, having made an 
impact in our self through our encounter with it. So it is, I think, within a relation of 
dialogue with a partner turned towards us, and us to them.       
 This lasting impact is possible because in such a relation we are inevitably opened 
up to the other, and they to us. Thus the relation is one of reciprocity by its very nature. It 
required each of us to turn towards one another and enter into the relation. And going 
forward, we remain open to the other’s influence and they to ours (if we are thinking now 
of another person) until one or both of us withdraws again thereby ending the I-Thou 
relation, though, of course, not its influence. Within this relation we are not simply 
passive. We are certainly capable of action – even, for instance, of argument. But what 
we cannot do is stop to contemplate how we should argue in order to “win,” or how we 
should comport ourselves so as to be thought of in high esteem by the other. But we can 
certainly, passionately, and without reserve, argue; or teach, or heal, or perform any 
number of actions, not on, but with our partner.   
 What remains now is to apply this understanding of dialogue to something that is 
beneficial for deliberative democratic politics.  
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A Politics Anchored in Dialogue 
 
 The easiest way to explain what rethinking deliberation through the lens of a 
dialogic politics looks like, I think, is by revisiting a basic sketch of the Habermasian 
foundations for deliberation. As discussed in the first chapter, the idea of deliberative 
democracy was built around a normative core of reason-giving, grounded in the inherent 
rationality of language. Even while some deliberativists attempted to create distance 
between themselves and the Habermasian account of rational argumentation that 
dominated the early deliberative literature, this normative core remained central to their 
project, if only implicitly. The unforced force of better arguments, however they might be 
communicated, received, or spread could be translated into democratic practices 
beneficial to everyone by the very nature of their being offered and defended. But, 
outside of a Habermasian faith in language use being rational at its core, deliberativists 
have had a difficult time showing why we could expect people to be moved by arguments 
to adopt new positions, make changes to their identities and worldviews, and bind 
themselves to new ways of thinking. There were both practical and deeper ontological 
reasons to suspect whether this program could be based on Habermasian influenced 
theories about language use, however compelling something about the idea of a 
democratic politics based on citizen deliberation seemed to be.  
But something other than arguments animated transformative potential in the 
accounts of the deliberative theorists that I presented in chapter 2: in the protected and 
friendly setting of the subaltern counter public among those with whom one shared a 
feeling of solidarity, in the face-to-face meetings in city life and in the interactions 
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grounded in greeting and storytelling in the public sphere, in everyday talk and everyday 
activism outside and beyond formal deliberation, and in the small-group face-to-face 
settings in Deliberative Opinion Polls. I argue all of these theories are gesturing at a 
moment or moments in which someone could be (and/or was) “moved” in ways that 
deliberative politics requires. Perhaps up to a point arguments mattered. But it was more 
about unreserved communication (in idiom and style suited to oneself and one’s 
audience), and being “bodily confronted” with the other in public, as the hearer of a story 
(this story, from this person before me), or as a member of a small deliberative group 
(where real others are present to me, not “naked” arguments). In these moments (where 
dialogic  meeting between people is possible) something beyond arguments seems to 
matter. What does matter is presence, interpersonal connection, and deep engagement 
with an other, in a word: dialogue. This seems to better explain the kind of event that all 
of these theorists are articulating. Rational arguments can have an impact on our thinking 
and worldview, no doubt. But such arguments apart from a real meeting with an other 
there in our presence lack the transformative power they otherwise might have. If 
arguments alone could do this, the large group meetings would suffice in the deliberative 
opinion poll, the egalitarian public sphere would be a good enough forum for neutral 
arguments, formal deliberations would accomplish anything informal, everyday 
interactions might, and stories and greetings would be just so much superfluous 
communication for real arguments to cut through. But this is not the case in any of these 
examples of successful communication/deliberation. An I-Thou connection (a dialogic 
encounter) seems to get much closer to pointing to what had the power to transform in 
these communicative interactions in face-to-face settings. In such settings, where 
 120 
 
 
dialogue is more likely to spring forth, the rational give and take of reasons may or may 
not occur. But if they do, they are much more likely to impact those who hear them in the 
way deliberativists need.   
Along these lines communications theorists Kenneth Cissna and Rob Anderson 
have adapted the ideas of Martin Buber and Carl Rogers into a theory of public dialogue. 
They based their work largely on the views expressed by each in a single “moment of 
meeting” between the two in a public dialogue in 1957. Prior to this event Buber had 
expressed reservations in writing about the possibility for real dialogue in a public setting 
before an audience. After the meeting, though he offered mixed impressions of Rogers 
and the topics they covered, he asked that the final paragraph of his “Elements of the 
Interhuman” be removed because it had stated that a public dialogue was impossible.54 
He had clearly come to believe it was in fact possible. The event and the positions 
expressed by each Buber and Rogers lead Cissna and Anderson to describe public 
dialogue as capable of producing change. They write: “Dialogic change is not 
progressive, not a constant, but the result of often surprising and even epiphanous or 
sporadic insight … Dialogue does not demand full understanding, complete mutuality, or 
pervasive cultural immersion; instead, it depends on sparks of recognition across the gap 
of strangeness.”55 And these momentary meetings can be facilitated by careful planning 
and institutional design – though of course, never demanded or forced. But they are 
possible, as Buber and Rogers seem to agree, even in the face of distinct and unknowable 
otherness and even deep disagreement. I will save the specifics of institutional design for 
the next chapter. But the very possibility that dialogue can be achieved in public settings 
means that the concept holds promise for deliberative politics.  
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With these insights in mind, let me present a few noteworthy features of a 
dialogically-grounded deliberative politics that I think have an advantage over the usual 
model. Following this, I will attempt to revisit some objections to the deliberative model 
offered in chapter 1 with this new normative center in mind. I think these objections are 
still weighty, but take on a very different feel when dialogue, not rational language, is the 
core of a deliberative politics. But there are also some concerns on this model that should 
be acknowledged. After detailing some advantages of the dialogic model, I will treat 
these concerns briefly.  Finally, the task of the following chapter will be to trace out some 
of the practical/institutional implications of this switch in focus. 
A dialogic core for deliberative democracy has five principle advantages over the 
classic model: It escapes a too-narrow grounding in rational language use; it can offer an 
account of fruitfulness with or without formal deliberation; it offers an account of the 
significance and importance of otherness; it holds a central place for mutual recognition 
that goes beyond a simple acceptance into communication; and it explains the nature of 
reciprocity and mutuality within the interaction itself. 
 First, dialogue successfully jettisons the problematic reliance on rationality 
inherent in language use of the right sort. The I-Thou relation, while structured in a 
certain way by language (we, after all, “speak” I-Thou, and we certainly have an element 
of communication whenever a dialogue is entered into), is nonetheless not reducible to 
language or language rules. After all, even silence could qualify as dialogue if it was 
shared in openness to the possibility of encounter with an other. Instead, the dialogic 
relation describes a phenomenon that is a part of our experience in the broadest sense of 
the term. It is located in the interpersonal relation itself, just as Honneth directs us to look 
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in his critique of Habermas. That is, it is in the “moral experience” of citizens as potential 
participants in dialogue with one another. How so? I think one often experiences some 
failure to connect with another along the lines described by Buber. We perceive a 
conservation as a failure when a partner refuses to put aside their own designs for the 
encounter (such as the aggressive debater who is clearly trying to “one up” our arguments 
for the sake of victory), or perhaps fails to recognize us as a whole being (remaining 
focused on some quality or other they have ascribed to us). To put it another way, we 
often know when we have been received as an object for the other – when we have been 
“It-ed.” This can even happen with a look (or a failure to look) at another, or some other 
non-verbal indication that we are unwelcomed as a partner. On the other hand, we also 
are aware when we have connected deeply with someone, or even when we were 
welcomed by an other even if no such deep connection occurred at that time or place.  
 Related to this decoupling from rational language use, I think dialogue can supply 
the idea of fruitfulness through meeting with or without deliberation in any strict sense. 
Deliberative democratic theories relying on a Habermasian foundation are relegated to 
attaching progress or movement to a (hopefully) successful process of public reason-
giving. Debate has to change minds on the basis of better reasons in order for democracy 
to improve. But a dialogic theory can understand the possibility of meaningful 
experiences that have transformative potential with or without argumentation, public or 
otherwise. Fruitful encounters exist even where no deliberation has taken place. This is, 
in part, I think, the reason stories and testimonials are seen by Young and Sanders as 
potentially productive forms of communication. They “do” something to us (sometimes) 
if we are in position to let them, not by virtue of any set of reasons that we affirm as valid 
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or not. We may not even be moved to respond or question in that moment of receiving 
someone’s personal message. But so long as we are there to receive it as such, we may 
feel ourselves truly changed (now, or over time) through the encounter, and thus a fruitful 
dialogue has taken place. 
 Dialogue provides an account of self-other relations that is fuller than anything 
deliberative theory has been able to offer. It understands the otherness of an other as an 
essential part of the dialogic encounter. Deliberative theory in its Habermasian 
formulations struggles with the actuality of an other apart from the arguments, made in 
universal terms that an other may submit to discourse. Even in its more sensitive 
treatments the real, bodily other is always in tension with the universal aims of discursive 
reasoning. 56 The rational process unleashed through “subjectless forms of 
communication” occur apart from the immediate interactions of “personal bearers of a 
conviction,” within their particularly constituted lifeworld. Hence Habermas’s limiting of 
recognition to one’s ability to participate in discourse – as “someone” from “somewhere” 
to be sure, but always obligated to using terms all might accept. This tension is at the 
heart, in many ways, of both Fraser’s and Young’s friendly criticisms of deliberative 
politics in the public sphere (which they both found too exclusionary of diversity), though 
they did not present it as a damning critique for the entire project of deliberative 
democracy. Dialogue, however, gives substance to the other in their particular interaction 
with us. They are this or that other, in particular, the person to whom I say Thou. Buber 
offers in his dialogue with Carl Rogers (referenced above) an example of how this 
otherness is linked to the necessary element of surprise and spontaneity in dialogue. He 
said, “A dialogue – let’s take a rather trivial image. The dialogue is like a game of chess. 
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The whole charm of chess is that I do not know and cannot know what my partner will 
do. I am surprised by what he does and on this surprise the whole play is based.” He is 
further reported to have said (though the tape ran out at this unfortunate point and had to 
be changed) that a feature of dialogue is that the otherness of the other is “prized.”57 This 
orientation towards the other convinced Cissna and Anderson that both Buber’s and 
Roger’s work prefigured some postmodern concepts in that it understood and accepted 
(even celebrated) radical alterity (otherness) and was suspicious of any meta-narratives 
that sought to reduce this alterity.58  
Regardless of its relative relationship to post-modernity, however, dialogue does 
“deal with” this fact of otherness by understanding a role for affirmation/recognition at its 
core. This is not exactly the same kind of recognition meant by Honneth, though it is 
clearly related. Honneth’s program is concerned with a “weak” universal argument for 
the inherent needs of individuals for intersubjective validation along specific lines (love, 
rights, solidarity), the absence of which is experienced as disrespect or humiliation. As 
mentioned in chapter 2, it is a program pitched at the very broad level of an entire social 
and cultural “order of recognition.” Buber’s sense of recognition or affirmation of an 
other is more clearly located in immediate interpersonal relations. It equates to the 
particular relation in which one is affirmed or granted a status as an equal participant in 
the co-creation of a dialogue. It is a creative act signified by our turning to them in 
particular, whom we “mean” when we address them. Without this act of mutual 
recognition, a mutual granting of “permission to be,”59 no dialogue can be entered into 
and no reciprocal engagement between I and Thou can ensue. 
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The deliberative democratic account of reciprocity and openness to an other’s 
views was something that either had to be assumed in the orientation of participants (an 
“ought” for each and every potential participant in deliberation, if it could possibly 
succeed), or could be rationally defended as a product of deliberation and thus could be 
assumed to motivate participants in a rational discourse (Benhabib’s non-vicious circle). 
They had some inkling this was possible given the “natural” functioning of 
communicative language in Habermas’s theory. But they also had a sense of the very real 
distortions of such linguistic functioning from the same source in his critical theoretical 
treatment of the pathologies of late modernity. And yet, something like reciprocity 
needed to be a part of deliberation if it were to “do” anything transformative. Dialogue 
solves this difficulty about the source and expectations of reciprocity in offering a theory 
of openness to the other as an inherent feature of the dialogue itself. It is, in a sense, 
thrust upon us as we are opened up to our partner. This is reminiscent of the Habermasian 
story about reciprocity inherent in our relations to an other, but now grounds this in a 
particular phenomenon of relation that by its nature leaves us in a position to be 
transformed (potentially) by an other and they by us. And this is not dependent on the 
type of language used, but on the type of relation entered into – the I-Thou as opposed to 
the I-It – whatever is said (or not) between the two partners. 
Let me make one final point about the relationship between a deliberative and 
dialogic politics. Nothing about this dialogic grounding of democratic politics means that 
deliberation is not a vital, even necessary element of a democracy. In fact, it is best to see 
dialogue and deliberation as complimentary notions. If deliberation properly speaking 
(the give and take of rationally-grounded reasons towards solving some problem or other) 
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could not secure itself as a normative foundation for democratic politics, this is not to say 
deliberation is not a valuable activity. Only now there is reason to see, in 
phenomenological terms, what often happens when it goes well. We are moved from 
within an opening up through dialogue to consider new positions and new ideas. This is 
where the transformative potential resides. And good rationally grounded arguments can 
be very useful in this process for realizing cooperative, political ends. In fact, such 
processes of reasoning may even be required if the positions we are moved to are in fact 
going to be beneficial in the creation of better (more fair, just, and practical) policy. After 
all, nothing in the nature of a dialogue guarantees good collective policy. To sum the 
point up: if deliberation is going to work to transform hearts and minds, it needs dialogue. 
If dialogue is going to be put to work in the service of better democratic politics, it needs 
to (at least sometimes) facilitate good and productive deliberation about political matters 
of more general concern.   
 
Criticisms of Deliberation: A Reappraisal in Light of Dialogue  
 
Another way of understanding what dialogue offers deliberative politics is 
afforded by revisiting the two major critiques of deliberative democratic theory offered at 
the end of the first chapter. I labeled these, broadly speaking, practical and ontological 
critiques. The practical critiques were concerned with the applicability of the normative 
core of deliberative democracy in “the real world.” And while I suggested that some 
major efforts to incorporate the insights of the practical critiques had been made, I also 
concluded that these critiques were evidence that the application of the normative core of 
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deliberative democracy was always going to be suspect given the difficulty in sorting out 
what could properly count as deliberation, and how to then apply this concept to politics. 
Reasons are tough to sort out, and even tougher to rely on in any consistent way for 
democratic practice. Thus these critiques, while to a degree able to be mitigated, 
amounted to a caution in placing deliberation at the center of any democratic theory if it 
were going to have real practical impact on the quality of politics and social life. 
I will only offer a limited defense of dialogue here, as the practical elements of a 
politics anchored in dialogue occupy the following chapter. But briefly, a dialogic 
grounding has the advantage of being phenomenologically “real.” That is, however rare, 
it is something we do sometimes experience in our relations to others that gets at the heart 
of when, how, and why we are moved to new positions and new ways of being. Slowly or 
suddenly, we are forced to answer for something brought to us by an other, not in the 
abstract, but in real presence between us and them. As such, the nature of the modern 
world does not distort this relation, only its frequency. The I-Thou relation is a central 
feature of human life, which of course was Habermas’s claim about communicative 
action. But with communication one now has to be uncertain about the possibility of 
communicative action given the rise of instrumental rationality (of the system) and the 
distortions of money and illegitimate power in the modern era – in short, whether 
communicative action could be both a critical measure of modern pathologies and 
simultaneously ground current political practice. Or, one had to consider other forms of 
communicative practice that could augment (formal) deliberation in order to ensure free 
and fair exchanges. Dialogue, on the other hand, represents the occasional moments in 
which such modern pathologies are cut through, at least potentially, in a present relation 
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to an other. Thus the effort to constantly sort out what communication “counts” (or not) 
as deliberation is circumvented by focusing on the event of dialogue that can spring forth 
between partners –  whatever the style or mode of communication unfolds between them.  
Now, there is still the matter of attaching what happens through such relations to 
something politically useful. Again, that will occupy the discussion of institutionalization 
of a dialogic politics in the next chapter. But at bottom, it would seem dialogue is no 
worse off than deliberation in terms of a never-ending attempt to get closer to its 
realization and impact on politics, while “hedging one’s bets” and recognizing the role 
for other political, institutional arrangements to facilitate more just and fair democratic 
processes. A politics anchored in dialogue still understands that more traditional political 
activities such as voting, social movements and interest groups will not and should not 
disappear in the near-term. But like deliberative democracy, a politics anchored in 
dialogue hopes to change the relative roles and power of these political avenues based on 
the transformative potential of real meeting both within and beyond “politics as usual.” 
And as I will argue in the following chapter, this opens up opportunities for institutional 
innovations that might harness the potential of dialogue for better deliberation and better 
democratic politics that can begin realizing this change. 
The ontological concerns about the deliberative core of rational language were, I 
argued, more damning than these practical critiques. Whether it was for reasons doubting 
the inherent rationality in communication, or because of brain-body issues in regards to 
our very ability to function as competent and rational users of language in the first place, 
these critiques cast serious doubt on whether or not the deliberative democratic model has 
a sound normative foundation in rational language use. How does dialogue stand up to 
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these concerns? As mentioned above, some have argued that Buber and other dialogic 
theorists have prefigured some of the very post-modern categories that have been used to 
critique the Kantian-inspired notions of rational debate. As such, dialogue seems more at 
home in a post-modern-influenced ethics that eschews the “meta-narratives” of rational 
foundations. Not that a relational ontology is without its own “meta” claim. Still, there is 
a strong resonance between this rejection of rational language and universalist 
orientations in favor of dialogue and  deference to real embodied others present before us. 
The brain-body issues also presents a much smaller problem for a theory of 
dialogue. Part of this is clear in Connolly’s treatment of the techniques of the self and 
micropolitics in his account of the brain-body issues. While he expressed a distrust of any 
perfectionist program of deliberative democracy for the difficulties related to our 
embodied self, he also refuses to conform to the rather limited and crude biological 
materialism this might lead one to support. Instead, in an argument recalling both 
Nietzsche and Dewey, he thinks the self can be worked on in ways that are always a bit 
unclear and unpredictable, but can nonetheless allows us to interact with those brain-body 
relays and change them, hopefully in desired ways. He returns repeatedly in 
Neuropolitics to film theory. In film, the techniques of directors can play on our affect. 
They can “do” something there of which we are very likely to be unaware in the moment 
of its happening. And the conclusion seems to be that if directors can do this to us, so 
might we do it for ourselves through creative and experimental play with the deeper 
structures that color our consciousness. While a dialogic politics cannot stop at this “self” 
work, something analogous can be said about those moments of being opened up in a 
dialogic encounter.60 In ways beyond the impact of arguments and rational language that 
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occur in our conscious brain, we are moved to new positions and ways of being. These 
fruitful encounters can shape us in ways that we may not be able to predict or know, but 
which over time (again, recall Buber’s description of our eventual need to answer to what 
was once presented to us by some other in a past relation) can produce new ways of 
being, even within our very bodies and brains. This is part of what it means to have 
someone “bodily present” to us, a way in which the depths of our self, bodies included, 
are available to the influence of an other. As Stawarska puts it with Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy in mind: “From Buber’s point of view, the interrelation of seeing and being 
seen, of touching and being touched, is not simply a phenomenon of meaning-neutral 
sensibility of an animate organism but a site of meaning and value.” As such it represents  
“a philosophy of embodied reciprocity” where “the corporeal reversibility of the senses is 
predicated upon the reciprocity of I-you relation rather than derived from the individual 
body.” In other words, between two partners in a dialogue physically presented to one 
another there is “intrinsic communicative import; it [the relation] is laden with meaning 
and value from the start.” 61 This meaning, then, is transmitted not only into our 
conscious, considering brain, which works through language. It is there, too, perhaps. 
But, the conscious brain excels at the I-It relation, where it can deal with things in the 
past at its own speed. The I-Thou encounter is one that can impact us consciously (as we 
become “aware” in the moment), but also in way that is beyond our conscious 
appreciation of it. It is, again, a relation of the whole body, perhaps even in the sense 
required to impact our way of thinking and being in the world as recognized by 
contemporary cognitive science. 
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But just because dialogue seems to fare better on these accounts (according to my 
arguments, anyway), this does not mean that it is without concerns of its own, thought 
they are different than those inherent in the deliberative account. A brief appraisal of 
those concerns follows before turning to a discussion of institutions in the next chapter. 
 
Concerns for a Dialogic Politics 
 
There are some concerns to be acknowledged in accepting this dialogic 
grounding. First, a deference to the inherent spontaneity of the I-Thou encounter means 
there are no guarantees of a particular outcome or other, much less the encounter itself 
even happening. It cannot be forced. And it cannot be scripted or predicted. Whereas the 
deliberativists following Habermas could hope the inherent rationality of communication 
could, in a sense, guarantee more rational political outcomes, the dialogic encounter 
having been de-coupled from any natural functioning of language cannot be quite so 
assured. However, I have spent a great deal of time suggesting that this guarantee of good 
relations and beneficial outcomes was elusive to the deliberativists as well. At least with 
dialogue one gets an account of transformative potential that is not attached to this 
abstracted understanding of language use that it then cannot depend on to produce the 
transformations being sought. Though, to be sure, a politics anchored in dialogue must 
account for the increasing difficulty of having I-Thou interactions in a world inclined 
towards It relations. But should these relations happen, the nature of the I-Thou precludes 
some of the more pernicious elements of self-interested, strategic reason as these are by 
nature I-It activities and failures to enter into dialogue. So, if one cannot guarantee 
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rational outcomes, one can at least recognize that within a dialogic encounter, something 
fruitful in terms of mutual understanding and transformation can be accomplished when 
and if such relations are entered into.  
The concern may be even greater that this, however. Failures to deeply engage 
with others may even worsen relations. And though this is a failure to enter into dialogue 
in the first place (as opposed to a product of a dialogue), the experience of this failure can 
nonetheless heighten tensions. This is an inherent risk in politics, however. But recall that 
there is an agonistic dimension of dialogue that explains how we might be opened up to 
an other in real struggle over and against them. Thus this risk carries great potential 
reward: the possibility of achieving real meeting with an other and the impact of a 
dialogic encounter with them. This is not a story of an endless agonistic struggle with no 
apparent hope for resolution. It is instead an understanding of risk associated with taking 
it upon ourselves to confirm an other, be responsible for them, and to trust them, and 
hope they will reciprocate, even if they remain an enemy before, during, or after our 
encounter with them.     
Finally, another concern associated with the acceptance of a dialogic grounding to 
politics is that this would seem to demand a reduction to small-scale politics where less-
mediated relations are possible. This  represents a practical limitation given the modern 
complex democracies we live in. And, broadly, I think this is true. But there are 
institutional arrangements already suggested in deliberative theory (and even already 
existing in practice created through deliberative reform) that speak to the possibilities 
here – though we may need to think a little differently about them in light of dialogue. 
That is the task of the next chapter. For now, though, it should suffice to note that much 
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of deliberative theory has already moved in the direction of institutionalizing spaces with 
real political “stakes” that bring people (either as representatives of a larger community, 
or otherwise) into direct contact with one another. These spaces are meant to produce real 
meeting and exchange between these citizens, and thus the possibility for dialogue. And, 
again, though they have not had a theory to explain it up till now, dialogue provides the 
explanation as to why these spaces seemed so valuable to deliberative theorists in the first 
place, given the “higher levels” of intersubjective communication that their normative 
theory usually relies on. 
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time, I think there is something to be said for retaining the word “Thou” despite this 
potential confusion. “Thou” gives the reader pause to consider there is something more 
going on here than everyday pronominal language can account for. Saying, “hey, you 
there,” is not what it means to speak I-You in this sense. So whereas the formality of 
“Thou” is off-putting, it functions to give pause for considering what in particular it means 
to say “thou” as opposed to a more mundane “you” to someone. Or, put another way, it 
highlights something about how the I-Thou relation is different compared to how I often 
interact with others – a greater separation with the I-It relations we mistake in the modern 
world for I-You relations. Thus, in what follows I have decided to use “Thou” in my own 
formulations. However, because I am quoting from the Kaufmann translation, direct quotes 
will appear with “You.” This is awkward, perhaps, but hopefully the reader can consider 
them synonymous for the purposes of this work. That is, one can imagine the possibility 
that within the I-Thou relation, one might well turn and say, “You” or “Thou” with their 
“whole being” and they would “mean” the same thing, so long as its “with their whole 
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CHAPTER V 
INSTITUTIONALIZING A POLITICS ANCHORED IN DIALOGUE 
 
 
 In the previous three chapters I have argued for a normative core of dialogic 
politics for deliberative democracy. Up to this point, however, I have been chiefly 
concerned to examine the problem from the theoretical point of view. This concluding 
chapter is meant to ground that discussion in terms of the institutions and practice of 
democracy. Just as deliberative democratic theory has found it necessary to make a 
practical turn as it seeks to be relevant to contemporary politics, so too must a politics 
anchored in dialogue find practical realization if it is to advance deliberative theory in 
any meaningful way. 
 The chapter proceeds by first briefly discussing the desirability of taking a focus 
on small, formally institutionalized spaces for dialogue and deliberation. Following this, I 
outline what differences might exist between the “new” model of deliberative democracy 
centered on a dialogic politics and the “old” model of deliberative politics anchored in 
rational processes of communication, especially when thinking about the design and 
implementation of institutions for citizen engagement. This is the last bit of theory to be 
accomplished before turning to actual empirical examples.  Following the line of thought 
pursued in chapter two (that many deliberativists already rely on an implicit theory of 
dialogue), I try to show that many attempts at the institutionalization of deliberative 
democracy already make use of spaces for dialogic meeting. This shows the realization of 
a dialogic politics for better deliberative democracy is in a sense already underway in the 
practical designs of deliberative opportunities for citizens. But this is not the only sort of 
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institutional design recommended by a focus on dialogue. Other spaces organized to 
produce dialogue – and consciously avoid anything resembling deliberation – can also 
have political benefits that the overall model of deliberative democracy would find 
desirable. Thus I offer a specific example of institutionalized democratic participation 
along these lines: The Restorative Listening Project in Portland, Oregon, which was 
designed as a dialogue-centered response to growing racial tensions and gentrification in 
the city’s NE neighborhoods.  
 
Institutionalizing Dialogue 
 
 The Limits and Benefits Inherent in Thinking About Institutions 
   
In a recent article on deliberative democracy and the role of rhetoric, Simone 
Chambers argues that there has been a “split” in contemporary deliberative democratic 
thinking between what she calls “deliberative democracy” and “democratic 
deliberation.”1 The former is the longstanding view of theorists such as herself and 
Habermas that deliberation is an activity largely reserved to the semi-anarchic processes 
of communication inherent in the everyday interactions within the “mass” public. These 
interactions more or less indirectly influence the political process itself through public 
opinion and the publicity of issues and ideas then “taken up” by those with administrative 
power. That is, communicative processes facilitate opinion-and-will formation through 
the informal institutions of the public sphere and must be “converted” into administrative 
power (as Habermas understands it) in the “formal” institutions of government.2 
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Theorists of “democratic deliberation,” on the other hand, have abandoned thinking about 
this mass public in favor of considering small-scale opportunities for deliberation, often 
with a direct connection to decision-making authority. These are more or less direct 
efforts at institutional design with the normative model of deliberative democracy as a 
sort of guide for achieving a better quality process of decision-making (not only opinion 
and will formation). Chambers thinks accounts of this sort are on the rise at the expense 
of actual theories of deliberative democracy and the communicative processes of the 
mass public. The preference for smaller institutionalized spaces means that deliberative 
democrats have largely “abandoned” thinking about those everyday interactions in public 
(she offers conversations at the mailbox about the state of a public park as an example). 
Instead, theorists of “democratic deliberation” focus only on very small, controllable 
settings that they hope might produce something approximating the normative goals of 
deliberative theory. Whatever the benefits realizable in this narrow setting, the worry is 
that the conversation at the mailbox remains “untouched” by these efforts at the 
institutionalization of deliberative norms.  
 I think Chambers has made too much of this distinction between deliberation of a 
mass public and the conscious creation of institutions as mini-publics. I will argue in a 
moment that such mini-publics and mass public participation are more connected then 
Chambers seems to think. But her differentiation between that which is everyday social 
practice and that which takes place in particular institutionalized settings remains an 
important one. Chambers sees deliberation as something that could and should be a part 
of commonplace communicative practice in public life. After all, discursive processes are 
based on communicative action, which is just such a foundational practice to our very 
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social existence (if one is inclined to agree with Habermas on this account, as Chambers 
is). Dialogue must be thought of similarly. Dialogic encounters are not necessarily the 
stuff of democracy and politics in its most practical variations. Dialogue (hopefully) 
occurs on any number of occasions in “daily” life, about any number of topics (or no 
particular topic at all), between any number of particular people (or a person with nature 
and/or things around them). And though there may be politics in these interactions (given 
our sufficiently broad understanding of the term in contemporary political theory) this is 
not the sort of politics one can “do” much about in the here and now. Any practical 
theory of politics concerned with the on-going business of collective self-governance 
needs to consider something more immediately achievable. That means looking toward 
improving institutional practice to accommodate the normative insights of a politics 
rooted in dialogue – though this comes, of course, at a cost. Anyone who seeks to 
institutionalize dialogue for the purposes of better democratic politics will have 
comparatively less to say about the phenomenon of dialogue within and across an entire 
community that is anchored in personal and social life – despite there being clear political 
importance for encouraging (as Buber would put it) a “Thou-saying” spirit throughout a 
community. Relative to the broader understanding of dialogic politics offered in the 
previous chapter this is undoubtedly a restriction in scope. But it is one that I think is 
necessary when considering the immediate and practical impact of dialogue for 
contemporary democratic politics. In short, then, this chapter will work towards the 
application of politics rooted in dialogue within the (limited) framework of institutional 
possibilities in complex modern democracies. It is thus an application of dialogue to 
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“democratic deliberation” rather than “deliberative democracy” according to Chambers’ 
distinction between these terms. 
 But along with these limitations of scale and scope, there are also some 
advantages to looking at deliberation and/or dialogue as it might actually be practiced 
towards better democratic ends. The work of Archon Fung, for instance, demonstrates 
several advantages of focusing on what happens in actual circumstances of deliberation 
between citizens. His Empowered Participation  focuses on institutional reforms that 
invested citizens with real power through participation in institutions that held some 
direct sway over local schools and policing in Chicago. Looking at these actual practices 
of citizen participation offered new and different insights into the possibilities of 
deliberation when compared with the more abstract and ideal theory describing 
deliberation. He writes: 
First, many theorists have thought that fair deliberation requires demanding and 
rarely realized preconditions – as economic or social equality, wealth, or shared 
values and a homogenous culture, for example. By examining deliberation in the 
context of Chicago’s poor and often conflicted neighborhoods, this investigation 
explores whether the often distant ideal of deliberative democracy can be applied 
fruitfully to urgent contemporary public dilemmas. Second, the conceptual 
development of deliberative political theory has come at the expense of 
investigating the practical institutional forms that might realize the ideal in actual 
organizations and agencies.3 
 
In short, Fung’s study realized that deliberation could work in these difficult settings and 
thus could valuably inform deliberative theory. Of course, Fung understands these 
institutions and the participation in them as deliberative according to more or less classic 
formulations of the model. But refocusing on dialogue, one might still insist there are 
similar benefits to looking at actual institutions and actual political engagement by 
citizens where dialogic moments have played a meaningful role. That is, there is a hope 
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for seeing the real and immediate impact of dialogue for democracy in practice in actual 
institutional settings where citizens participate (to some real extent) in collective self-
rule. A focus on real interactions between citizens and officials in institutions is decidedly 
less abstract and utopian then theories that remain attached to major necessary changes at 
the level of entire social cultures (either towards better deliberative practice or towards a 
greater place for dialogic relation in lived experience).  
Further, such institutional attempts to realize a greater impact of deliberative 
processes and dialogic meeting can “spillover” into those broader social and interpersonal 
interactions in positive ways. Contra Chambers’ overdrawn distinction, there is, in fact, 
some reason to think that what happens in constructed institutions feeds back on the 
everyday interactions beyond them. According to those that have studied the impact of 
participation in civic enterprises and deliberative forums, greater senses of political 
efficacy and a continued desire to engage with other citizens can result from participation 
in deliberation.4 Deliberative designs that rely heavily on a dialogic core may have an 
even greater spillover effect of this sort. So, perhaps it is not entirely an either/or in terms 
of thinking about institutions and the immediate and practical possibilities of dialogue 
and deliberation. The extent to which more dialogue and better deliberation characterize 
the activities of the entire community in its everyday public interactions may have a 
strong relation to the building of capacities for these activities in the citizen body itself 
through institutional innovation. The conversation at the mailbox may turn out to be more 
deliberative (in the broadest sense) because one or both of the conversers have 
experienced some successful event (possibly sponsored by their local city government) 
where real dialogue emerged.   
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Institutionalizing Deliberation vs. Institutionalizing Space for Dialogue 
  
 
Beyond keeping the limits of institutional settings in mind, there are some 
immediate concerns for realizing the potential of a focus on dialogue in democratic 
institutions. The spontaneous nature of dialogue, the fact that it cannot be fully planned 
out or controlled, that it cannot be forced upon a particular other, that no guarantees can 
be given regarding its results – all of this would seem to make a politics dependent on a 
dialogic core unfit for institutionalization. More so, certainly, than the more typical 
theory of deliberation with its more structured (perhaps restricted is the proper word) 
vision of public argumentation. However, institutions can be constructed that open up 
space for dialogue that might have positive impacts on what these institutions can 
accomplish. But thinking in terms of dialogue and not (only) deliberation will make a 
difference in how the institutions take shape and operate. 
 Deliberative theory fails to make sense of institutional practices on both a 
normative and a descriptive level. Because deliberative benefits are based in the value of 
public reasoning as a means to achieving more rational and legitimate public opinion and 
will, deliberative theory recommends institutions that facilitate the inclusion and debate 
of arguments as a means towards moving to greater understanding between participants 
and better (more rational) positions/outcomes. That is, institutions that approximate the 
appropriate conditions for unleashing the benefits of a Habermasian-influenced ideal 
democratic procedure. Early theorists of deliberative theory seem inclined exactly 
towards this understanding – even those that had moved “beyond” the institutions of the 
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public sphere (mass media and social movements, in particular) to consider organizations 
tied directly to decision making authority. As I have been arguing, this is a normative 
failure in that it places all its transformative potential in a process of communication that 
cannot fully deliver. Even when deliberative practice in institutions seemed to 
demonstrate something other than deliberation was central to the work being done, 
deliberativists have often continued to frame their value in deliberative terms – thus the 
descriptive failure of the theory to understand what about the institutions in question was 
valuable to producing better democratic outcomes. Let me offer some brief examples.  
 John Dryzek was one of the first of the early deliberativists to look specifically at 
institutions as a means for unleashing the potential benefits of discourse for democracy. 
His “discursive designs” have a clearly deliberative orientation towards unleashing 
rationality through the exchange of reasons and arguments. Dryzek suggests three 
guiding norms of institutional design: that only the force of better arguments should be 
granted authority, that no barriers to participation of interested parties should exist, and 
that no “autonomous formal constitutions or rules” should exist.5 Further, he thinks that 
participation in discursively designed institutions requires communicatively competent 
individuals and should require the “embodiment of communicative ethics in rules of 
debate.”6 All this leads Dryzek to describe a discursive institutional design as “a social 
institution around which the expectations of a number of actors converge [where] [t]he 
focus of deliberations should include, but not be limited to, the individual or collective 
needs and interests of the individuals involved. Thus the institution is oriented to the 
generation and coordination of actions situated within a particular problem context.”7 In 
other words, these institutions should serve the function of bringing citizens into 
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communicative interactions, in order to unleash their collective (communicatively 
generated) rationality, in the service of some particular political problem(s). Formulating 
needs and interests as arguments backed with reasons, then, produces a better policy 
process so long as this discursive institution can retain some critical distance from the 
state itself, thus resisting co-option.   
 More contemporary efforts at institutionalizing deliberative norms have often 
reproduced something similar to Dryzek’s original link between institutional practices 
and communicative rationality as the transition to formal deliberative practice is 
considered. Consider Archon Fung’s account of ideal deliberative participation. He 
describes several elements of an ideal deliberative process as demonstrated by the 
activities of local residents through their involvement in institutions attached to 
governance of local police and schools. Fung describes a five-step process for solving 
collective problems through deliberation. First, a problem must be identified and 
prioritized, however vague this may be in its initial stages. Then, “a proposal, 
justification, and selection of provisional strategies” for solving the problem ensues once 
a particular problem has been defined and agreed upon. This second step involves a 
“complete proposal” with set tasks, divisions of labor, and set expectations in regards to 
benefits from accomplishing particular tasks. The proposed solution must then be 
implemented. Following this, a process of monitoring and evaluation can assess the 
success (or lack thereof) of the solution for the particular problem. The fifth and final step 
is “reiteration” where the information produced in the prior steps can be incorporated into 
further efforts to solve the chosen problem (or redefine in some way the problem itself).8 
As an ideal, this captures much of the thrust of deliberative attachment to a process of 
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public, practical reasoning. The effort to define a common problem and propose and 
justify solutions happens through a process of public exchange of some sort. Usually, the 
public input is gathered with an eye towards the inclusion of as many perspectives in the 
community as possible, but it is especially based on an effort to include as much relevant 
knowledge as possible regarding the nature of the problem to be solved and the most 
productive ways to solve it. Fung’s addition, then, is to see this process “play out” in 
actual trial and error of policy-making towards solving collective problems. But real 
deliberations often stall out exactly at the first two stages. Settling on the exact nature of 
a problem or problems to be addressed collectively, and then coming up with solutions 
that all can accept. In the cases Fung studies, this stage was shorted by either limiting the 
topics citizens could refer to in deliberation, or by beginning with a relatively bounded 
problem (police activity within a particular “beat”). Within these confines, new 
consensuses are expected to emerge from the public reasoning process of citizens and 
administrators. And so this very practical approach to envisioning a place for deliberation 
offers little beyond a gesture towards the possibilities inherent in good public deliberation 
along the lines articulated by deliberative theory.9 To be sure, Fung’s work adds 
important insights to how the messy practice of deliberation has actually worked, 
surprisingly among some of the poorest and most difficult conditions imaginable (in 
diverse and economically disadvantaged communities); and further, how deliberation 
might be practiced in relation to matters of practical governance, with strong 
administrative involvement and lots of accountability throughout the process of creating 
and implementing collective decisions. The process by which collective definitions of 
problems and collective solutions are to be made, however, remains in practice cut off by 
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the strict constraining of topics and issues to be deliberated on by the public;10 or, when 
articulated in theoretical terms, tied to deliberative theoretical conceptions (public 
reasoning) of a familiar sort. Thus institutions benefit by unleashing deliberation about 
very narrowly defined concerns (as decided by administrators), which then works through 
the power of collective rationality and public reasoning processes to produce (over 
several iterations) better policy for solving collective local problems. 
 A final example of a deliberative understanding of institutionalized public 
engagement, and a telling one relative to the case of the Restorative Listening Project I 
will offer below, might be drawn from Gutmann and Thompson’s defense of Truth 
Commissions on deliberative terms in Why Deliberative Democracy?. Gutmann and 
Thompson offer a democratic defense of these commissions (they have South Africa’s 
Truth and Reconciliation Committee in mind) that demonstrates just how awkward a 
deliberative theory lens can be to certain (politically valuable) institutions that do not 
actually fit that theoretical framework. They argue that justifying Truth Commissions can 
be done according to a principle of democratic reciprocity (the same principle as 
explained in chapter 1) and thus as a practice in support of deliberative democracy. That 
is, the Truth Commission functions as a “trial run” for the give-and-take of moral 
argumentation based in mutual respect for others and their positions. They defend the 
institution of the Truth Commission accordingly: 
A commission that accepts reciprocity as a justification also practices what it 
preaches about the democratic society it is trying to help create … Reciprocity 
serves as a guide not only for a future democracy, calling on citizens to justify 
their political views to each other, but also for the commission itself, calling on 
commissioners and testifiers to practice some of the skills and virtues of the 
democratic society they are striving to create … More generally, sincere efforts 
on the part of citizens to offer an account of their political past closely resemble 
the most basic activities in the kind of democratic politics to which a healthy 
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democracy aspires: sharing one’s political point of view with one’s fellow citizens 
in an effort to persuade them at least of its reasonableness, and potentially of its 
rightness. The very activity of providing an account that other citizens can be 
expected to understand as reasonable (even if not right) indicates the willingness 
of citizens to acknowledge one another’s membership in a common democratic 
enterprise.11   
 
The existence and practice of a Truth Commission, then, is justifiable (and normatively 
valuable) largely because it provides opportunities for instituting and building norms of 
deliberative practice, which is aimed at a public argumentation of moral positions from a 
orientation of mutual respect. Again, even in this unique setting where what is most 
important about the process of reconciliation initiated by this commission is far from 
deliberative, the deliberativist reading remains tied to the argumentative possibilities 
being practiced in this institution.  
These examples make clear the tie to standard deliberative norms that reproduce 
the core of a rational linguistic exchange, usually coded as “public reasoning” when 
thinking about deliberative practice. As such, the spaces envisioned for institutionalizing 
discourse are meant to reproduce, above all, the exchange of arguments and justifications 
by all affected in order to arrive at best decisions (as policy), be it a full-fledged 
consensus or something just short of this. Communicative rationality and impartial norms 
of respect are to reign, and institutional designs are best if they produce and protect these 
activities.        
 Dialogue does not need to tie itself to rational argumentation in the same way to 
realize politically useful outcomes. Instead, institutions should not be oriented (only) to 
incorporating as many arguments as possible for each and every participant to consider, 
nor should they necessarily even organize around some immediate problem for which 
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immediate solutions are sought. Recalling Buber’s description of a technical dialogue in 
the previous chapter reminds us that institutions established along these lines may still 
foster moments of dialogue, but they will have much more to get past in order for real 
meeting to emerge. And analyzing those institutions that do not fit with a conception of 
rational exchange on the wrong terms may miss what is politically valuable about them, 
not to mention risk undervaluing them entirely. So what kind of institutional space does 
dialogue envision?  
Cissna and Anderson (drawing on their study of the Buber-Rogers public 
dialogue) envision an important role for institutions in putting dialogue at least 
potentially in the service of democracy. They argue that dialogue is “facilitated by 
structuring potentially dialogic spaces, both geographic and attitudinal, and not by 
arranging or mandating the dialogue itself.”12 They rely on a metaphor of “a clearing” in 
order to show what must be (and can be) accomplished as a means to facilitating dialogic 
possibility: a space where real meeting might occur because people are inviting and 
supportive of experiment and play with relations, interactions, and ideas, rather than 
oriented towards a back-and-forth defense of respective positions. And this requires a 
certain openness in terms of goals and designs for the “outcomes” of any dialogic space. 
As such, facilitators become crucial to guiding and supporting engagement between 
participants in some institutionalized discussion, however it emerges (if it does). But 
facilitators cannot direct or will the participants to particular outcomes. Along these lines, 
they approvingly quote William Isaacs, a member of the MIT Dialogue Project: 
[Isaacs] has discovered that although suspending defensiveness and exploring 
reasons for change are important, these cannot be his goals as a facilitator. Rather, 
he writes, the ‘central purpose’ of a dialogue session ‘is simply to establish a field 
of genuine meeting and inquiry (which we call a container) – a setting in which 
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people can allow a free flow of meaning and vigorous exploration of the 
collective background of their thought, their personal predispositions, the nature 
of their shared attention, and the rigid features of their individual and collective 
assumptions.’13 
 
There is a broadly deliberative (or at least communicative) element to this arrangement, 
in which the discussion of assumptions, values and norms can be undertaken. But the 
focus is entirely different. A clearing in which this conversation can unfold (but may not) 
allows for the possibility of engagement between participants with one another. This is 
not a space organized only for solving particular problems or generating new policy and 
direction. The restrictions are few and the guidance is necessarily minimal (only so much 
as is necessary for “the clearing” to remain possible). And each group member is asked to 
participate as persons, not simply as participants or stakeholders offering some 
necessarily contestable point of view.  
Already, then, I think we have a sense of what a dialogic politics requires of an 
institution that might be different from what is suggested by a more traditional 
deliberative theory, even though (as we shall see) many (even most) practitioners of 
deliberative democracy have implicitly gone the route of facilitating dialogic meeting as a 
means to better deliberative practice. 
 
 
A Note on Two Notions of Dialogue  
 
 
 What I am calling dialogue (as laid out in the last chapter) needs to be 
distinguished from an increasingly common usage of the term in the literature on 
deliberative practice. Because, at one level, it is uninteresting to say that dialogue has 
occupied a central place in many deliberative designs, since several authors have 
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explicitly utilized the term “dialogue” as either a component of or a complement to 
deliberative processes, though usually without defining this term or indicating any 
noteworthy difference. One of the few efforts to consciously distinguish it from 
deliberation is made by Levine, Fung and Gastil’s concluding discussion in The 
Deliberative Democracy Handbook. Here they indicate that dialogue is a different kind of 
public talk, which is distinguishable from the more problem-solving, argumentative 
forms that deliberation often takes. They think dialogue can be useful as a “first step” 
towards deliberation when “bridging linguistic, social, and epistemological chasms 
between different subgroups of the potentially deliberative body” is necessary.14 
Agreeing with this view of dialogue, Katherine Cramer Walsh’s Talking About Race, 
understands “civic dialogue” as a part of an overall “deliberative system.”15 But it can be 
distinguished from deliberation, properly speaking, in several elements. According to her 
account: dialogue is focused on “improved understanding” (as opposed to decision-
making and/or agreement); treats inclusivity, inequality, and difference as topics of 
discussion (rather than bracketing difference, or fixing it by pre-arrangements of 
participants); functions without the requirement of publicity in favor of confidentiality 
and a sense of a “safe space;” encourages emotional expression (as opposed to reasoned 
debate); urges common good and mindfulness of the community, but without orientation 
towards consensus or broader desire to include all affected.16  
 On the surface, nothing is wrong with these accounts. Indeed, as I have defended 
it dialogue is a useful component to a deliberative process exactly because it opens up 
possibilities for dealing with deep, seemingly intractable differences by making 
meaningful connections between very different others possible. But dialogue described 
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by Levine et. al. and Walsh seems more linked to a technique of communication, or a 
particular type of public conversation among others. Nothing in these accounts captures 
the interpersonal encounter of the sort described by Buber. Thus, dialogue described in 
this way  reproduces a similar mistake committed by deliberativists relative to more 
argumentative forms of communication. Levine et. al. and Walsh see dialogue as defined 
in certain patterns and types of communication that can produce by way of proper 
procedure “accommodation, reconciliation, mutual understanding, or at the very least, 
informed tolerance” where the “general method” of dialogue can create (hopefully) a 
situation where “each subgroup understands how the others think, talk, and reason.”17 
Instead, dialogue must be understood not as a master-able art of communication, but an 
(occasional) happening – an event that occurs between people in relation when and where 
it happens.  
 Why does this distinction matter? As described by Levine, Fung and Gastil, and 
also Walsh, dialogue is being thought about in non-Buberian terms. It is instead a type of 
talk structured by certain communications and management techniques. It is a practice for 
overcoming difference through proper institutional arrangement and rhetorical mastery 
by facilitators and/or participants. As such, it is something to be produced, willed, and 
accomplished by some on some others. Handbooks exist for dialogue of this type, 
directed at mediators, managers and councilors. Goals can be set and accomplished and 
the techniques of dialogue are a means to these ends. These understandings of dialogue 
function just like deliberation, only better (or more appropriate in certain contexts). Their 
accounts of an ideal type of communication fare no better than deliberation, whose norms 
and idealizations all-too abstract, even utopian (recalling the practical critiques of 
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deliberation in chapter 1). Also, in these accounts, the phenomenal aspect is entirely lost. 
Communication of the right sort, not the orientation towards one another by the particular 
communicators, does the work. Applying this account of dialogue to institutional design 
means seeking to consciously construct and facilitate spaces to produce dialogue of some 
pre-envisioned sort. As such, spaces oriented this way are potentially an obstacle to real 
meeting between participants in a dialogue, as Buber would presumably argue.  
 This is an important distinction for understanding what happens in dialogue and 
how to think about providing space for it to occur. But, at the same time, I do not want to 
overstate this distinction. There is a real place for institutional design and facilitation in 
producing spaces congenial to dialogue that is benefitted by this orientation – at least in 
that it has moved away from a strict focus on deliberation. Maintaining a focus on 
communicative practice will likely limit the possibilities for Buberian dialogue, of 
course. But even without the proper understanding of dialogue, there is something to 
build on in these authors’ turn towards non-deliberative communication. Anderson and 
Cissna, for instance, imagine institutional designs not unlike those suggested by many 
envisioning these non-deliberative reforms. Certainly, this orientation towards dialogue 
of the one sort (conversations directed at mutual understanding or personal expression) 
are more likely than other (say, more deliberative) arrangements to succeed at opening up 
“clearings” for Buberian dialogue. In the following section, I turn towards a few 
examples of such spaces that facilitate dialogue within the deliberative literature. These 
spaces have been relied upon to facilitate better deliberation, though without a clear 
theory as to how or why.    
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Dialogue Within Deliberative Institutional Designs 
 
 
 As I outlined in chapter 2, James Fishkin’s Deliberative Opinion Poll had built in 
an important element of small-group, face-to-face deliberation where deliberators often 
experienced their most epiphanous moments (and statistically, produced the biggest 
change when compared with the other elements of the event). I argued in chapter 2 that 
this was indicative of something that went beyond deliberation and pointed towards a 
concept of dialogue. Fishkin, it turns out, is not alone in having done this. By examining 
a few more examples of this dialogic core already present within deliberative institutions 
we can go further into outlining the particular features of a practical application of 
dialogue into institutions.  
 Citizens Juries are another deliberative design that has received some attention by 
deliberative theorists and practitioners. Created by Ned Crosby in the 1970’s and 
administered by his Jefferson Center (a non-profit organization based in Minneapolis), 
these meetings were designed to “enhance reason and empathy among citizens as they 
discussed a public policy matter or evaluated candidates.”18 These groups focused first 
and foremost on a “high-quality process” that seeks (like the Deliberative Opinion Poll) 
to randomly select citizens according to the demographic make-up of the group in 
consideration (a town, city, nation, etc), but consist of no more than 24 people – the 
“largest possible” size while maintaining quality deliberation. They also made sure 
opportunities to meet in smaller groups of 4 to 6 people are made available. Further, 
facilitators were trained to both help the quality of deliberation (ensuring no one 
dominates the discussions, for instance) and also to help those brought in to provide 
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expertise and information answer jurors’ questions simply and directly. The process was 
allowed to continue as long as possible while still being able to secure participation of the 
invited jurors. One week was given to complete the deliberations, with the jurors being 
paid $150 a day for their time. Finally, Crosby and Nethercut also suggested that for this 
process to work, “Jurors must be welcomed to the process and made to feel at home. It 
takes an hour or more to explain the basics of the process, outline the issue to be studied, 
and allow the jurors to introduce themselves and ask questions.”19 All in all, these 
Citizen’s Juries produced some impactful examples of deliberation and transformation of 
opinions and wills. One example recalls a Jury convened to look at balancing the budget 
during the Clinton years and offer the results up to citizens and lawmakers. The jurors 
voted 17-7 to impose a $70 billion tax increase, against the initial preferences and ideas 
of many of the participants at the outset. Also, research on the project in 1990 found that 
the Citizen’s Jury findings and candidate recommendations had the potential to change 
somewhere between 5-10% of the vote when they were sent to prospective voters, 
indicating the potential impact of this process beyond its particular meetings.20 The 
model, while having largely died out in the U.S., has continued with some noteworthy 
results in Australia used on a large scale to influence public policy.21  
 What is interesting about this process is the attention paid to the actual meeting 
and speaking of jurors to one another in a space that is meant to be as inviting and 
comforting as possible. The key to good deliberations on this model, then, is less about 
getting as many arguments out there and as much information as possible to the 
deliberators (though it does aim at this), but is about person-to-person engagement 
regarding the topic at hand. Even in terms of the generating of information through expert 
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witnesses, Crosby and Nethercut note that “During the first ten years of experimentation, 
it became clear that the best way to present information to the randomly selected jurors is 
to have witnesses express their own views, rather than relying on written information or 
even on staff presentations summarizing different points of view. It is also important to 
give jurors time to question witnesses directly.”22 Opportunities, then, for dialogue are 
given space to unfold even in the process of becoming informed as each argument comes 
from the personal views of some real person sitting in person with the jury. These 
mechanisms to facilitate high-quality deliberation, then, look very much like facilitating 
dialogue in the service of this better deliberation. 
 Another example of contemporary deliberative institutional design with a clear 
dialogic element is the Study Circle. The contemporary design of the Study Circle 
emerged in 1989, but was based on an institutional innovation originating in the 19th 
century in the United States and popularized in Swedish government throughout the 20th 
century. The most recent version of the Study Circle was the product of philanthropist 
Paul Aicher and the Study Circles Resource Center (now known as Everyday-
Democracy). It has since been used for a variety of purposes (from race relations issues to 
the creation of educational policy) in a variety of communities.23 The design of these 
study circles are meant to specifically encourage “a marriage of deliberation and 
dialogue,” though this is largely understood as dialogue in the sense of a communication 
style as described by Levine, Fung and Gastil, where it is meant to encourage 
“constructive communication, the dispelling of stereotypes, honesty, and the intention to 
listen and understand the other.”24 Still, in the name of this “marriage,” Study Circles 
work as follows: the circles (if there are many organized around the same topic, it is 
 159 
 
 
called a “study circle program”) are designed to be a diverse group of eight to twelve 
people who meet for several two hour sessions. These people set their own ground rules 
for discussion, though they are led by an “impartial facilitator who helps manage the 
discussion.” The process “starts with personal stories” of each of the participants.25 This 
method is meant to produce a diverse, community specific (given that local communities 
can alter aspects of the design, as well as the control each circle has over the rules of 
discussion), opportunity for face-to-face deliberation amongst citizens organized to solve 
some local problem or other. 
 Like the design of the Citizen Jury, these Study Circles have created a space in 
which citizens can work on local problems, deliberatively, but always in settings that are 
small, face-to-face, and personalized to the particular citizens involved. This creates 
space for dialogic opportunity where participants can (at least hopefully) find themselves 
in moments of dialogic meeting with fellow participants and thus open to transformative 
moments throughout the group discussion. This is seen as critical to the overall quality of 
the process of deliberation and problem-solving in these Study Circles. And thus, they 
represent another case in which the possibilities for dialogue are central to the 
possibilities for good deliberation.      
 There are other examples of deliberative institutional innovations that contain 
designs that can better facilitate dialogue.26 But the upshot here is that even those 
institutional designs interested in something like deliberation have often relied on a core 
of dialogic opportunities of the kind described in the previous chapter. For the design of 
deliberative institutions, then, the lesson is that these spaces that are a “clearing” for 
dialogue are beneficial to deliberative processes as a whole. And if I have convincingly 
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argued for a Buberian conception of dialogue here, then the reasons why should be clear. 
Opportunities to engage meaningfully with one another can open citizens up to moments 
of dialogue where real transformative moments might be experienced. These moments, 
when and if they are experienced, open participants up to receive new points of view and 
incorporate them into their own thinking in ways that compelling arguments and 
information alone can simply not offer.  
But beyond these more or less clearly deliberative designs, there are spaces that 
do not quite fit the deliberative model at all. In fact, I think only a theory of politics 
anchored in dialogue can lend support to their designs. I turn to one such institutional 
design in the following section where something like Buberian dialogue, and not 
deliberation, or even dialogue as structured communication in the immediate service of 
deliberation, seems to be central. This has had some politically noteworthy consequences 
of the sort deliberativists cannot help but praise, despite there being little connection to a 
proper theory of deliberation. 
 
Beyond Deliberation; Or, Dialogue in Practice: The Restorative Listening Project 
 
  
The above examples show how institutions aimed at deliberation can benefit by 
making dialogue possible in their designs. But there is also a way of institutionalizing a 
space for dialogue that can have political benefits beyond what a deliberative theory can 
recommend. These institutions, rather than orient themselves towards solving particular 
problems through inclusive political debate or argument, rely on the normative power of 
dialogic meeting to open citizens up to transformative interactions in the presence of one 
another. And though they are often organized around some local tension or particular 
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problem, they are not designed for generating policy in any formal way. Instead, any 
political change stems from the changed attitudes and understandings of participants 
themselves, not necessarily through the power of better arguments (the attempt to debate 
or make counter arguments often palpably disrupts the process), but because of the 
opportunity to engage directly with their fellow citizens, hear their stories, tell their own, 
and (hopefully) get caught up in those moments of meeting made possible in dialogue. 
To better explain this sort of institutional design, I want to look in depth at an 
example that took place in Portland, Oregon. It was arranged as a means of addressing 
racial tensions that had sprung up in relation to a process of gentrification, experienced to 
a large degree in the city’s NE neighborhoods. This was the Restorative Listening 
Project. It was a clear example of an institution that was not deliberative in design, but 
based around opportunities for dialogue. The dialogue this institutional space facilitated 
through the efforts of the city government has made a significant impact in the lives of 
many citizens and on the relationship between local government and its citizens and 
neighborhood communities more broadly. 
Portland has a long and proud tradition of civic activism. Whereas other urban 
areas saw their civic activity decline steadily after the boom of the late 60’s and early 
70’s, Portland’s citizens stayed politically engaged. Portland was so unique during this 
period that it receives its own chapter in Robert Putnam’s Better Together. There he 
sought to uncover, “What magical elixir boosted Portlanders’ civic engagement and 
social capital so astonishingly in the twenty years after 1974 [the year that Portland’s 
neighborhood association system was created]?”27 One of the answers to this puzzle was 
the responsiveness of city institutions to the active citizenry. Portland city government 
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had made great strides in responding and adapting to its citizen demands throughout the 
period Putnam studied. But in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, much of this vigor had waned. 
The city became increasingly less concerned with community empowerment and more 
concerned with “livability concerns” and city services (housing inspections, combating 
noise violations, etc.).  And strong population growth, especially in minority 
communities, changed many community relationships to the old neighborhood system, 
creating many alternative sites of community building outside of the political ones 
historically pursued by active Portlanders. Gaps between “classic” activist citizens, the 
communities they claimed to speak for, and the institutions of city government threatened 
to end Portland’s enviable run as a poster city for grassroots governance.28 In response to 
this, the city recently refocused its efforts to expand and include citizen participation with 
renewed focus on involving those citizens that had historically not been heard from.   
This refocusing happened largely due to the leadership of Mayor Tom Potter who 
served from 2004-2008. Potter expanded the budget for Portland’s Office of 
Neighborhood Involvement (ONI), the institution that linked the city government to the 
neighborhood association system. He initiated a panel of 18 volunteers called 
“Community Connect” to study and recommend ways to reinvigorate community 
involvement and solicit new ideas for community-city interaction.  By 2006-7, the ONI 
was charged with implementing many of these suggestions, again with a renewed 
emphasis on a greater diversity of public input.29 
The focus on systematically including more input from traditionally 
disenfranchised populations was long overdue. Though Portland can be proud of its 
history of civic activism, its history in dealing with minorities is considerably more 
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checkered. In addition to the disconnect between under-represented groups and 
traditional civic activists, Portland suffers many of the unfortunately typical urban 
problems associated with race and class. And on many measures they are doing worse 
than other urban areas. A recent report by researchers at Portland State University and the 
Coalition of Communities of Color indicated that Multinomah County (the county 
containing the greater Portland metro area) is doing worse than other urban areas on 
several measures comparing whites and communities of color including: income disparity 
(communities of color on average earn about half of what whites earn), poverty levels, 
educational attainment, experiences of harassment, unemployment, and juvenile 
detention rates. Further, city and county services were failing to address these issues 
while racism was going largely unnamed and unchallenged in public.30 As one recent 
Portland Tribune article describes it, Portland’s racism is “subtle and under the radar,” 
which in effect means it often goes unchallenged even in the face of such immense 
disparities institutional failures.31  
And so partly in response to these increasingly evident community divisions, and 
partly with the increased resources available to the ONI to encourage greater community 
involvement, the “Effective Engagement Solutions Program” was created. This program 
was created within the ONI with the mission of hiring a staff person with, “strong 
facilitation, mediation, and intercultural communication skills” to “facilitate collaborative 
approaches to resolving chronic community conflicts,” and to conduct “high-stakes 
community meetings,” to encourage “community dialogues on challenging subjects.”32 
They hired Judith Mowry as program coordinator. She proceeded, along with two other 
community leaders (Celeste Carey and John Canda), to create the Restorative Listening 
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Project to deal with issues of race and gentrification in NE Portland – one major site of 
“chronic community conflict.” 
Gentrification in NE Portland has happened in waves. Due to redlining practices 
throughout the early and mid 20th century, the city’s relatively small African-American 
population was housed almost exclusively in the city’s NE neighborhoods, centered in 
the Albina district. As the city envisioned major development projects, the neighborhoods 
that were bulldozed were generally in this area. The proposed expansion of a hospital, the 
construction of a coliseum and an Interstate bridge, led to the destruction of 
neighborhoods and the communities that had developed in them without any invitation to 
the black community to participate in these decisions. More recently, a new phase of 
gentrification has seen young professionals, usually white, moving into the NE 
neighborhoods. They have spurred development in the form of the construction of condo 
buildings and the remodeling and refurbishing of old homes. They are driving up 
property values, and bringing new businesses that have replaced many of the African-
American owned businesses that had previously existed in the area. Much of this new 
influx of young professionals was the result of the city of Portland’s concentrated effort 
to bring in professionals in the “creative services” industry, which they had become a 
national leader in.33 Music production, movie and sound editing, software, and other 
high-tech and creative enterprises grew in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, with much of this 
growth (new buildings and new housing) happening in the city’s Pearl district. Soon, 
however, the housing prices in this district had grown so steep that these young 
professionals were forced out and into the much more affordable NE neighborhoods. 
With them (and their middle and upper-middle-class incomes) came the services and 
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businesses associated with this group: bike shops, wine bars, upscale grocery stores, 
vegan eateries, etc. Within a relatively short period of time, the entire feel of the NE 
neighborhoods had changed. Many families that had been in those neighborhoods for 
generations were confronted with an entirely foreign population, if they hadn’t been 
pushed out altogether. Further, “the traditional community”34 had witnessed city 
involvement in the NE neighborhood unlike anything they were used to in generations 
past. City sponsored events such as the “Last Thursday” street parties (a once a month 
event with vendors, live music, and food), increased police presence, and the windfall of 
investment dollars previously seen as inaccessible to populations that had been there for 
years. All of this led to growing tensions between these young whites, the city leadership, 
and the “traditional” black families.       
In order to deal with these tensions, The Restorative Listening Project began 
organizing and sponsoring community meetings arranged by local community leaders. It 
was consciously modeled on the concept of “restorative justice” with the intention of 
dealing with the “relational aggression” that had been bubbling under the surface for 
some time. Its mission statement reads: 
The Restorative Listening Project is based on the principle of Restorative Justice 
which says that only when those most impacted are heard, acknowledged and 
efforts have been made to repair the harm can the community be made whole 
again. Once the following questions are answered - What happened?, Who was 
harmed?, How were they harmed?, and How can the harm be repaired? - we can 
identify ways to move forward.35  
 
Rather than be focused on making policy to combat gentrification, or even creating new 
rules governing local neighborhood events and city-neighborhood relations, this meeting 
was meant to put citizens together in order to get them thinking and talking about race 
and gentrification. As such, it was in no clearly discernable way a deliberative 
 166 
 
 
institutional design. As such, it is a rare and unlikely institutional design to be made by a 
city government. As author and well-traveled public speaker Nathan McCall remarked in 
a presentation at an early meeting, “In all my travels … Portland is the only place having 
these kinds of discussions.”36   
 The meetings were to be held in various locations – a local college, churches and 
community centers. They were initially planned for a year. They generally featured local 
African American residents, usually with longstanding roots in the community, but also 
occasionally experts on some element of race relations and/or gentrification, as the 
principal speakers. They were asked to tell their stories before (what turned out to be) 
largely white audiences. The usual format then gave space for a large-group question-
and-answer session following the presentations. They finished with a break-up into small 
groups called “listening circles” for “processing.” At the beginning of the meetings an 
explanation of the purpose for the event was usually given, sounding more or less like 
this: 
  
People want community, yet they build fences and walls go up. This has created a 
grieving, hurt and angry Black community, who see an unfair and unjust 
distribution of resources, and see their own families being forced out of the 
neighborhood. The problem is compounded by a largely oblivious white 
population that comes in, and in their words, takes over. What results is a 
‘relational aggression’ and it is easier to talk about our relationships to things than 
to one another. So, we talk about how the groups have different experiences of 
bicycles, strollers, dogs, coffee, stores, and bigger things like access to home 
improvement loans, police surveillance, and losing the local gathering spot.37 
 
Some notable changes in behavior have occurred in those that participated in the 
meetings. Two particular areas of major conflict revolved around dogs and front porches. 
For many black residents the white residents’ propensity to have large dogs (often seen as 
guard dogs by black residents), their failure to keep them on leash or to clean up after 
 167 
 
 
them, and their treatment of the dogs relative to their neighbors was a major source of 
tension in the community. It had become a repeated concern in the sessions, prompting 
the organizers to devote three individual session to the issue. As one participant in the 
Restorative Listening Project meetings explained it, “We see you treating your dogs 
better than you treat us, our kids, our elders. You talk to your dogs like they’ve done 
something to deserve respectful treatment and then you pass me on the street and can’t 
look me in the eye or say hello.”38 The statement was met with challenge and resistance 
from a white woman when it was delivered. But the message had resonance, if not for 
that particular woman, then for others. Some white residents have taken special care to 
clean up after their dogs and, perhaps more importantly, to stop and say hello to their 
neighbors.39  
 Another particular area of concern that emerged from these meetings was the role 
of entertaining on the front porch as a symbolic act indicating one’s belonging to a 
community. The tendency for the young white people moving into the neighborhood was 
to host their gatherings and spend their free time in the fenced backyards. A longstanding 
community tradition, however, was to utilize the front porch for such gatherings as a sign 
of one’s desire to interact with and, in a sense, invite one’s neighbors to join in. The 
reclusive move to the backyard, coupled with incidents in which local black youth 
drinking and interacting on front porches and in front yards were met with fear, 
suspicion, and even calls to the authorities, symbolized either that these white people 
were too good for their neighbors, or scared of their neighbors, or both. The traditional 
community’s sense of loss for their own community made this symbolic unwillingness to 
be a part of the neighborhood especially insulting. These became central themes for the 
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presenters, both the sense of loss of the former community and the perceived insult that 
whites were committing by not interacting with their neighbors. As such, a “mantra” was 
offered by one of the organizers, based on the testimonials of several participants for both 
white and black residents: “Use your the front porch” because that’s where “everything 
comes together.”40 And just as with the dog issue, this seems to have had an effect on at 
least some participants in these meetings. According to testimonial by one white 
participant who attended the meetings and reflected on one of the guiding principles of 
the project – that the one who strikes the blow doesn’t know the force of the blow, only 
the one who has received the blow knows the force: “I [strike a blow] when I don’t say 
hello … when I don’t sit on my front porch. And I understand that … I understand the 
power of these small things [brought up] in this Listening Project. So, it’s been a 
wonderful experience and a humbling experience.”41  
Emily Drew, a sociologist who did participant observation research on these 
meetings, noted some inherent limitations for the overall success of this project: a lack of 
corresponding efforts at combating structural racism that continued to perpetuate the 
harms of gentrification, and a strong current of “white denial” among white participants 
and audience members. But these meetings also produced some notable successes in 
terms of making breakthroughs, at least for those willing to listen “without white ears.”42 
Drew writes: 
As African Americans produced knowledge about whiteness, and many white 
people struggled to listen to and accept this expertise, the majority of people who 
participated in the RLP dialogues consistently learned about gentrification and, 
perhaps more importantly, they began developing or deepening their awareness of 
racism. Although white people and people of color characterized this antiracist 
consciousness differently, my data provided evidence of people becoming more 
deeply aware of racism, having strong feelings during and after the dialogues, and 
experiencing some healing from the effects of racism.43 
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And, in particular, a new consciousness of the effects of gentrification and white 
behaviors on the “traditional” community emerged, sporadically, but directly as a result 
of the experiences had at the meetings: 
 
Several of the white participants that I interviewed reflected upon one of the 
RLP’s purpose questions: ‘Is this who we wish to be?’ and noted their 
embarrassment and guilt about behaving in ways that contributed to the harm of 
people of color. One shared that the project profoundly shaped her thinking about 
race because she realized that she would never even known how many ways her 
behaviors have been affected by race, but that the dialogues made her realize they 
all were. ‘I don’t think I can get rid of it all, all of my racism, that is. But for the 
time being, I just want to be less damaging.’44 
 
Other stories emerged from these meetings indicating similar transformative 
experiences, though often with a great deal of discomfort and awkwardness. A New York 
Times article on the Restorative Listening Project details a story from one of the meetings 
where a woman expressed gratitude to a presenter for explaining the difficulties 
surrounding home improvement loans for many blacks. She claimed to have come to 
understand “why all the houses weren’t fixed up.” She then announced her confusion 
over whether to call the folks in the room Black or African-American. One audience 
member responded “Donna.” But a few days later when asked about the meetings, this 
particular woman indicated, “I’ve chewed on that meeting like I’ve never chewed on a 
church sermon or anything my entire life,” and that she hoped to be able to continue open 
and honest discussions on race with local blacks.45    
 The transformative potentials in these meetings are not relegated only to whites 
who listened to stories of gentrification’s harms. Some local black residents also 
experienced transformative experiences related to the meetings. Drew noted several 
instances of black participants refining their own understandings about the operations of 
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racism and about the history of their neighborhood. Further, a healing catharsis of sorts 
was experienced by some who took the opportunity to describe their own suffering aloud 
to the audience, especially a white audience.46 An article in the Oregonian (the main 
newspaper in the Portland area) details the story of Charles Ford, a black, 78-year-old 
community leader in NE Portland when the Restorative Listening Project began. At that 
time he had an intense distrust, even hatred of white folks, which a great deal of past 
experience had justified. But interactions with two white folks in particular – an assistant 
police chief who sought to look after him, and Judith Mowry who sought his input and 
participation in the Restorative Listening Project – “broke the ice.” He eventually spoke 
at a meeting, receiving a standing ovation for his participation. The theme of his talk was 
about “getting over it” and interacting with your neighbors and within your community.47 
When asked if he’d be willing to participate again he said, “I'd be glad to join Judith 
anytime. We're headed down the same road.”48 
 These are politically important changes relative to neighborhood/community life 
in these NE neighborhoods. And real changes in understanding and behavior, especially 
by newer white residents, have at least sometimes been the result of these opportunities to 
see and hear their neighbors speak. Beyond this immediate impact, there could well be 
larger political benefits to these sorts of institutionalized meetings. As I argued above, 
dialogue that springs forth in these mini-public settings can resonate into new ways for 
citizens to relate to their neighbors and to their larger communities. This changed 
understanding and orientation can start to build political inertia that would not otherwise 
be present – just as deliberativists have been convincingly arguing, if based on the wrong 
understanding of the process at work.  
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Evaluating the Restorative Listening Project: A Deliberative Success Without 
Deliberation? 
 
 
 I have argued throughout this chapter that spaces for the emergence of dialogue 
between citizens – a place for “politics anchored in dialogue” to occur between them – is 
necessary for successful institutional designs aimed at better deliberation. Further, some 
dialogically-inspired institutional designs that cannot be properly labeled “deliberative” 
can also be crucial to realizing better democratic politics. The Restorative Listening 
Project, detailed above, was such an institution. The unique attempt to bring people 
together to discuss the harms of gentrification without any particular or immediate 
designs on making or changing policy allowed a space to open up between participants in 
which they could be impacted simply by being in the presence of one another, hearing 
stories, and becoming personally acquainted with others and their experiences of harm.  
Nothing in this institutional design created formal deliberation. In fact, the open 
challenging of the “facts” of presenters or audience members was discouraged – though 
such challenges did happen and were perceived by many as an interruption of the 
process. In a sense, this restriction worked to keep those seeking to retreat away from 
being impacted. By resorting to challenges and arguments – to “It” the presenter as 
another “angry black person” or “ignorant,” (or some other reduction) indicates a refusal 
to fully engage with the presenter in question. It was, though it was not understood in 
these specific terms, an effort to allow the possibility that an I-Thou relation might 
emerge between participants by keeping the clearing open to such moments of meeting. 
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This is also why the design to have speakers present their stories to an audience that, at 
first, was only supposed to listen was an effective design. Though it may seem anti-
dialogic to restrict the free give and take of responses (and in the sense of dialogue as a 
particular type or process of communication, it was), this had the effect of permitting 
sufficient engagement between the audience and the speakers to unfold without 
challenge, interruption, or contestation that might act as silencing – that could act as the 
defeat of dialogue by monologue. And, of course, opportunities were created for this 
more free exchange (in question and answer periods and the listening circles)  once the 
personal stories had (hopefully) been received.49 
 This, I am arguing, is an institutional design capable of reaping the rewards of 
dialogue for the sorts of ends that deliberative theory seeks. In this particular case 
participants in the Restorative Listening Project benefitted from new awareness of the 
harms created in gentrification, and could muster up a desire to work on their own 
behaviors from the impact of their experiences in the project. In fact, there was a theme 
reminiscent of Buberian dialogue articulated both in relation to the procedure of the 
meeting itself and the interactions between participants, but also as an element to be 
achieved among the members of the community at large. It was articulated most strongly 
by one of the co-organizers, John Canda, who often referred to the importance of being 
looked in the eye, being acknowledged and engaged by his neighbors. The active 
resistance to engagement was one of the major harms that his new neighbors perpetuated. 
And it was understood as a potential barrier to repairing harms and building community. 
As he put it: 
 It's back to the social and personal consciousness that I want to be the best person 
I can be, and I want to bring the best out of people I'm dealing with, and in order 
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to do that we HAVE TO acknowledge each other. You have to look at me. If you 
look away from me because you think you're better, because you think I don't 
matter, right away we're going to be very limited in how we communicate. I can 
go from a one-word answer to a paragraph. It just depends on if I feel you value 
me as I value you.50  
 
This, I think, is indicative of exactly why dialogue is a necessary component for a politics 
that is based in direct citizen engagement; because, without the proper engagement, the 
turning towards one another, answers to questions will never reach their fullest potential 
and any attempt at politically productive dialogue will be stunted from the outset. 
In terms of evaluating the Restorative Listening Project, Emily Drew saw their 
efforts as consciously constructing local African-Americans as “experts and knowledge 
producers,” making their stories and experiences the focus of the proceedings and 
problematizing white behaviors as harmful to local residents. She also labeled the 
meetings as a “strategy” of dialogue aimed at “community formation” and “anti-racist 
place-making.”51 I would disagree slightly with the terms of this characterization of the 
Restorative Listening Project (more on this in a moment). But on these terms, Drew’s 
conclusions about the success of the Project were ambivalent. Though there were clearly 
some successes in terms of individual transformations (of understanding, and in limited 
respects, of behaviors), Drew contends that the Project falls short in its ability to address 
structural causes of these racial harms. It may even reproduce established patterns of 
social exclusion, putting African-Americans in a position of performing a “racial 
spectacle” that confirms stereotypes and removes whites from any sense of wrong-doing: 
as long as the white audience members do not have to take responsibility for their 
own  behaviors and feelings, an opportunity for antiracist consciousness can 
quickly become racial spectacle. When the power dynamics in the dialogues 
mirror familiar social patterns in which oppressed people must explain to their 
oppressors the very conditions of their oppression, white people become limited 
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in their ability to clearly see themselves and thus become …  “collaborators” with 
the system of racism.52 
 
Further, as a strategy for dealing with racism and gentrification, the Restorative Listening 
Project falls short so long as these underlying causes remain untouched. In fact, Drew 
argues: 
If white residents are now picking up their dog’s waste, and not calling the police 
on their African American neighbors when they have a party on their front porch, 
this does not mean that the ongoing economic and racial oppression of 
gentrification has ceased. Because they have not addressed the actual problems 
that led to the relational aggression in the first place, this will likely be an ongoing 
battle in which white residents are just “waiting it out” and African American 
residents must continue to assert their right to place.53 
 
All these concerns about the limited impact of the Restorative Listening Project are 
legitimate concerns, to be sure. Despite them, Drew holds out hope that the project will 
move into an effort to address these underlying structural issues in order to make its 
impact more lasting in the quest for “anti-racist place making.”  
But, I would argue, that this analysis is in part limited by the terms on which 
Drew understands the project. First, understanding the African-Americans who shared 
their stories as “knowledge producers” is in part correct. They were indeed placed in a 
position to share their stories as the recipients of the racial harms caused by 
gentrification. As such, their perspective was privileged in the room. But to understand 
them as simply as “knowledge producers” is to undersell the unique element involved 
with putting particular people, with particular stories in front of a group. Thus they did 
not serve as sources of general information about the nature of gentrification and the 
potential links to racial injustice, but stood up as particular people recounting their own 
stories about injustices that they had experienced. The knowledge produced, then, was 
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not some set of propositions about the harms of gentrification or racial prejudice, able to 
be alternatively accomplished by a series of pamphlets published by these people and 
distributed to doorsteps. It was instead a series of opportunities to connect to real people 
with real experiences that might impact listeners through this encounter. The knowledge 
production, then, was in some ways a secondary aspect of the opportunity presented for 
the transformative impact of being in the presence of these others and hearing their 
stories. 
Second, understanding the Restorative Listening Project as one amongst many 
“strategies” for making “anti-racist” community makes the conclusion about its limited 
impact too easy to draw. After all, since no direct effort to combat structural injustices 
was built into the meeting, it would seem that this institution stopped short of the 
“ultimate goal” of solving the problem of racial injustice in these neighborhoods. But the 
effort to empower citizens themselves to form connections, build community, and 
address, cooperatively, the difficulties associated with gentrification was engaged in 
precisely because other efforts had failed and this was perceived to be a “chronic 
conflict” in the community. Indeed, it is a single limited strategy, but one that has 
enormous potential to work through a problem from the ground up that had previously 
been failed to be addressed at all. After all, it is difficult to see how to ‘make’ white folks 
in the community accountable to their behaviors and their complicity in a system of 
oppression if not through these sorts of conversations. Any ‘top down’ solutions to 
address structural matters causing gentrification, if it lacks sufficient ‘on the ground’ 
support from the white community, is likely doomed to cause anger and resentment (not 
to mention further distance from the “traditional” community members they live beside).  
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The wider payoffs of attacking structural issues and larger political matters will, 
hopefully, follow.54 But at a minimum some kind of “momentum” has been created 
towards this. It could even be partly understood as a growing discourse about the effects 
and harms of gentrification, as well as a growing discourse about communal norms and 
social rituals being constructed by the residents of NE Portland – not to mention the 
direct modification of harmful behaviors by some of the new residents of the 
neighborhoods. But this growing discourse has been connected to the meaningful 
experiences of participants, bodily present before others in Restorative Listening Project 
meetings. Its further transmission into the broader community will benefit from these 
experiences, no doubt. Op-eds in the local paper can help, but a politics of real, direct 
meeting of citizens who carry these experiences at the Restorative Listening Project with 
them will go much farther towards combating the problems in the NE neighborhoods. 
 Responding to a question about the Restorative Listening Project as being “just 
talk,” Judith Mowry said explains the potential for this kind of meeting to have bigger 
political spillovers: 
  
The reason the policies aren't what they need to be is that we don't have the 
political will in the majority white paradigm to make them so. What I believe is 
that if we actually get it, if we are actually willing to look at it then we will 
become passionate about creating that equality. There is nothing like sitting in a 
room with someone like Lisa Manning [an African American participant in the 
meetings] and hearing her experience. You walk out changed and you walk out 
feeling like it's no longer this abstraction of some black community. It is people 
valuing each other and starting to figure it out. And we can do that.55 
    
This was a theme that often actually emerged in the meetings themselves – how to apply 
what was experienced in the meetings to “outside” life, both in terms of changed 
behaviors (using the front porch, supporting businesses owned by “traditional” members 
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of the community, etc.) and to continue the conversation at home, in coffee shops, in 
church, and so on. Echoing this point was an exchange between audience members at one 
of the Restorative Listening Project meetings. A white audience member, sympathetic to 
some expressed frustrations about the lack of tangible progress by the community in 
dealing with racial tensions, asked what the presenters thought it would take to get these 
conversations “to the coffee house, to my church, to my friends. That is the question for 
me.” A member of the traditional black community in the audience expressed hope that it 
would not take anything tragic, such as another incident of police brutality directed at an 
African American youth. He addressed the questioner and said that to avoid this tragic 
scenario, “you have to do it,” referring to the work that needed to be done to spread the 
conversations into the larger community.56 There is no way to know whether this call was 
answered, but I think this certainly rings of a potential moment for meaningful (and 
politically useful) dialogue between these two audience members.  
Perhaps, then, there are limitations to the immediate political results a program 
like the Restorative Listening Project can offer in terms of solving immense problems 
like gentrification. But it remains very difficult not to classify it as a deliberative success. 
A conversation about race, white privilege, and a connection between both city policy 
and individual behaviors that contribute to the harms of gentrification have all been 
articulated – and has produced some observable changes in understandings and actual 
behaviors of citizens.  And, again, all this without anything that looks like formal 
deliberation. Dialogue, however, certainly seems to be at the center of what this 
institution has been able to accomplish, and may yet be able to accomplish.57   
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 The upshot of this section, then, has been to suggest that alternative institutional 
designs that do not “look” like deliberative designs can accomplish a great deal of 
success on deliberative terms. This is because (just like many typical, successful 
deliberative designs) they allow a space for dialogue to unfold between engaged citizens. 
The Restorative Listening Project was one such design. But other arrangements are 
certainly possible. What is clear is that facilitating dialogic experiences should be an 
explicit goal of those interested in promoting effective shared governance, deliberation, 
and citizen engagement.
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